Purpose built Governance: Season 8 Updates with Lavande

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and We are live. Yay. Welcome. Welcome everyone to a new live space from SIDGOV. I'm super excited because today we are going to talk about the updates of uh season 8 of optimism governance and also I'm super excited because we have a amazing guest for for this lives. Welcome Justine. We are so happy to have you once again here with us.

>> Yeah, thanks for having me. It's like a season tradition. >> Yeah, exactly. It feels like a tradition. I think this is like the fourth or or or fifth time we are doing this. But I really like the the tradition. We can't say a new season starts until we do this this live. So, so thank you again for for being here with us. So today we have h a lot to talk about and we are as I mentioned we are going to talk about season 8 but before we we start doing in the in season 8

it's well known that every season of governance has a a theme as always you mention the foundation it's always learning about previous seasons and then you took those learnings and apply them to to design the the new experiments and and the new seasons. So before we start to talking about season 8, can you talk about what what were the the key learnings um you guys took from from season 7?

>> Um sure. So a lot of what we learned in season 7 was about like um talking to what we call customers op chains to understand how they want to participate, what's important to them, how do they view governance. Yeah. Kind of what are their priorities. Um we also like took steps towards standardized measurement of of all the grant programs. So I think that was a good project. um good progress. We ran a few turkey experiment. We learned a lot from that and have kind of decided to pause immediate next steps on that

because there's like a lot to learn and there's other people that are experimenting with it and we're focused on other things for now. But was useful in um that initial set of learnings that other people are now going to build on. Um we learned a lot or we collected a lot of data about how um different groups make different budgeting decisions and actually learned that in general people want to defer to experts and that's a part of the um genesis of the budget board. A lot of what we learn is also um I mean a lot of it is based on direct delegate feedback andor behavior but a lot of it is also based on internal um research work streams that we do. So

some of the things we shipped in season 8 are were based on a work stream that we did on vetos and like how do vetos work all over the world in all different contexts and throughout history and what can we learn from that and having combos with external experts um and that can be that that's like a wide range of people but experts in their field they might work um in governments they might work in academia they might be other practitioners but we try to combine all of these things to make sure we have like a strong academic or theoretical um basis that forms our hypothesis and then we combine that with like the okay how did this actually work in practice and what are the governance participants

saying and doing in response >> awesome awesome now talking about season 8 there was a mirror post that I think it's super helpful to give all the audience the enough context for for the season. So Dely, please if you have the link by hand, you can send it in the chat so the people can have access to it. So season 8 lot of changes.

I like the so different concepts from from those for for from that post and one of the things it's like we are shifting from a general purpose to a purpose-built governance >> and I I I want to know like in practice what does that change really mean for for all the people that participy ate in the in the collective daily.

>> Yeah. Let me um first maybe answer like why and what and what we mean by purpose-built governance. So um you I think you can see in other ecosystems I'm trying not to call anyone specific out with the change in regulatory environment there's like a questioning that's going on in the industry of do we need governance and do we need to have Dows if before a lot of what they exist like a lot of the purpose that they existed for in the past was regulatory cover if people are being honest and you can see that in concrete examples of people saying now that regulation has changed let's get rid of the DAO

basically and so yeah I mean and I and I think we will continue to see that um or people pausing the DAO for example or just saying I don't know like this is kind of hard and messy and now maybe we don't need it so let's just like put it on pause over there or just get rid of it alto together um so we went through the exercise of saying okay But um why does governance exist if we don't need if it's not for regulatory reasons? Is there still a purpose? Is there still value? Why are we doing this?

And our strong hypothesis is like yes, it still matters and it's still important for things like reducing platform risk for people that depend on the OP stack and things like building a business that can be more sustainable than what you see in a corporate governance model. That's right. And there's like lots of problems with that I won't get into right now. um and and probably some other core value propositions that we're still developing. And we need to validate these also like if we think that platform risk is really important to customers but customers don't actually believe that then that's a different story and we have to reassess that. Um so that's why we're talking about

purpose-built governance. It's like going back to the drawing board and saying like this doesn't matter like in and of itself like we're not just like doing this for some kind of like decentralization um theater. In many cases we have to figure out what are the specific reasons that governance exists and that the stakeholders of the super chain would care about it and use it. And if it's not providing value in that way, we need to change it so that it is or we should ask why it's here. But I think lots of protocols are going through that process. And some have the hypothesis that it doesn't add value and it doesn't

matter and it shouldn't be there. And that is not our hypothesis. Our hypothesis is that it does matter and it in important ways and it should be there. And it's our job to get very specific about what those ways are and make sure that that those things resonate with the primary users of the of the super chain. >> Awesome. Awesome. >> So that's what that's where it came from. And then like what does it mean in practice was actually your question. What it means in practice is honestly that we have to go back and question a lot of assumptions. And what that means is temporarily we might have to move slower. So we we don't ship a

system like by default because that's how we did it in the past or quote because it's decentralized and it's it's like what does that mean specifically and why does that matter? So there's like rethinking of a lot of things which just will add some time. I actually think we'll be closer to the original four-year timeline that we set out than I have thought we would at any other point because I think we're getting to like a pretty clear hypothesis and a system that's more minimized.

Um it does mean that like day-to-day participate participation in governance will be less like on purpose because if we think about who's very impacted by the decisions that governance is making and therefore should be involved in those decisions are like very busy stakeholders like OP chains and the and the teams building applications on those OP chains and yeah user that have other jobs or full-time investors that have a portfolio of investments um they have to take care of. And so what this also means is like I think we need to redefine what it means to

participate in governance and even what governance what people think of when they think of governance. Right now, what people think of when they think of governance, it's like, I go get in a Discord server and get yelled at and go on the forum and read a hundred posts and be like very confused and spend like 30 hours and still not know what's going on and then like have like a nasty fight over some proposal, get blocked, and it's going to take me three months to ship something. This is what people think of when they think of governance. And instead, I'm hoping we can get to the point where people maybe don't even realize it's governance, but it's like something more like you get an email every time a

decisions being made and you can push a button and say, "I hate that and I veto that." Maybe you get asked once a quarter or once a season, what are your top three priorities for the super chain? like what what are the things that matter most to you and what do you think our north star should be or something. Um and then probably for very high stakes things some kind of platform that's better than a Discord server or a forum as we currently know it to have like an actually productive conversation and come to consensus about things. Um, so that would be very minimal engagement on like an ongoing basis and but then greater but also more

productive engagement but only on the things where that's really important. >> Awesome. Awesome. You mentioned some really interesting facts and and I want to like split the different things. So what one of the things you mentioned was the design of a like minim minimalization minimalized governance system. So we're really seeing like for example some structures like the collective feedback commission and the ACC that were sun setting down going to to this season and yeah we really are seeing that some struct structures are

disappearing from the from the governance itself but I think it's we go because we are evolving to this new system. But do you think regarding this like daily participation of the of delegates for example it's going to have some impact in the future like the perspective will be like I don't know the people doesn't care anymore about the DAO we are not having enough conversations we are just having this kind of new voting types what what's the foundation perspective from from that situation?

>> Yeah. Um so okay there's two models you can think of. You can think of like the 2020 DAO which is like everybody should be involved in um making all decisions basically like that's that's what I think of as like the classic DAO paradigm let's call it and you have like the corporate governance model which is like the opposite basically and it's like once a year you're going to get to vote on very material like decisions which which is basically like who's on the board of directors and anything that would affect your ownership as a shareholder.

Um I I am currently or have done a ton of research on the corporate governance model and said well what if we used that as a base case like is that what DAO should look like and the answer is no and I've spent like bunch of weeks outlining all the failure modes of that model but we also know that the 2020 DAO which has these classic characteristics of like very high participation on the forum and a lot of like grassroots initiatives everybody decides everything etc is also a model. And so it's like we're trying to figure out like where is the right point in between these two models that allows the DAO to achieve the things basic specifically to create the value

propositions that are important to the users of the super chain and that's basically like what we're in the process of of trying to figure out. >> Awesome. >> Yeah. Again to like answer your question, I'm going on tangents a little bit. question about participation. So um definitely it's something that we monitor especially in in relation to something like cororum although like uh and and you see a bunch of other dows struggling with that and there's different things that they're doing to try to protect against not reaching quorum and you can do a dynamic quorum and anyways there's like a design space in there if that becomes an issue I but I also think part like participation is

just going to shift in what it looks like I think um you see people setting up like Duna structures which allow a lot of token holders to vote that couldn't vote in the past because some concerns that the Duna alleviates for them. So I also think if we redefine what it means to participate in governance, you can have different types of participants come in. So for large OP chains have not participated in governance to date and that's partially because they don't want to get involved in something that's going to require 30 hours a week or being political and like yeah a lot of the pro like a lot of what it means quote to participate in Dows

right now. And so it's like if we can actually make it so that you only have to spend 10 minutes a week doing governance. I also think like those people will then show up and start to participate. But it's like it's an unknown. It's kind of an un we don't know what it's actually going to look like in practice. So we have to monitor it basically. >> Yeah. As always, we need to experiment and learn from these things and get to know if they work or not as we as we plan them, right? >> Yeah. It's like make guesses and then monitor.

That's what we do. >> Yeah. And for for this new season and we introduced uh two new tools that are the optimistic approvals and dynamic videos. >> I I know the the optimistic approvals were a thing before cuz I read them in the in the operative manual and I think we only use it once before this season. But can you explain us a little bit how these new mechanisms work actually and in what ways they help us to to in in the decision- making process?

>> Sure. Optimistic approvals I think the first st that used them was lido uh in their easy track motions. We had used them before for um code of conduct council decisions where the code of conduct council would say this was um how we decided what enforcement should be for a certain case and then they did that on behalf of token holders. So token holders could veto and it it's an accountability mechanism. Really optimistic approvals are like a a way to defer a decision to a group of experts but then still have the final authority in the in the token holders or the the governance

participants hands. And this is um something that ca comes up a lot in feedback that we would get especially about protocol upgrades where delegates would kind of say I I don't have the technical knowledge to actually assess this proposal so I'm deferring to the dab or I'm deferring to someone else um that I know or have hired as an adviser to kind of tell me how to vote on this proposal. Uh same thing it was feedback we also got on budgeting decisions where people were like I don't know like I would actually just rather have the foundation or whoever make this decision for me. Um but then what's important when you're delegating a decision like that to somebody else is that you can override that decision for example if the if that group of experts becomes

corrupt or is just doing like wild things for some reason. So the idea with optimistic approval is that a proposal is assumed to pass unless unless somebody uh unless it gets vetoed basically and it um does two main things. It shortens the voting process which is really important for protocol upgrades because engineering wants to ship stuff and needs to ship stuff to be competitive with other ecosystems that are shipping stuff. Um and it also removes the um like cognitive overhead of participating in governance. So a lot of our stakeholders were like we generally

think good decisions are being made but we don't want to like place 100% trust in that. We still want to be able to come in and override if we need to. And so optimistic approvals allows you to do that. allows you to say most of the time I think they've got it under control and I'm just going to like monitor that. But in the instance where I think we've really gone off the rails, I want to be able to come in and and stop it. Um, and that's what we saw a lot with the chains where they're mostly like we're kind of fine with what um, the foundation and op labs and the core dev and governance is doing. Um, but but they do want like an emergency break in case for some reason they really disagree or you know they

think that something changes and we start making decisions that are very offc course. Um, so that's where it comes from. The dynamic vetos um come more from research that and and thinking that we did around like accountability. A veto is a is a mechanism usually to hold um people in power accountable and so we thought well who should optimism governance be accountable to and like also how does this work in corporate governance? House works in corporate governance.

And one of the problems with corporate governance is that you're only accountable to the largest financial interests uh which are like the largest shareholders and that creates all kinds of problems. I think probably obviously like the companies are definitely not accountable to their users. They are in in the way that users can leave if they hate what the company's doing. That's not true at a certain level of market share, right? like if I don't want to use Google, my life's gonna be very difficult. I could do it, but like yeah, it's not a credible option really. Um, and so that's the idea behind four groups having veto power and that's the users, the

applications, the chains, and then the token holders who are the financial interests. And then the dynamic nature of that was based on a conversation we had with somebody who's work who works in the government and I can't like tell talk about who that is who suggested um creating a mechanism that encouraged those different groups to come to consensus as opposed to um be in gridlock basically. And so the way that the veto is dynamic is that if more groups agree with each other the threshold comes down like if more groups are like this is a bad idea fewer vetos are required to um to block the proposal but if it's only one group that actually

one group by themselves cannot veto you need at least two groups then the threshold is higher because there are groups that are saying no actually I like this and that's like an attempt to balance the competing interest like chains and users might very often have like different interests on proposals. And so, uh, this is also like the thresholds and how exactly that works is the first iteration and something that we modeled out a lot and did a lot of simulations, but now we'll collect data on how it how it goes in practice and we'll likely update the exact way that it works.

>> Awesome. And do you have like some examples for example when a dynamic video situation could happen? For example the Opilabs team proposed an upgrade proposal and a chain they are in favor of updates but I don't know the citizens house found some kind of situation and they are against the proposal in that kind of situation for example. >> Yeah. Like for a basic general example could be like some proposal that increases fees a lot and the chains like that because that's the revenue and the users are like no I hate that because I pay

those fees and then the token house is like yeah but I want those fees as a dividend or I mean we can't pay dividends but like yeah but I want more fees also because that goes into the treasury and then I'm going to have some control over that treasury or something and so So it's like a scenario um like that's a very basic kind of example. >> Yeah. Got it. But it's all super interesting mechanism. So yeah, we will keep an eye on it. and and and and another another question that I have is just to be clear, I assume it's possible, but yeah, to to to make the obvious questions, we as a member of the collective are still able to go to the

forum and write a proposal and it it got the approval from delegate. It's still going to to voting as a normal vote situation, right? There is like Yeah. >> Yeah. If it it's um if it's a valid proposal type, it it will follow like the process outlined in the operating manual. Some things like the protocol upgrades no longer require the delegate approvals because they have a week-long period where the developer advisory board approves or rejects that proposal.

But otherwise like the other proposal types work the same way. >> Yeah. >> Perfect. Perfect. Perfect. And another interesting uh change that come with season 8, it's regarding the citizenships in the in the citizen's house. And right now we have a a public definition of of citizenship has that has now been expanded and subdivided into three categories that are users, apps and and change. And the question I have is like what changed exactly with with this segmentation and how does it affects governance in practice?

>> Yeah. Um so first of all the the mechanism we had previously to determine who was a citizen was like the most MVP of the most MVP have which was like there was some original group of like 12 people and then it was expanded via web of trust which meant like if I was a citizen then I could invite like two other people to be a citizen and this is this is flawed for many many reasons and so we just like went back to the drawing board and we're like okay what are the set of decisions the citizens house is responsible for and it's really about um retrofunding and the uh sequencer ETH which is contributed by

OP chains that have a rev share and so and then the question was who's impacted by those decisions and it is the chains that are generating that revenue and it is like the applications and the users that also contribute to that revenue um so that was part of the like thought process was okay what is the decision citizens houses um responsible for and then who's impacted by those. In the previous citizenship set we just had a lot of um like web three leaders that are smart and have a good reputation but were not necessarily directly impacted at all by um the decisions that they were responsible

for. And I think it's like a basic principle that if you're responsible for a decision, it should have an impact on you. Otherwise, you have all kinds of incentives to make bad decisions. Um, the second thing is it's actually pretty well supported by how the initial shareholder model evolved and how cooperatives work. And in the initial shareholder model like back like East India company times the investors were very frequently also customers and uh there wasn't like public markets public equity markets at the time and so the reason that you would invest in one of these companies was because you wanted um access to the services that

the company was providing and also there was an incentive essentially to reduce platformer risk, but to make sure that someone else who was like part of that uh collective didn't um implement monopoly pricing that was a concern at the time, but also like implement policies that would advantage one of the members over another. Um and that's like there's a pretty similar dynamic in the super chain and also um in the there's like cooperative um model is similar in that like the part owners or the members of a cooperative have one member, one vote and they contribute fees etc. And so it's like

roughly based on those things. It's like Emily would give the exact answer to this because Emily is the person that defined citizenship, but I also like um that's my summary of where that came from. >> Thank you. Thank you. I I wanted to to say to the audience that after the initial set of questions that that I have for Justine, we are picking up some some of them from the from the chat. So please keep asking your your questions in the chat and in a few minutes we are going to to pick up them. So we are still in this in this like

citizen citizenship uh topic and I I want to ask right now we are adding to the citizens group to the for example for the apps and and chains and maybe exactly the chains that already participate like in the token house. What was like the feedback from them? Like they wanted to join to this group of of citizens and but but the most like important part of the question is they were like okay having like the same voting power of one as any other member of the of the citizens house.

Um, yes, but uh they also are token holders, right? And so, and so if there was ever an issue with that, it was like, well, that's fine. If you want to have like u more influence or or more say, then you can be a token holder and you can participate in the token house. Um, I think like the challenge is just like in explaining to these groups, some of them want to wait and see. They were like, "Okay, that's interesting. we're interested, but we want to like watch how others participate for a season and get smart on this and then we'll participate. Um, there's also just like the challenge of reaching out to like Sony and being like, you can be a citizen and they're like, what is a

citizen's house? Why do I care? Why am I having someone spend time on this? Which are all valid questions. So, there is also just some like onboarding um that goes into it. So the I think we expected like the initial set or the first season of participation to be lower and we set minimums for that and then hope like the idea is that that will increase over time andor we'll adjust the numbers. >> Perfect. Perfect. Now I want to jump in another topic that I think for the audience is super like crucial that it's retrofunding and we saw that in in season 8 retrofunding

well saw a notable budget reduction uh that is around 75%. Um it was uh explained in the in that forum post that it was both for internal and external factors and external factors like the broader crypto market situation at that moment. But the question is is retrofunding still an initiative that is considered a a priority for optimism? >> Yeah. Um it's a good question. I mean, I think the main reason is just like retrofunding is really hard to measure like the impact of it. And it's one of

the things you can see we're really trying to get better at is being able to to compare. If I spend one OP via the grants council or one OP via Superstax or one OP via Futuri or or one OP via a chain grant to I don't know who. um what is the amount of TVL or whatever that I generate for that OP so that we can funnel the OP to the place where it's going to create the highest return or impact for us. It's just it's really hard to measure the impact of something like retrofunding and it's very experimental also and so the idea was like okay while this is still really

hard to measure and like a pretty new relatively untested mechanism maybe let's scale the budget back um yeah and then also some mac macro factors I think in general we went through the process of like relooking at protocol upgrades talking engineering ing to the OP chains, how does you know like one of the big feedback was like it needs to be faster, it needs to be shorter, you're slowing me down, etc. And then in season 8 introduced what I would call like protocol upgrades 2.0. We're in the process of doing that with um the treasury with capital allocation basically what how should this work?

What should this look like? And um I think it's a little bit confusing because we and I this is I've always thought this was confusing but we talk about we use the word retrofunding to mean like many things and what it is just a mechanism actually it's just like do we give the tokens up front or do we give them after but we associate what I think we really associate retrofunding with is like a commitment to public goods or to funding open source software. And so, um, I think we're in the process of when we look at capital allocation 2.0 of like being explicit about what are the goals

and the commitments that we're going to make to funding certain things. And so, I think the question is not really like specific to retrofunding. I think the question is like what is the commitment to funding public goods and open source software and why does it why is it important for the super chain and so we we got to answer that question or we're in the process of trying to answer that and so in the meantime the budget is smaller. >> Yeah. Perfect. Perfect. And another huge change that was introduced in in season 8 is the introduction of the budget board.

>> So this new structure proposed the resource allocations for season 8 and season 9. So my question is in practice what does the implementation of the budget board for the found oh what this implementation of this new structure means for for the foundation and how do you think this like new structure change the dynamic with delegates for example? >> Yeah.

um how the budget board changes things for the foundation is that I mean we gave them all the historical context about how these budgets were um proposed or what frameworks and data were used but they were very autonomous in terms of what they did this season. I think we made good progress like there was better conversations around this these um proposals happening and there's some establishment of frameworks whereas before there was no framework. So um some of the proposals there was lots of discussion around and maybe they were imperfect but at least we were looking at an overall budget and understanding

what that meant in terms of runway and other things which was not conversations at least I saw happening before. Um on the delegate side I mean the delegates also didn't used to propose these things with budgets specifically um it's like makes sense to delegate that decision to a specific group of people otherwise like imagine I put up a proposal oh retrofunding for 8 million and then you put up a proposal retrofunding for 7 million and then someone else for 11 million and then there's like other budget proposals by other authors for governance fund and it's like it gets very uh siloed and

very hard to compare these things. So the idea was like let's delegate this to a group of um people with proposal rights but then give the the DAO um the ability to veto if they they hate it. It's also based on feedback when we collected data on budgeting. I think we also collected this internally at foundation and labs. I think um we shared the budgets that the councils had like last season and said do you think it's like just like too high like about right or too low and all of the feedback from like delegates and people internally was like we don't know like assign this question to someone else.

>> Yeah. In in in my opinion, the introduction of this budget board was super productive for for give us the well give us the leads from for the councils to really discuss and understand more about this economic like situation and budgeting. So I think it was super cool and also this is like the first iteration of the budget board. We of course know it isn't going to be perfect like in the first season and and we are also going to like talk about the season 9 budget or something if we saw something from this season

doesn't work. So uh the possibility of keep talking about and discussing about these topics are really cool and and I like that the foundation gave that responsibility to an an entity of different experts. So I think I see that like a a huge improvement. So yeah, it's going to be exciting to to know or or or to be how to know how the this budget board will work in the in the future. >> Yeah, same I mean same. We're not sure exactly how it will evolve, but I think was a an incremental step forward.

>> Yeah. And another change that we saw is like this is the first time that we are going to have 12 months mandates. So I think it's pretty obvious why we are doing this. But can you explain like what was the goal behind this decision and what advantage does it bring compares to to previous season? Yeah, it's really to slow lower the overhead of running elections and onboarding new people every six months.

So, both for the people that have to be elected and onboarded, but also for delegates like being asked to assess I don't know 40 candidates every six months is a lot for delegates. And the feedback also from C council members was that doing the elections every 6 months also wasn't like a super strong accountability mechanism. So it wasn't like better accountability wise to do them every six months than 12 months. So um it also gives the council members just like more certainty over what the next year of their lives looks like and keeps more continuity. So it's like a team it with six ones it's like

the team gets onboarded and then they like start working well with each other and then it's like time to break up and like form a new group and there's coordination costs when you're with a group of people you've never interacted with before. So now at least okay they go through that process and then and then there's like still like nine months where they can actually work together. >> Yeah, that that's true. When you really find your pace it's like yeah byebye I see you. >> Yeah. >> Perfect. Perfect. Yeah, I I think that change it's it's awesome too. And okay, that was like the the set of questions uh that I have and right now in the comments we have two really interesting questions. So let's go with the first one from Juandra.

It says if an OP holder is not participating in decision making, what's the incentive to hold the OP governance token? Will it be just to show agreement disagreement? >> Yeah. Um uh yeah, we have to create you I think my opinion we have to create utility for the OP token outside of governance. And so one of the things that you'll see other protocols experimenting with and that we've talked about is like a buy and burn mechanism or some way to allow token holders to I don't know. I'm trying to be super careful about what I say, but I think that there the the OP token needs to

acrue value through mechanisms unrelated to governance. I say that. Perfect. Perfect. And the next question is from Austin. Do you contemplate any type of AI integration or implementation for governance? I also think there was like a foundation mission request regarding AI. So yeah. >> Yeah. Um yeah, for yes is the answer to the question. On what time frame? I'm not sure. So we did um have a mission request and I think we had four or five teams. I wasn't the point person on this um that were that built AI agents that were trained specifically for optimism

governance. And now we are in the process or I think we have done the evaluation tests on those and we'll post like the results shortly. I think the TLDDR is like we want to continue working with some of those teams but that the optimism specific purpose-built trained quote AI delegate did not perform meaningfully different than like GPT5. And so it's also like what we mean by do I contemplate AI integration implementation for governance. I think some things will explicitly be automated or yeah some functions are maybe done by an agent in

the future. But I also would hope and would think that most delegates right now are using uh AI to help them decide how to vote on proposals and do other things. >> Perfect. Perfect. And one last question that for from me, what is h like the topic or what excites you the most about I don't know maybe this season or for next seasons or or what really excites you about optimism governance in general like in the future? Yeah, I think I think we're getting like pretty close to under to actually understanding

the um like the value prop that it enables and how to design it so that it meets the needs of the users of the system. What I mean by that is like so that protocol upgrades go through a process that that like base likes and it's like okay this doesn't slow me down and I also understand the extra value I get from this going through a governance process and um I think that we're we've been doing a lot of thinking around that and capital allocation also and so being very clear on why optimism governance exists why it's better than just building a regular

company or not having a DAO at all. Um, and then being able to as a result of like that clarity ship a pretty streamlined system, which again just makes me think that we might be closer to our target of having like the MVP system running um, much sooner than at certain points of time. I mean, I don't know. If you asked me a year, a year and a half ago, I I might have said like, it's going to take 10 years to get there.

And now I'm like, we could maybe do it on time or close. So, that feels good. >> Awesome. Awesome. Well, thank you again, Justine, for your time. It's been a pleasure as always to to have you here with us. And yeah, any last words? No, I think I said everything. >> Awesome. Awesome. Well, um to everyone in the audience, thank you for tuning in. Uh remember that this uh live was recorded. So you are going you are able to see it in our YouTube channel and also in our Twitter account. H remember

to follow SIGO for keep uh learning about governance and for this kind of uh lives events that we do uh always. So yeah, thank you Justine, thank you everyone and see you on the next one. Bye-bye. >> Thank you. [Music] [Music]

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