Mechanism Design
Designing rules, auctions, and curves so self-interested participants produce the outcome you wanted.
220 talks
- Paying Nodes That Actually Execute: Proofs a Free-Rider Cannot Copy From a Peer
- Sybil Attacks on Inclusion List Mechanisms: FOCIL and AUCIL
- From P2P to P4P
- Why Auction Design Matters (ft. Nobel Economist Paul Milgrom)
- Why Markets Fail — and How to Fix Them (ft. Nobel Economist Alvin Roth)
- How Ethereum's Tokens Can Continue to Evolve
- On the Welfare of EIP-1559 with Patient Bidders with Moshe Babaioff | a16z crypto Research Series
- Vesting Unlocks: The Original Sin of Token Design
- Tokenomia: władza bez siły, mechanika bez nadzoru
- How To Fix Crypto's Token Problem | Weekly Roundup
- Funding Ethereum's Future: EIPs, Profit-Sharing & Security Incentives
- Quantifying Inefficiency with Yannai Gonczarowski | a16z crypto Research Series
- The Transaction Supply Chain for High Performance L1s with Pranav Garimidi
- The Politics of Negotiating as a Group with Peter Buisseret | a16z crypto Research Series
- Continuous Clearing Auction
- Institutions and Decentralization
- How to Design a Token System, Shermin Voshmgir, Token Kitchen | ETHSofia 2025
- How to Distribute Tokens
- Social Contracts for Web3 Coordination
- Lotteries vs. Auctions: Prover Market Design for Ethereum’s ZK endgame
- Scaling Ethereum by Optimizing ZK Prover Networks
- Validator Reputation & the Future of Restaking: A Crypto-Additive Security Model
- TE Unplugged – Designing Fairness & Efficiency: Incentive Mechanisms in Staking and ZK Proof Markets
- Fireside Chat with Friederike Ernst