Ethereum Sequencing and Preconfirmations Call #7

Transcript

okay uh welcome everyone to uh sequencing and pre-confirmation call uh number seven um today we have a couple of presentations uh one by me on uh bootstrapping base pre- confirmations how do we go from from zero to one and then uh we also have a a talk from uh Sasha which is going to who's going to share uh the the Lio perspective on pre-confirmation and and restake more more generally so without Much Ado let me try and share my screen and get started okay uh bootstrapping based

pre-confirmation uh this is a fairly uh short talk uh but hopefully has a couple ideas that uh might be might be new to you so um the the talk is in two parts uh first of all I want to highlight two uh small tweaks to the the design that I've been talking about so far and those two tweaks kind of help with the bootstrapping process uh in my opinion and then two I want to talk about the coordination game that's involved it's kind of this multi-party complicated game and like how can we try and simplify it uh to to get to mayet as as quickly as possible okay design ideas so idea

number one it tries to solve the problem of the empty look ahead so in the um e research post on base pre confirmations there's basically this this requirement that in order to have uh pre-confirmation at every slot you need at least you know something like 15 to 20% of validators opted in so that you have a a non-empty look ahead at least one sequencer in in the look ahead and 20% of of all each Stak is about20 billion so it's you know we're asking a lot in terms of uh operators opted in opting in and there's this really cool idea from lime chain which I call

sequencer fallbacks which basically totally removes this requirement um uh can basically launch with one single validator that that opts in as opposed to 20% of validators so the idea is is super simple it's uh basically pick a sequencer at random whenever the look ahead is is empty so you basically look at the registry of um sequences that have put down collateral for example 1,000 if they are candidate sequences but it's it's it's so happened that right now uh there there's none of them in the look ahead well just choose one uh at

random now um one of the questions you may have is um you know isn't this a little complicated because now you know the atau n n plus 31 this this random uh this random sequencer uh doesn't have uh proposing rights and so all the pre-confirmation that they've made made they can't actually guarantee settlement um but there's kind of a few remarks here like remark number one is that ethereum layer one is already like relatively uh sensorship resistant if you want to get a transaction on chain you can get it you know within usually

within one slot like in the next slot but like with extremely high probability you can get it within let's say four slots and so for the first 28 slots uh kind of 32 minus 4 it's actually very very safe for this random sequencer to be giving pre-confirmation and what they can do is they can stop um at slot 28 giving pre-confirmation uh because those are kind of more risky pre-confirmation and so in some sense we've reduced a problem from having 32 slots without prec confirmations to just having four slots without prec confirmations so that's that's already quite nice but it turns out we can do like a little bit better especially during the the bootstrapping phase so what we can do is

look at the next uh sequencer who will show up eventually in in the look ahead and there's several cases like case number one is that these two uh sequences in green are actually the same entity um and that might actually happen with relatively high probability at the beginning if there's like only one or two gateways um another possibility is that these guys are actually friendly to each other like they they they know each other they try each other so it could be I know the Titan relay and ultrasound Relay For example like we we Loosely collaborate like this kind of this this weak trust uh involved and so what you can do is uh

basically ask this sequencer to take into account all the pre-confirmation that were made here even though they might not be settled on chain yet um and so yeah especially during the early days where I expect just a handful of gateways all of which will know each other all of which will probably you know be participating in these calls um I think we we can actually have pre- confirmations at every single slot even with uh with a tiny fraction of the valid data is actually actually op opting in um any any questions on this uh first idea of of sequencer

fallbacks sorry don't understand what happens if if the sequencer from n plus 33 gives PR confirmations from n to n plus 32 and it overloads where it could not respect them and now it falls back to it comes to their own slot do they have to fulfill all of them uh what if they given more than the block space they have access to okay so there's there's several things here like first of all is that the the sequence SL n plus 30 three they only have precedence over these three slots n plus 32 all the way up to n plus 33 they don't have the ability to do pre confirmations uh here another thing is

that in general um as a as a sequencer you don't want to give too out too many prec confirmations um because otherwise you might grow a backlog as you said that that you can't can't fulfill and so really what you want to be doing is as you give prec confirmations you kind of want to include them on chain you know relatively quickly and here for for this random sequencer there's an opportunities to kind of clear the queue uh as he goes along um but you know for this lot n n plus 31 this is you know especially problematic to give pre confirmations because the if basically they if they give a pre-confirmation they basically need to make sure that it it arrives in this slot it settles here

in this slot but if they're friendly with the plus 31 well this this friendly sequencer will just say okay even though you didn't get your pre-confirmation included here I'll try to just include it in this one or this one um I'll kind of take it under my umbrella if that makes sense and that's why there's a this window between 31 and 33 for because the block the slop might not AR arrive by 33 what's the relationship between n plus 33 n plus 32 and N plus 31 um so n plus 31 plus and N plus 33 these These are are controlled by the same um

sequencer and and and and these here are all controlled by the same sequencer so that's that's already one one one key difference um and like the the the awkward part is basically this transition phase when we go from one one sequencer to another one and basically what I'm arguing is that um this transition pH actually just a few slots is something like four slots if you if you can get a transaction on chain within four slots with very high probability then that's that's a relatively small transition phase but you can basically get this transition phase down to zero if these two guys know each other which more likely than not is going to be the case in the in the first few weeks and months in in the current setting it's assumed that the

sequencer is sequencing for the world Epoch right um not necessarily um so I mean in this specific slide then yes uh the random sequencer is for the whole Epoch but in general if there's lots of green green sequencers here within the slot then they will have only fractions of slot or fractions of AO does that answer the question so if there's like three sequencers in this Epoch um then they will each have you know one of three parts of the AO Justin assign to yes just as a as a quick remark uh another another option there

is for each of the gray slots to have one of these Randomness there just to mention it as a as an option but one of the difficulties with doing that other option is that you're increasing the number of transition points so here there's only one awkward transition Point whereas if you have like lots of random ones you might have 32 a transition points and like the or transition points can either be smoothed out with this assumption that you can get transactions on chain within four slots that's fine or with this kind of this friendliness assumption that these entities actually know each other and they're talking to each other I mean this this notion of uh

forwarding um pre- confirmations from one entity to another could also be helpful uh whenever you know this this sequencer just can't handle the load so there's there's more than 30 million gas of pre-confirmation PR confirmation request in this slot and basically the sequencer here needs to tell users okay please start talking to the sa sequencer so in that case we're kind of creating a precon pool like just like we have transaction pools yes you could say that like sequences in the look ahead are kind of like a pool um it's like a scarce resource and once it's fully consumed uh

then you can try and go to the next one to get a pre-confirmation sorry a thisp here slot and 51 is twice on the slide is that an error or is that intentional oh yeah that's an error that should be 32 33 34 apologies for that ah okay so wait so the the proposer of the sequencer at not n plus 33 is actually n plus 34 so that's in the next eok yes so they're not part of look ahead like right now but they will be in

look ahead eventually yeah okay yeah sorry that's a typo here I got my numbers wrong now the the other idea is to try to solve the problem that at the very beginning there will be like zero incentives to uh to provide pre- confirmations it will be kind of a loss leading type of activity um and asking pre- confers to put down you know stake that can be slash in my opinion is a really big ask uh especially with nent code uh which could be buggy and so the suggestion I have instead is what if we

relax relax the slashing to just freezing so we still require um sequences and and gateways to um to put for a thousand e u because that's eventually what we're going to need but instead of slashing it we just freeze it whenever there is a a bad event so there's two types of bad events right there's the safety faults and lifely faults if either of these happen then you freeze the Stak for for one week for example or one day or some some amount of time and during that amount of time that entity can't uh provide uh pre-confirmation anymore so it's almost like a timeout um and sure like this entity will be suffering the opportunity cost of money

you know which 4,000 e is actually you know not not totally negligible um and so what I and I expect this cost of money to potentially be uh greater than and the the me opportunity and and and and and whatnot from from sequencing in the early days and so what I expect will happen if we do ask uh sequencers to put in with a thousand e um is um that we won't see any tourists like we will only see people who really care about bootstrapping this network um it will so go ahead or was it just

uh maybe just someone who is not muted okay any any questions on on on on this slide here uh can't we do just like um when we bootstrap eum 2 like for a year we have reduced uh penalties yeah that's a great idea uh I mean we could have a curve you know which literally starts at zero zero slashing and then over time kind of ramps up to 100% slashing um and it could be a tapered thing yeah for sure is there an argument to have more

issuance towards the people that are like running these relays and as a result um the time value money is even higher because that you're missing out on potential Rewards um so issuance uh from the L1 uh to compensate yeah um yeah this changing insurance is like a a huge kind of Wars um it is something that's not done likly I I don't think that's that's feasible I think user should just pay for it yes but like at the very beginning there will be l Lally like zero

pre-confirmation requests until Integrations are made and and uh yeah so so really the the people who will be coming in at the beginning for example ultrasound like we're interested in helping out with pre- confirmations um like we're happy to to have a a lost leading business in some sense that's what we've been doing for years now um but yeah just the only challenge maybe with this is in the initial stages like let's say you only have two of these and they both get frozen so you're kind of people that's the only but like I forget who said you could do like the curve so you like get this you know

initially there's you know maybe it's only freezing for an hour and then over time you start to increase that or something like that but that could be a problem like if you freeze two of the five out you know what are you going to do right that's a good point yeah um I mean one thing we could do is if there's one uh sequencer left then it it's it's unfreezable um because it's the the last remaining one um but yeah if did you say two of the five I mean yeah once he it's not a big deal I think it's just like initially have to think about like how we P it in I think yeah so and people get you know their hand hand around this and

things right I mean I think users might also be uh you know willing to suffer like the the degradation for at the beginning um because in some sense this is an additional feature that that's not wouldn't be present otherwise so it's some sense a strict Improvement well uh users uh would be using a b rollup that would be competing with rollups that already have uh pre confirmation so they actually um kind of already used to having prec confirmation that's true uh but Tao at first will launch without prec confirmations and so in some sense for Tao users it is a strict upgrade uh but yeah point taken Andrew I

think this is a good point uh we should think about how long to to freeze if we do go go down this direction okay so those were the the two tweaks uh to the to the design that might help with uh bootstrapping and then part two is just thoughts on on on the coordination game um and I think to a very large extent the effort to get from zero to one is like 80% coordination um and is something that uh I I do want to help with uh in 2024 so one idea is uh basically to use Tao as a template as a shutting Point Tao will be the first mover uh it will

uh launch its mainten net I believe uh this month um and um the nice thing about Tao is that they're as far as I can tell completely opinionated on like specifics of the pre-confirmation design like right now they're head down uh working on on their main net without pre- confirmations and as far as I understand they've been talking with all sorts of entities that could help them out build out the the infrastructure so there's these consultancies lime chain and never mind and there's uh startups um that are that are also working on pre-confirmation and so what I what I hope will happen is that like all these entities kind of compete with

each other and share ideas uh and then Tao ends up picking you know the best solution or at least a solution which is good enough um and um that whatever they pick is is kind of good enough to become a shaning point for everyone to to copy um and so yeah one of the things I want to make sure is that Tao doesn't rush in right like between when they launch on Main net without pre- confirmations and when they actually do pick the pre- confirmations that there is a real process of deliberation uh involved the other um ideas that I have are regarding uh credible neutrality so

if we want like this this initial uh selection by by Tao and and this initial infrastructure to to hatch on to the whole ecosystem uh it needs to be credibly uh neutral and there's basically two parts to pre-confirmation one is how do you elect the sequences and in some sense Tao will have Monopoly power there uh in terms of uh setting the the example and then you have the sequencer commitments like what types of commitments are made um and uh and how is the slashing done and the nice thing here is that the sequence of commitments is like a totally open market totally permissionless and in some sense Tao has

no power uh no power here so they have full power here and no power here now one of the um things that might be a big advantage while bootstrapping is that there's going to be very very little me on there's going to be little activity little me which means that we might actually not need redistribution right there's a lot of teams out there thinking about tickets and redistribution well if there's no me there's may be no need for redistribution and and one of the advantages of having no distribution is that it it means that you might not need to have a a token and so having no token could you know at least in the short term uh be a way to to gain more credible uh

neutrality and then on the sequence commitment side of things as I mentioned it's totally permissionless for anyone to come in with with proposals for for for commitments and one of the things that I think would be kind of potentially a bad thing is is if different uh pre- confers give up different types of pre-confirmation there would be kind of a mess from the point of view of the user you wouldn't have a very homogeneous uh market and so here I kind of have two suggestions like maybe the simplest suggestion is just to go with the status quo of how pre-confirmation are done what is the status quo is basically first come first serve um and this is something that um you know wallets like metamask have

already integrated uh in and so there there's there's probably like specs out there where you know there's there there's already a notion of a pre-confirmation request a pre-confirmation promise uh and you know all we need to do is add the the freezing and the slashing whenever this this this promises is not respected and one of the really nice things here is that from the point of view of wallets one to provide pre- confirmations there's there's very little room for maneuver um they either connect to the next uh preconferences except that you know

behind the scenes it's a rotating one so in of having just one IP address that you connect to you just change the the IP address that you connect to uh at every at every slot and then there's kind of the you know more messy but maybe like more rewarding uh Way Forward which is that we we start doing all sorts of exotic pre-confirmation uh and we have these very Advanced and sophisticated pre-confirmation markets and like I think diversity is great um but maybe the the more organized way of doing it is like first there's a standardization phase and then there's diversity of implementation so there's in some sense like agreement on what the protocols are uh and then there's

diversity of of implementation as opposed to having a plurality of of protocols which kind of lead to this this fragmented uh user experience from the point of view of of users okay now here's a little uh timeline of of how I think about progress uh in 2024 and I think I think 2024 is the year where we go from 0 to 1 so how do we get there so today uh we have the call number seven and then we have the Tao launch happening later this month and um in terms of events that will help out there's the three of them that I want to highlight so we have these two sequencing days that are happening one in Zub Berlin and one at

ECC and um during Edge City in zalu one of the ideas that I have is to organize a whole sequencing week so for 5 days uh we uh we we just focus on on on sequencing uh in in person uh in Thailand which is where HT will happen and what I'm hoping will happen is that each of these events where we actually meet in person will be a catalyst for a major Milestone with pre-confirmation so for example in Zub Berlin where we're going to be spending multiple days together um I'm hoping that by the end of it or a few days later we will have some sort of death net for pre-

confirmations and so um yeah what I'm hoping will happen is that a lot of the teams currently building pre-confirmation infrastructure do come to Z zuin um and at least within you know within this Hacker House uh we can have an initial def net for ECC uh there's going to be again uh a sequencing day and I'm hoping that a few days later after that we can can have a test net and then you know 7 months between now and and Edge city um I'm uh I'm hoping we can basically have have have have main net uh I don't want to push things to December because usually not much happens in December but um I think we

can actually get uh uh Tao mainnet pre-confirmation well not just Tao but for everyone uh around around this amount of time that feels reasonable to me um and I think what will happen is that once we have this in main net all sorts of other um base roll apps can come in so for example rise which is a base rollup uh they said they want to launch on in Q4 which is kind of perfect timing uh becausee uh pre-confirmation will be ready hopefully uh by then and that that's that's it happy to to take questions uh and then we can move on to sesha talk so yeah happy to take questions or or

comments on on on the design ideas the two design ideas that I presented or some of the the coordination tactics that we can use people do you think are going to oh uh I can hear a voice can you speak a little bit louder sorry sorry it's my microphone um how many people do you think will opt into being preon you know based on that timeline right um well yeah so the one one of the the things that we won't have by 2024 is execution tickets or execution auctions

which like completely decouple um validators from from from pre confirmations and so when we talk about a preconference in that context we we're really talking about pre-confirmation gateways which is basically the entity that you as a validator you delegate to um I'm expecting uh at least at least one which would be like the ultrasound relay coming in as a pre-confirmation Gateway but I'm hoping that others will come in um Titan expressed interest um chainbound expressed interest maybe like Lio could come in uh with a Gateway uh coinbase might come in I I

think we might have a handful uh you know by the end of the year at least that's my hope Justin can I can I add one more thinking here to to Simon's question uh I think something that we should consider is uh the incentives of the proposers to actually opt in as part of Simon's question and in order for uh um for proposers to get in um it needs to be very very easy for them uh and if it's as easy as essentially having an upgrade on M boost or a drop in replacement of M boost uh I think it's going to lend itself to a much easier

early participations by proposers so I think this is something that also the flashboard team should be part of this conversation because like for me they hold a significant key towards the the adoption of all this right agreed um yeah I think in the ideal case is basically a tiny modification to Mev boost there's no additional computational resources or bandwidth or anything like that um basically the instead of connecting to a relay you connect to a Gateway and it's is the same flow otherwise the Gateway gives you a header to sign you sign it and then and then that's it uh

Ellie um yeah so I'm just trying to get my head around the different pieces of infrastructure that needs to be built for this to work so I think that we have like the the modification to me boot me boost um like a modification to existing relays so that they can be these uh gateways um presumably some interface for like a user to actually request a pre-confirmation through like some wallet or something is there any like pieces I'm missing right we we also need a registry uh on chain for the the the gateways to register and post collateral and get Frozen um in terms of the integration with the wallet for the users um I think

that already exists right for for wallets like metamask okay um yeah uh Andrew can you talk a little bit more about that um maybe to just uh give a little bit more info what's in there in metamask like have they proposed the standard for prec confirmations and they have embedded in metamask right so um I actually haven't looked at the the metamask code base but um my understanding is as a user if you're using optimism or arbitrum and you you make a you kind of click Send on metamask like you you you kind of get the green check mark immediately that's

part of the the value proposition of of arbitrum and optimism um and so in some sense like there is already an API endpoint to send a transaction to a sequencer and get from the sequencer a a confirmation or promise that that your transaction will be included in some some way and you know here's here's your your your price you already know how much you're paying and so really what needs to change is the recipient like of this API Co instead of being the same entity the centralized sequencer every single time it's a rotating Gateway H Ellie you have your head up uh yeah I guess I as far as this

registry for posting collateral um it seems like I don't at least as far as I understand I don't think Ian layer like could quite support you know posting that level of collateral so is the plan not to use something like reaking for this initial uh like this initial test net and kind of like roll our own or what are your thoughts right so I did talk to three about this and he did mention that it is possible to um to take multiple validators and expose the whole group against like one slashing condition um so if something bad happens actually like you know 30 different validators get slash at the same time having said that

um like in some sense the ways if if we think of them as being relays or entities like that like they they don't necessarily uh stake um and so like reaking for them might not be um might not be the the natural move um yeah and there there is also a concern about credible neutrality like if we do pick I layer then that is some sort of opinion that's being made so I don't have a strong opinion here um I my guess is that a thousand e is like a a small enough amount that uh like the the additional yield from staking that

you're missing out on is is is is maybe not too much of a big deal um and also one of the nice things about doing this is that again like the the opportunity cost might be higher than what you stand to make with pre-confirmation tips and so really those who who who are showing up in the market are are truly serious and in some sense altruistic uh as opposed to being a tourist kind of spamming and potentially degrading the the experience early on makes sense Andrew I just wanted to say I'm not sure why my zoom still says BR Howard I'm no longer there but uh Shilling my some some efforts we have going out so a couple of us are coming

together and talking with a lot of proposers about you know would they be you know amendable to adapting um you know things propose your commitments more generally but our focus is pre confence initially but also inclusion list and so far the conversations have been quite receptive um I think it's you know not the big big validators but the ones that are more on the frontier side so maybe even by June in Berlin we'll have a Dev net on our side with how we're kind of thinking about plugging in proposer commitments to the proposer and have a good sense better sense around you know what are their requirements how do they think about this even though the pre-con market isn't isn't huge um trying to get some some bootstrap going so um probably in June we'll have a lot more information but we're if others are

doing this we're happy to engage and help doing this as open source open development projects so no you know uh specific company or team behind it so hopefully incredibly neutral very nice I think Andrew you'll be coming to Zubin right I'll be there making it all the way to Berlin nice J can I highlight a little bit of concern just p on the Practical side uh about the timeline um as people that have looked into the implementation side of this you kind of some implementations might require some forms of validation of the

uh BLS keys of the proposers of the validators of the A1 validators and just wanted to air a word of caution that uh if this is part of the implementation for some of the uh Dev Nets or test Nets that are there um there the pectra update needs to happen in order for the EAP for BLS verification to to happen uh and I'm not sure when this is scheduled for just it might impact the timelines that you that you're mentioning here okay gotcha so that would be a gas efficiency right uh thing yes yes yes this is when when you when you want to for some reason you want to prove something about the validator but specific validator in the validator set

right that makes sense uh do you have uh an idea of the gas cost with the currently um uh proposed uh gas prices because I'm trying to petition for reducing the gas cost of the EIP 2537 but I had no feedback so far and having an actual application uh would be helpful to uh Lobby no I don't if if this was for me I I don't I don't either okay thanks okay um next up we have uh Sasha

who will talk about uh thoughts on pre-s from uh Lio contributors Sasha the the floor is yours can can you hear me okay yes okay um I'll just put up my screen quickly and say hi it's bad internet so I'm going to cut it see if I can share okay desktop okay can you see my screen okay

yes okay so um this to talk on Li on precons um it's you know it's quite high level it's not um meant to be super technical and it's more like the end is basically open questions and and a small call to action um the the background on me is um I'm I'm currently a Lio contributor researcher um I've been base rooll upfield since I heard about Justin since I heard Justin present his vision back in October some relevant context today is

hasu has just proposed u a suggested path forward for Li um in terms of the high level takeaway here is that the mission hasn't changed but there is a need to respond to you know how how much the the market has changed over the last few months and one of those um one of his suggestions is supporting the thaline validator services now there's questions about what AAL line you know how to even Define that and and one sort of there

are key constraints from from our side with respect to not imposing any additional risk to stakers and not not turning SD into a reaking token um one sort of fundmental model here is you you can't think of any boost evme boost as a sort of uh reaking service um in the sense that validator is opt into additional constraints with the possibility of penalties at least if they are operating using Lio

and there are several contributors I mean to to give some sort of context for this uh this talk I'm I was very excited about base rollups back in October November and I raised it with a bunch of contributors that were more on the research and development side at the time I wasn't in the research in lier research I was more on the government's team but everyone was sort of very bound constrainted and there wasn't really well people were excited there wasn't really any any um you know time to sort of think about how we could help here and

but a couple of weeks ago Eugene and Sam two sort of core Lio contributors reached out and and said they were they were working on on thinking about how to do this and so you know that that kind of led me to to reach out to Justin and and and led to this talk um and sort of the high level here is like Lio does want to continue pushing the envelope forward with respect to St um and that means sort of actively exploring uh these sorts of our dat services so the expectations from our

side is that um at least from a number of contributors are that precom will be the next wiely adopted validated service after M boost but there'll be an evolution not a substitution M boost and that they'll be the first possibly a handful of um eum align side cars so there are sort of three potential uh directions here the first is B precons um that clearly Lio can offer access to block space

but this would have to be opt in from a subset of the validator set and because we don't want to increase uh we want to be prepared for any sort of teror risk scenario it would it would involve um probably an operator Bond or collateral of some sort and an Insurance Fund ideally it would support trust this fashing but that doesn't have to be uh there at the beginning um I'm going skip over this because it's not that

relevant yeah and so extending sort of Base precons um in general we sort of see or I see preon as the first of um possibly a handful of of other feign validation Services inclusion lists being one another possible one um the key here and why kind of we've been hesitant to say anything so far is um like this doesn't work if Lio inserts itself as a point of influence or point of failure um so this is like

a what I liked about you know Justin's talk for example is that there might be a way to do the bootstrap precom without um needing like 20% of the validated set to to opt in um and I think that would be great that would be like actually like a more of a motivator for Lio to get involved um because we don't want to take away from the neutrality of this I don't think it works if lier is is kind of if it's dependent on lier um for three high level uh sort of values phoc you know

guiding philosophy Northstar here is um the first is like Redemption risk to users absolutely should not be inre um like Li's brand truth in my opinion is is really rooted in its security culture almost bordering on on paranoia um like it's hard to sort of get a sense of that from the outside but when you're like working in the trenches there it's like I've never quite seen I've never seen as much attention to edge cases given as I have with with with the lighter devs um yeah

so again that it needs to stay focused on on what makes it uh on its Edge right um it you know users need to always know the risks they're taking and where they're you know what what what conditions their funds are are being um subject to what constraints and conditions and part of that involves uh thinking very longterm and and not letting you know shortterm Market Cycles or uh

um yeah just avoiding the the sort of the The Madness of of crowds and sort of zooming out and saying okay actually um we need to to build something that that is long-term resilient so open questions here I mean these are quite recent um from my end I've just sort of started diving deep again into based rollup so you know after November I you know was caught up in dual governance research and and um and didn't have time to engage in these

calls but i' I've caught up with the calls and these questions are really focused on um credible commitments because that's what I've been diving in this week and so just reading them out um you know it's it's unclear to me at least what the best way to ensure credible commitments today is and and how enens sure this path is future proof it's also unclear to me whether Li can just start with reputational collateral rather than economic collateral if we do go with economic collateral uh are enough node operators willing or able to post

bonds um how large should the bond be I mean just mentions the Thousand Eve I think that's that's one you know uh hypothesis um maybe we also need an insurance fund to sort of handle uh worst case scenarios but you know then there's a question of how large should that be [Music] um Lido's recently like made a lot of strides of DVT so is there a way to leverage that to simplify things and make commitments more credible um can you kind of lowered the economic collateral if you have a you know commitments that are in enforced by several validators again not sure

um are there any IPS that could make existing commitment designs more elegant I haven't had the time to dig in yet um do we expect there to be one winning precon framework or protocol or a purity that can interface seamlessly together you know again it's fuzzy for me it's sort of the the delation between framework and protocol maybe there are many Frameworks one protocol again don't see that clearly can Lio kind of choose a framework without discouraging experimentation should lier be open to experimenting with more than one framework or protocol can Li meaningly improve the

liveness guarantees of based rollups so this sort of relates to a post by chainbound I think that that was released yesterday one one thing that that jumped out for me there is there seems to be at least with the current design a um there is a liveness tradeoff um with with their their way of looking at things um and part of the promise for me at least originally in November um with base rollups was was the fact that we could inherit the liveness guarantees of dl1 now if we're ring on uh an

external entity on top of the proposer um how much does that matter um I think they they frame it really well the question of uh that they ask which is you know what is what is what does it mean to be based is there a spectrum what does the spectrum look like um how does this how do the dimensions of finality and liveness uh you know it's still unclear to me how we up finality versus liveness if we're thinking about being based as a spectrum like my intuition is still that liveness is should be weighted probably more um but but again it's like a loosely held um loosely held opinion and and

then you know it's also unclear to me whether V can improve this in in in any way um yeah and then finally sort of more Broad is there any way we can help bootstrap these Bas precs without discouraging experimentation or influencing the outcome um again credible neutrality is what makes AUM special is doesn't make sense to to help with based rollups which is about you know reinforcing what makes a special if if we're going to detract from that um and in closing uh sort of mini call to action um I'm open and Eugene and Sam

who are sort of driving the research and development here are open to collaborate with anyone who uh can help answer these questions that wants to work with us um feel free to email me and I'll I'll share my Telegram and Twitter in the chat okay that's that's all I don't know if I have time for question yes we have time we have seven minutes left thank you so much Sasha for the presentation um I mean for me the big takeaways are that like one Lio is now excited about Bas pre confirmations this is this was new to me even just uh you know a couple weeks ago um and it's

partly because you now have more time on your hands because you've you've pushed the research for dual governance and then the other big takeaway for me um which is very nice to hear is that like um you didn't really like the idea of using Lio as a mechanism for bootstrapping right to get the 20% uh because in some sense that meant pre-confirmation relying on on Lio and uh and uh yeah that that that's great to hear that um you do care deeply about credible neutrality yeah I mean like obviously if you like the only perception people have from Li is on on sort of Twitter battles

then you don't get that but I think it's something many people within lier D care about and there's no yeah this doesn't work if if uh if we're detracting from that in any way any questions for Sasha Um well hey Sasha uh long um so um what did I want to ask yeah regarding um reputational collateral uh I think it's interesting because um like if we want to ship um PR boost or whatever is the name uh

commitment boost um uh fast I see two technical issues one is uh um reaking part if we need to connect to a reaking protocol um igen layer or something else and two it's a part with uh how do we uh for Builders we ask uh them to hey please include this while in the past there are um um they were used to building a blocks uh fully on their side so uh if we can remove uh the um uh uh economical uh St reaking uh that

makes it easier to implement um so I think that's and we also have like we rely on relayer a lot uh and they don't have any stake uh so it's not like it's the first time that we do this uh either or something that's op in right yeah I think like it's again I think it's it's like a I mean my intuition and people can disagree here um but is that it's like the simplest way to move it forward but but there might be a tradeoff in that maybe it like it puts too much Reliance on on Lio um so yeah I again open to to

more thoughts on that but but agree it's like it just simplify things but is a tradeoff worth it I'm not I mean if we rely on reputational collateral then Tao needs to explicitly have a white list of who they consider to be reputation worthy and then that might uh affect the credible neutrality a little bit of the the sequencer selection mechanism um well the idea that we have internally is that we commit to a date where we remove the training wheels uh to say uh and uh even for testnet we will likely use this uh to prove the

concept before we add the uh any complexity regarding reaking or maybe we can push um eum L1 to include one of those Pepsi fancy things okay good to hear that you're considering it for the death Nets and test test Nets any final question before we wrap up the public part of the call and open

it up to the private after discussion Sasha just shared his telegram handle in the chat if you want to talk to him directly okay thank you everyone uh this wraps up the uh private uh public part of the call uh now opening it up to anyone who wants to uh bring up any topic of the choice