EIP-8363: Should ETH Be Sound Money or a Productive Asset?

Transcript

We don't really have hundred billion dollars of security. We really have five million a day at the current curve. And depending on, you know, what people think about equilibrium for this new one, it might be a million dollars a day or less. And I don't really know if that's enough to protect a kind of a a trillion dollar computer like we wanted to be. >> Hi everyone, welcome to Unchained, your no hype resource for all things crypto. I'm your host Laura Shen, newly back from vacation. [music] Thank you so much for joining this live stream. First, we'll start with with a quick word from this.

This episode is brought to you by 1-in Aqua, the shared liquidity layer from 1 in. Back multiple liquidity positions with one wallet balance and keep your tokens in your wallet until a swap fills. See how it works at 1in.com/ aqua. Today's topic is EIP8363, the Ethereum improvement proposal about ETH issuance, which has kicked up some controversy. Here to discuss are Kevin Owak, founder of coin, Oshene Kin, CEO and co-founder of DV Labs, and Jerome Dishe, president of Ethereum Foundation.

Welcome Kevin Osheen and Jerome. >> Thank you for having us. Welcome everyone. I'm the president of France. not of the foundation yet, but uh glad glad you mentioned >> Oh, did I say the foundation? I meant to say France. I meant to say France. >> Yeah, it's it's two separate entities, but uh we we like each others. >> Okay. Okay. Sorry, that that's um probably some jetlag brain. [laughter] >> All right. So, Jerome, since you are actually one of the authors of this EIP, let's have you start. Explain what problems you're trying to solve for uh with EIP 8363.

Um sure. Um so we today have a curve that rewards [clears throat] the validators. So if you put if at stake you become a validator and you get rewarded and under today's curve the more if is staked uh the more if is printed. Uh we print new if to reward the validators and there are incentive to stake that never really switches off. uh the the the reward continue to uh to appear and to uh to pay uh whatever the the staking ratio is how many uh e are at stake. So at the at the same time every holder that doesn't stake uh pays for the staking through delusion and um and thus we we want to implement a mechanism that um uh burn a

rising portion of uh the validator rewards. So that as the staking ratio climbs um the reward actually gets lower until the markets find its own level with the market find an equilibrium in term of staking. So that's the that's a proposal in itself um a burn that grows with the staking ratio. So uh the reward sters towards zero uh at around the level of half the EA at stake and in practice the market stops well before that um at whatever yield stakers require to participate and staking remains attractive uh when participation is is low uh in our uh in our model that's overstaking stop being

subsidized and thus u uh it's also stop the delusion that the holders uh are facing above certain levels. And so why did you come up with this as the best solution? >> Yeah. Um so there's a in the in the v this there's a uh a couple of things we should uh we should clarify. Uh there's a the max issuance level. That's that's one of the thing because the the curve itself has a maximum issuance. Uh there's also uh the transition period like how fast does this change um gets implemented. Uh there's also the the the ultimate level

like at what rate and do we even reach zero in terms of of rewards. Um and uh yeah I think that the shape of the curve itself uh uh that can be that can be discussed. Um so we took a different thing into consideration. Uh so there's um probably like four four to five years of research on uh on the current state of the curve and how we should modify it. Um it's well we're building on top of research from many different researchers that I I won't name them all. Um but we have a research backing that the minimum viable issuance of Ethereum should be around.5%. that would be the the minimum amount that we have

to issue so that we we guarantee our economic security and um pay for our econom security budget and uh this boils down to 0.5. So first we we selected um a curve that match this uh minimum viable issuance of 0.5. Uh then we uh targeted the ideal uh staking ratio which sits between uh uh 20 to 30%. Uh and so the the payout is maximal around this uh the payout in term of issuance is maximal around this range. Uh and then in term of uh of um making sure that the the the market actually finds an equilibrium um and we avoid also to go beyond 50% at

stake um the the curve tends towards zero and reach zero uh around after 50% of E at stake. So that was also one of our reasoning we wanted to make sure that we never cross the 50% at stake uh level. And I think finally if I'm not mistaken whatever whatever yeah transition period um we wanted to make sure that also this uh this transition doesn't happen from one day to the next like uh okay EIP has now proposed maybe uh it will get considered and then it would get scheduled and then a goes live and then suddenly we go from this amount of uh yield to a much lower amount. So we didn't wanted to uh to have this kind of um uh extreme transition from one day to the next. uh we chose a pretty long

transition u ready to argue if it's long enough or not long enough. But between the time that this proposal gets discussed right now and the time that this proposal gets in full force there will be a period of uh uh year and a half to two years um like 18 months kicking in um for sure after the go live and probably a little while before we get a final date for the implementation of of agota. So we uh we picked the different things that we considered from the re side from our perception of uh how the market will react and how the the industry will react sorry try to u to to come up with the the best of world um and uh now we are getting

feedback on what we've missed what we should consider to adjust the curve and also uh what kind of um of adjustments we should uh we should make in the in the short to long run. >> Yeah. Yeah. And you're getting a lot of feedback actually. Um, so let's actually move to that. Um, so I would say that you know what seems to me and again I so I was on vacation so I didn't see this in real time but it feels like so first of all a lot of people in the community are against it.

Um, it even feels to me like it's kind of mostly concentrated amongst the business people in the community, which is funny because in my book I talk about sort of the business people versus the devs. That was a whole controversy in the beginning of Ethereum, but I feel like I kind of see this over and over again in crypto. Um, but you know, Oshene, you were one who wrote a very detailed critique and it wasn't even like a complete critique. You said this is just like some of my thoughts. So go ahead and uh you know give us your topline thoughts on why you oppose this proposal.

>> Yeah, happy to. Um so the main reason I not super happy with at least the current proposed curve is this idea of it like going to zero and particularly I want to highlight that there's like more than one ratio like metric that me like matters for Ethereum security. What you're almost like put up in front there is this idea of finality. So it's like we have um this amount of ETH and that will be guaranteed burned if this transaction like ever becomes undone, ever changes. And I agree that the research there says, you know, tens of billions of dollars getting destroyed is probably enough disincentive at this part of um the world. Where I think we kind of um diverge in opinions is that's

not the only thing that can go wrong with Ethereum. Um, we also have this risk where the people that are staking their ETH decide to be particular about what they will include and not include in a block. And they can say, "We're going to only attest to block that do what we want that don't have, you know, people we don't like in them." And if they do that, um, there's no penalty. So long as there's 51% of them or more doing it, um, it costs them nothing. um the like pack like plan we have is like oh no maybe we'll coordinate as a group and we'll like destroy all our ether for doing so but I think that's a very big risk to kind of hedge all of Ethereum security on and I don't really think we

should be sacrificing you know this type of resistance to censorship or the staking ratio um the kind of fancy word you maybe hear me say it again is like Nakamoto coefficient kind of come from Bitcoin but it's this idea of how you orgs make up 50% of hash power state weight and I can talk about lots of other things but I think that's the kind of main one is that um we don't really have hundred billion dollars of security we really have five million a day at the current curve and depending on you know what people think about equilibrium for this new one it might be a million dollars a day or less and I don't really know if that's enough to protect a kind of a a trillion dollar computer like we want it to be >> yeah like basically the number of

entities required to kind of control something or sort of break the system or just yeah make it much more centralized is already like kind of low. So um yeah, anything that centralizes it further is a bit risky, but I'd love to. So before we go to Kevin, I don't know if Jerome if you want to respond to to that. >> Uh yeah, well I uh I I have lots of response to that. Uh and I also uh spent some time uh reading uh Oshin's uh post and uh gave a full on written response to uh to his comments uh earlier today uh a few few hours before. I was kind of back to back today. So sorry for the for the delay

and I'm trying to get a uh an answer to everyone one by one. So I'm I'm currently around the comments number 25. So we have like 180 90 uh 190 comments. So that's a lot of reactions. But I I want to comments first on the fact that uh uh when you said like everybody's against it. That's not really the case. Like people that write about it are uh kind of there are some people that are pro it uh uh pro pro EIP change. Uh not the majority that people are writing but that's normal like we are getting feedback from people that are uh looking for answers that are looking for uh comment clarification or that just log in and say like I hate this don't do that. Uh but that's that was the case for every single changes that we did in

the past regarding the aphirium issuance. So it's not a it's not a surprise. Um and the people that came to speak against it in first place are were people that had their business more or less directly affected by this and this is expected as well. So we're not we're not we're not trying to hide it. Uh it's a contentious uh proposal. Uh but it's also worth having this discussion right now. And now specifically on the on the security side of things um sec security is a spectrum from the uh from the Etherum perspective and from the blockchain perspective at large. So we need to to to consider different level of attack, different type of attacks and how we protect against them. Um I'm not going to uh to say that uh what Oshin uh

try to put out is wrong. I I honestly think it's the it's it's um it's it's true indeed. uh how much it costs per day to uh to uh to to bribe or uh coers uh different validators to to not do something or to do something specifically is rather low uh in the in the range of a couple of million per day. Um so depending on uh how much uh is at stake sorry how much how much is how much money you can uh you can uh uh divert this kind of attack the the couple of million per day maybe maybe not not that much um considering that we want to be uh the the network that secure the future of the settlement of the world. So um but nevertheless

there is also the the security consideration of uh how much it's it's um how much is needed to to revert finality and our EIP mostly focus on uh this side of uh the security spectrum uh making sure that uh we maximize this because from from uh my understanding and maybe uh well ocean you can tell me if uh if I'm I'm putting words in your mouth or not like the uh the the second part of the thing like the the security of how much it cost to prevent someone to write a transaction or to to to not include a transaction and so on. Uh this is something that uh will always be lower than uh our uh big security thing for uh for big security budget for

preventing u um uh messing up with the finality. But also this is something that uh mostly uh uh DVT tax and uh and fossile uh are taking care of for which I I I both support and uh I don't think the issuance is something that really can uh can influence on on this specific part of our of our security but I I hope we'll have the the chance to to discuss also the Nakamoto coefficient and concentration effect because I think also our views on uh what's uh the uh the um um the the the state that we should wish for um is a bit is a bit different uh you and me on the on the matter.

>> All right. So, in a moment we're going to um turn to Kevin to talk a little bit more about the business community reaction, but first we're going to take a quick word from the sponsors who make the show possible. $540 million. That's how much concentrated liquidity sat idle in a given week in the first half of this year. about 30% of the DeFi TVL if you're wondering. That's according to Dune Research commissioned by 1 in. But there's a solution. 1-in Aqua is the new shared liquidity platform. It lets LPS back multiple positions with the same token balance and keep their tokens in their wallet till a swap comes. Why does that help? Because the LPS don't have to split their tokens across positions.

They can cover more market conditions and pairs with their full balance. That means more activity across deeper liquidity. See how it works at 1in.com/aqua. Remember that providing liquidity carries risk and fees aren't guaranteed. Back to my conversation with Kevin Osheen and Jerome. So, as we mentioned earlier, a number of business leaders have opposed this proposal such such as Stani Kulichav, Mike Siligodsi, Joe Shalom of um Sharplink. And Shalom's article had a succinct header. it would undermine DeFi and DeFi is Ethereum's superpower.

So, suffice it to say that a lot of entrepreneurs have made business decisions on this yield. You know, I heard on the chopping block they kind of compared this proposal to how a central bank might come out and make a decision that has a lot of economic and business consequences. So Kevin, you know, I'm curious to hear what impact you think this would have on the different businesses in def in Ethereum and DeFi broadly. >> Yeah, thanks Laura. Well, uh I'll just say before I answer that, um I'm undecided about this EIP and I'm trying to contain all of the feedback and discussion in my mind, which uh uh you know, I think is a feat in itself. But uh it would suffice to say that uh the

business community has had a lot of strong feedback about the proposal. Uh Stani from A said he ran the math and if validator income falls from about 3% down to 1.5% that's a 50% cut. So does a more zero yield regime accelerate uh the capture that this EIP is meant to deter? Uh does this kill the case for borrowing ETH? Uh does it create a tax landmine? Those are some of the feedback that we've heard from the business community. Ryan Sean Adams from Banklist called this dead in the water. Uh so I think this is valid feedback and what I want to talk about for just a minute here is how does the community come to consensus about whether or not this EIP goes live and I think that with EIPs like this

there's not one right answer. This is not an engineering problem. This is a political economy problem. there's sort of like a quantum superp position of possible solutions for what the best issuance of ETH is. And I think that these camps are in a debate about what is ETH? Is it ultrasound money uh or is it a productive asset that can be used in uh in in DeFi? And so the political economy has to come to consensus uh before the next fork about whether this is going to go into Ethereum mainet. And the debate has been stuck for about the last two years. These camps have not moved uh from each other. Uh and so uh quick primer on Ethereum governance.

Ethereum has off-chain governance. There's a meeting called the allcore devs in which they try to come to rough consensus about which EIPs are going to come into the network. And uh ACD has never really passed something with this level of contentiousness or like active push back or conversation. Um there's a precedent for controversial things being killed like Praguepow uh was a was a thing that was killed many years ago. And so I think the question is who makes the decisions and how and how do we come to rough consensus about this uh and how much will the core developers risk fissures in the community uh in order to uh pass this EIP. there has not been a major fork of Ethereum since uh the DAO hard fork and um the so so the real

question is what happens in all core developers uh all core developers meeting number 185 is scheduled for Thursday August 20th at 1400 UTC so that'll be the uh thing that you want to tune into to see if this passes or not but uh it would suffice to say that there's a lot of active discussions happening right now they'll probably reach a boiling point around ACD this Thursday Oh, okay. Yeah, let's we'll we'll get into that a little bit later as well because people also had some issues with how this was proposed. Um, so I know we touched a little bit on like the ways that this could potentially centralize the network. Um, Oshene, I don't know if you felt like you were able to kind of fully lay out your thoughts on that or

if you wanted to add anything. >> I may just add two quick things. one to highlight something that Jerome nor I said is that none of the debates here have any chance of us um changing what Ethereum says as in like printing extra ETH changing someone's balance that's controlled by who runs full nodes and anyone would see that like happening. So that's like not one to really worry about. The only two, you know, ones we're arguing about the importance of is whether or not a transaction could ever be like undone um when it's not supposed to be or whether we can like block someone from using the chain. Um that and then the other thing I'd note is that Jerome pointed out the re

researchers said that we need about 0.5% of issuance per year to stay secure. I agree. I think if we stopped at 0.5% issuance and didn't cut it any lower, this would be a much like less objectionable proposal. I think this idea of cutting it to zero is where most of the negative effects come in because that's where, you know, an entity that has 40 50 60% of ETH, which I won't name, um, could just drive the issuance to zero and it would cause pretty much everybody else that's a rational actor to leave and they'd be left, you know, controlling the majority of the stake. And I think that's kind of what we're, you know, facing at the moment.

>> Okay. Um Jerome, >> if I may react, it's uh it's great that we having this kind of discussion because like for example, I had the pleasure to speak to to Mike from a few others have spoken to him and he now has a much more nuance view on the topic. Uh I hear you that uh okay well let's let's consider 0.5 and see if we see what we get if we can do 0.5 all the way through from zero to 100% of the of the staking ratio and I think the discussion that we are having right now on the on the thread uh for each magician is um very productive in a way that uh uh we get more informed as the offer offers of what's acceptable what's not acceptable what kind of thing we missed what kind

of thing should be added into consideration in the in the in the tracking of the the rolling out of the thing and so on and uh we will necessarily improve this proposal. Um one one thing you said uh Laura initially on it's like if a central bank decided to break everything um central bank have clear targets and they do are doing really small adjustment at regular at regular quarter quarterly meetings and so on. uh in here we are proposing a transition that will take couple of years to roll out but this is aiming in a direction and I think businesses that have built on Ethereum that have built on the yield of Ethereum and that are coming now to shout and say like no way

over my dead body uh it's it's not it's not um a good justification from them to say like we have chosen to build depending on the seal and now you're touching the seal because um the the curve and the issuance uh and overall the the how the consensus function on Ethereum was bound to change since we announced lean also. So we we know that there's going to be evolution and we have a history of modifying our um our issuance uh policy u always downward but still we have a history of doing so. So it's not necessarily something that um that uh that I foresee as a as a receivable argument against the case. Um and regarding uh killing

the borrowing case for E if um well uh when you are out of the D5 space um and you are looking at the lending market as a repository market a repo market from a threat perspective and you said oh the usage of there's a lot of people borrowing if well isn't that people shorting if uh that's that can be also received as a red flag. So if we taper the the the borrowing case for it's also pretty good for the asset I would say. So I I I don't necessarily think it's a it's a bad thing to uh to uh stop subsidizing the the yield over a certain point um because we would be just paying too much for our security and at the same time we would be protecting the value of our assets.

>> All right. Well, let's have you also address um you know some of the I mean you started to talk about that in terms of the central bank comments, but I do just you know want want to hear you address um these concerns that it could have a big cascade in DeFi that's um you know detrimental to a lot of services such as lending like fixed income um even just deans who like to loop might be hurt by that. So, you know, there there's been a lot of talk about how this would really hurt DeFi. As I mentioned, you know, Joe Shalom's comments. So, what's your response?

>> No. >> Um, that's um I I have to be completely honest here. Uh we don't have a cascade model. We know that this will have an impact. Uh we know that the impact will likely be a lower staking rate. uh uh like a sorry the the impact will be that the the staking u uh the staking ratio will stabilized and the yield at equilibrium will be lower. So necessarily uh the looping part of DeFi uh will likely reduce. How much it will reduce uh that we don't know. Um but we want to take a transition a quite long transition to make sure that the impact is not like boom everything explode. Uh like this this transition will bring the

tapering in a in a slow way. uh but also uh I have invited um the different venues that will be impacted to reach out and to collaborate. Let's let's build this cascade model. Let's uh let's discuss the parameters and um let's try to converge to something that makes sense um so that we can actually uh uh deal with the problems. We we cannot with our resources and also with the amount of publicly available informations make wide guesses on oh this is what the casket model will be this is what the thing will be.

Nevertheless um someone that has um 50k in stable coins and put that on a and borrow if to start looping it in order to uh uh earn on the yield of um of ethereum earn on the dilution of each holders each holder. Sorry. Um, yeah, this is a a pretty uh behavior and um I I I don't think this is buying extra security for Ethereum at this stage and it's also uh putting a weight on every holder for delusion. So that's uh that's maybe not something we should cons continue to subsidize.

And wait, so um your your models uh say that most likely the equil [clears throat] the equilibrium of ETH staked would be somewhere between 30 and 40% if you implement this. Is that what it was? >> Um well the the amount of ETH at stake um post EIP uh if we reach 50% it's zero. Uh so the market will stop before that. um difficult to say exactly at which amount. U I I think it will stabilize around uh 40 to 45 something like this.

I don't know uh Ocean if you have a a wild guess in your mind with the new what would be >> I've been digging into the research on your EIP and mine is 45 to 49. So 10 10x lower. >> So then the the yield on that would be what? Like where do you think it would level off? 0.4% APR. >> Jerome, do you agree with that projection? >> Oh, yeah. At at uh at this amount of uh of uh of equilibrium, the I'm checking the map right now so I can give you a proper uh a proper answer. Uh if we are at uh sorry uh here it is. If we are at

uh 45% we are at a point three.3% yield. If 45% of the eile stake we will be at a.3% of uh of yield >> and Kevin do do you have thoughts on where you think this will all level out if this proposal gets adopted? I think I'm interested to see if the different tribes can build consensus about the right rates. And you know, you could see what happens in in sort of traditional legislation is that you'll take two different bills that are apart from each other and you'll sort of blend them together. And so I'll be curious to see if there's uh any consensus that can be built. Um, and I don't think that the

all core devs are going to push this through if there's this much disscent without amendments. But, uh, that's my guess. >> Okay. Well, like what I was trying to get at is so if we if we can kind of project out where we think the um staking rate will end up, then we could um you know, back into like then what will the yield be and then map out like then then probably you know Gauntlet or somebody would do like a bunch of Monte Carlo simulations of kind of what exactly would happen in these different DeFi sectors. It looks like that hasn't happened yet, but like um presumably wait so yeah. So if so if it's going to

end up where you guys are projecting then I don't even know what would that be like onetenth of the activity or or where what fraction of activity do you think we'd end up with? >> Oh, it's it's not a question of activity here. It's a it's a question of uh of staking appetite in this case like currently >> um well do you do you uh >> well like I'm saying like so let's say so I actually don't know what the what the yield is right now but let's say it's 3% and and if you're saying it we end up at.3 then wouldn't defy shrink um you know to onetenth of what it

currently is or I I know it's not exactly like that But you know just for simplicity sake is that how to make fun of >> unfortunately the the jol is in the the details here. Um look um clearly uh um let's uh let's take a step back like what is the minimum yield for which anyone will stake uh if you if you pay me if you pay me like what what ocean just says like you know I think it's a a good uh a good uh receivable estimation like uh maybe people will continue to stake until uh they get paid uh 3 but if you pay them

less than.3 they will stop. Well, what that means is that our our staking ratio continue to grows towards that number. Um and if we have a curve that cannot reach that number which is the case right now the curve will reach to the minimum 1.5 like five time what a a wide guess on where it should land. Uh it's just a constant pressure for people to continue to go a stake. Now regarding the activity um D5 activity we used to uh we used to get excited about a vanity metric that is TVL like okay okay we'll just look at TVL uh we to just count the same if being looped multiple time uh or the same derivative being counted se several time with the different

principle being double counted and we say like yeah activity is good look we have big TVL no what matters is the volume what matters is how much transaction is being done on taxes uh how much back and forth is are are being done to collateralize, recize, recapitalize, move positions and so on. That's the activity that actually burn ETH on Ethereum. That's actually uh a good thing and so on. Uh I highly doubt that um uh reducing the uh attractiveness of uh uh staking derivatives and looping strategy that are beyond that are going to be costful for the network. It's actually a pretty good thing. uh talking taking the the central bank um parallel uh when the when the the the principal funding rates

of the central bank is super high all the money goes there uh because that's the best thing like it's almost risk-f free and everybody wants this and nothing really can compete. If you start to lower this rates uh then other asset that are in some perception more productive uh gets attractive as well. Um and um as we if we don't change anything let's look at the status quo. Um if the reservation yield is that low of.3 uh then what it means is that just um we got we are just going to continue the the growth of the staking ratio uh to 50% to 60%. the the reason why we kind of not rushed but uh make sure that this EIP gets discussed now is that by

2028 we will likely reach the 50% mark and it just uptrend beyond that. Um and if the reservation yield is that low we're going to just continue to to to push more E to go at stake and that's not really good for the market depth of E. That's not really good for people that are purchasing E and want to make sure that when they sell them uh there will be no big slippages. Um it's not good for theition of of of new holders either. So I think that the time is now in that in that respect.

>> So also actually talk for a second about solo stakers because there's been a lot of discussion about this. Um there's concern that it would hurt solistakers because basically the thought is their um after tax income would drop up to 77% for a home validator. Um as far as I understand I guess the gross rewards are taxable but then the burn would eat up their profit. So Jerome you know do you have thoughts on that concern? >> Yeah absolutely. Um there was a misunderstanding in how we uh we phrased the the EIP itself. Um some uh early analysis from uh from people that wrote

the the uh the EIP maybe too fast or maybe missed missed the the point is that um uh it's it's not we give you one and then we take five. Uh you the one never really reach your activable balance. So um some critiques that said like hey if you um if under the new regime um you give me one and you take five I still have to pay uh taxes on the one. Well actually the the the five doesn't even reach your balances. It's uh similarly to uh when we do uh any when we do 1559 burns uh you your activable balance never never receive the rewards before the burn. uh and we

can we can change the wording if uh this is this is sensible and so on. Now nevertheless on the on the tax situation of uh the solo stakers it's um it's a very meaningful uh meaningful problem. Um let me try to uh to um to explain it uh a little bit more in detail. So as a solo staker which I'm solo staking since Genesis um I'm getting currently 2.5% yield. Um this 2.5% yield is a taxable event. Um I have to pay taxes on this. Uh in France it's 30% of u 30% flat taxes. In other regions like in UK it's a similar and so on and so forth. You can compare with all the major regions.

Normally when you receive a yield uh it's a taxable event. So the rational uh behavior regarding this um this uh this tax is to consider uh your yield as a tax adjusted yield which is completely different from one region to another. We're not arguing against that. But that what that means is that your yield is um probably uh 7 of what you get. Uh and then you have to consider that your yield is also delusion adjusted because when we print we print uh on top of the whole supply. So if the uh issuance is 1% uh you're getting diluted by 1%. So if you're taking 2.5 and you're paying 30% of taxes and you're also being diluted of uh 1%

uh well as a solo stakers uh your your reservation yield should be reached pretty fast and that's a total concern like u there's um we we we did a we did we did not do a good job initially with the publication of the EIP on explaining where we stand regarding the solo stakers uh because it was perceived that uh we argued strongly that uh our proposal was going to save the solar stickers. Um it's it's not going to save the solar stickers. Uh it's uh giving us a shot at making making them still sustainable uh at certain threshold.

Um and it's also giving us a chance at uh I think them all out like the current status quo will lead us uh but in a better situation in term of of the network. Uh what I mean is that um the current curve is also pushing the solo stakers at a arguably faster rate and we end up with uh also no solo stakers at certain threshold but a much higher delution for everyone. What can save the solo stakers is me burn which is a a topic that's actively being researched and I hope that it will be published in time for AR for after he or later and also anti-correlation penalties that uh has decided to uh to to jump in and I'm

very glad that you are bringing back this uh this topic. Yeah, I so I don't remember where I took down this note, but I think it was maybe from listening to bank lists. Um, but I guess there are some solo stakers that said that if the ye if the yield on ETH drops to 2% or lower, then they won't remain as solo stakers. So, you know, if you guys are projecting this to drop to like 3%, then that definitely means that there's going to be this whole category that um will likely reduce sharply if not you know be eliminated. But one other point that I've heard is that this could basically just drive people to stake through ETFs and custodians. And this kind of goes back to um Oshene's point about the Nakamoto Nakamoto

coefficient and like the number of entities that could collude to kind of control the chain in some fashion. And frankly, it's also against crops principles as well. So, um, yeah, I know I keep asking Jerome to respond to this, but but any of you can can talk like as the author, it makes sense that, you know, it's natural to know what you're to wonder what you're thinking, but um, you know, any of you can kind of respond to that on, you know, whether you think that possibility is a likely outcome or, you know, um, yeah, what what you have to say to that.

>> I might have a go and give Jerome a break. Um, so I'm glad to hear him acknowledge that like the framing on this IP EIP wasn't maybe so hot when it comes to solo stickers. What he highlights is absolutely real. Solar stickers get a raw deal here in terms of they're getting taxed as income all along. Whereas if you hold like a wrapped LST, you pay cap gains years from now. Um, so you can kind of compound at a much better rate and it's it's definitely more effective. I think you know what caused contention and I was one of them like you know with my calculator being like wait a minute if we do come down to 0.3% APR doesn't matter what your taxes are you you don't

cover the the electricity cost or whatever the case may be is um I think what would be really more effective um to try and like solve this solo staker versus like delegation problem is something that the proofofstake alliance used to advocate for as like policy in the US which was to get um staking rewards taxed as created income as opposed to what they currently are. And the analogy here is that um a baker doesn't pay taxes when he bakes his bread, he pays it when he sells the bread. A fisherman doesn't pay taxes when he catches the fish, he pays it when he sells the fish. Uh Ethereum stakers shouldn't pay taxes when they earn the eat. They should pay it when they sell the E. If they did this, it

still wouldn't be like quite the same as LSTs. cap gains is different to income and like all sorts of different things, but it would help quite a lot with this disparity because the current proposal doesn't really make it better. But it is it is a problem like you are that the calculator that you showed there um pretty much you can name your ratio and equilibrium and whatever you want and you're almost always better off delegating except maybe in this worst case scenario where your delegator gets slashed or fails or whatever happens. Um yeah, >> if I if I may u come back to your your word uh Laura when you said uh some sort of stakers are saying if you go if you go below 2% I'm out and that that's a

concern of course um definitely uh and and all of us we have a reservation yield at some point I'm like yeah I'm I'm I just received an update that I should uh uh from Lighthouse I should put my put my nodes up to date now so I'll spend 15 20 minutes uh doing my maintenance to uh you know doing my job. I'm helping the network. So if you say it's 2% I'm out. Uh at current regime it's 58%. Like oh wow 58% it's coming it's coming really fast. Well it's it's coming in a long time. We are just at uh 35 right now. That's all right. But the entry queue has been full uh since the SEC gave its guidance in May 2025. Uh and it's it's not going downtrend. And as you get more delusion as a holder

that is not staking, your incentive is to stake now like uh fight for fight against the delusion. So there's there's there's actually real concern that we are just going to continue to grow. So let's say this person that want to be out at 2% well at 58% staking ratio is out. What's left in the network is one few sort of stakers and maybe a bunch of them that are in the same category. But at the at the at the same time uh we are down with way less set of stakers and a much higher issuance. We have a issuance of 1.1. Uh and that's how uh the current curve may allow for uh the survival of certain set of stakers by saying yeah well uh you have an operational risk

that's all you have as a as a solo staker and if you decide to go with an LST or a derivative you have the operational risk of the operator and you have all the governance risk and and smart contract rates linked to those u those uh entities. So maybe for them uh this extra type of risk can be compensated and they will stay. Um so what what we mean to say regarding the solo staker is uh the following. The current curve is a much worse situation than the curve that we propose because at least uh if all the sters are out we'll still have a lower issuance and some of them might very well stay up close while under the current regime it makes just sense for them to leave and

join something else at certain a certain certain stage. And this is a centralizing effect indeed because um when you when you look at um when you look at how well that's that's how that's why we want MV burn alongside of this proposal like we want to make sure that uh low um low impact low portion of um of of the validator set can actually have the same competitive advantage as bigger players. Otherwise you will just go to the biggest player because um he can play some time games. can get most of the of the me uh his return is much better. Um so you have an incentive to pick the biggest one but also the biggest one can be perceived as too big to fail. So uh you just stick with the

biggest one because you want to minimize your your risk of having operational risks and you know it's it's definitely something that we want to avoid. Um and um I'm happy to uh uh walk the the nakamoto coefficient next if you if you if you want ocean. >> Maybe before then if you wouldn't mind Laura one thing that I think we should mention of like data points from other proof ofstake chains. Um there's you know five or six maybe large mature proof ofstake chains out there and most of them don't have any slashing. So they don't have this kind of risk that is present Ethereum where you may lose like all of your principle and highest of them are usually around 70% staked but

many of them are in the like 50 to 50% type of stake. So I think while I do think it's very possible that we can get up towards 50% I think the every kind of 10 beyond that gets less and less likely. um especially if we see something like a mass slashing or a compromise or something I think people will like chill out quite a lot more and it's also taken us uh approaching six years to get to 36%. Um while I know we've had a big influx now we had the DAT and Tom Lee and you know a very kind of strange you know year of like large accumulators I don't think we will see that to the same level. Um so like I agree with Joan who says like we should

wait for me burn. I think we should ship Mev burn and you know we should consider this at le um you know when when we have a lot more insight like real time proving and like VK EVM is already a big one that people are eyeing up and you know we'll have quite a lot of expenses with it. So I think this is a bit early more than anything. >> Okay. Yeah. before we um so I definitely want to get to some questions, but I just want to talk about one last constituency that I saw called out as potentially being hurt, although I guess it's more that it's Ethereum that would be hurt because this constituency might not be as interested. And that Stany wrote in his essay that he felt that this proposal would effectively

um make um activity on Ethereum uneconomical. and he said that that would be quote a negative factor for any institutional buyer who would be considering taking ETH an ETH position instead of other networks with predictable cash flows. And he said this uncertainty has a significant adoption cost. So do you agree with his contention that potentially this would hurt institutional adoption of Ethereum? So Jerome, you had you very visibly shook your head no. So go ahead and explain.

>> No. No, not at all. Um, well, I think from um um look, sharpling did indeed make a statement on the matter. So that that's they they express themselves. Uh the the research of Grayscale uh published a couple of pieces as well welcoming the discussion notably uh also the 80s and ETF have uh yet to uh to um to express themselves. Um, no let's just but when you mentioned the sharpl link essay like >> uh he does make the point in here that he feels like institutions choose ETH because it's a productive asset. So it I

I don't know why you mentioned like like basically they are agreeing with Stani it seems like >> absolutely they they agreeing with they agreeing with Stani uh and the very next day they announced a partnership with Galaxy to open a D5 fund uh mostly focused on staking um and the day after they announced that they are going to send 200 million dollar worth of ETH to Lido. So I I definitely guess they are uh they are uh considering that uh yeah this is impacting their uh decision on on putting their asset into a specific strategy. But I I disagree with the framing of this is bad for institutions.

Um for example the position of grayscale is much more measured. Um when you are selling an ETF or when you're selling a DAT on if you are convincing people that if has a future uh if is going to raise in price or at least hold its value. Um and you are sprinkling on top of this a coupon say oh I have some yield look uh it's it's a productive asset uh it's a productive asset because I'm staking it could be a productive asset because um I'm doing an equity providing I'm doing u um all kinds of shenanigans on DeFi or uh no I'm picking the lowest risk possible something that dilutes everyone and that adds little security but that's that sure is yield look um when you are an investor on the other

end of the spectrum uh you are trying to get the the narrative behind that. You want to hear uh why would this thing hold it value? Where is the yield coming from and pretty soon the the delusion question arise because those investor are sophisticated uh they know that the like delusion is something real. So they do delution adjusted uh then they look at whether what is the what is the the direction is it going to keep on at this rate of 2.5 or is it going to go lower? What is your plan against that? And I I feel like it's um some some ETF and and DATs that we have talked to not shopping but uh the the other ones are like yeah but I have a problem in my narrative regarding the principle. I need to I need to explain that this thing is will

hold its value. And when you are an ETF or DAT and you declare like uh consideration regarding the issuance will hurt DeFi. We don't want that. You are also saying that uh uh things that would improve the narrative regarding the storage of value of your assets are not not an urgency. It's not it's not something that we should consider now. And at the same time um you are pushing the narrative that the best use case for E is just to go at stake and stay there which is not really good for the activity and certainly not good for uh adoption at large. So it's not um it's not the best um it's not the best framing I think. Um

look Tomley for example back in late April or May I don't remember exactly when said like oh we would we would wake up a discussion regarding issuance it has to be uh taken seriously and so on and so forth. And I'm I don't think it's it's very productive to go out again and say like we don't want this don't do this uh we are instead welcoming feedbacks and trying to improve our our proposal so uh it makes sense in terms of narrative of EF. But if the only use case for if is to go at stake uh then we should completely reconsider our security uh assumptions and how the beacon behave uh and also tell uh the people that are pushing for everything going at stake that under linear and ZKVM this doesn't work and this is happening in the next three to five four

years. So >> okay yeah I I want to actually what sorry >> what I mean is that if we are if we are going to have this discussion now we are preparing for the next upgrade at the same time and this is long-term thinking. >> Okay. Yeah. You so you you pulled on a tension that I feel is kind of like underlying this whole proposal which um is basically it sort of feels like it's intended to help regain its position as ultrasound money. Um and then you know all the people that are against it are saying like um this is hurting ETH's ability to remain a productive asset and those you know just maybe I don't know

is it is it possible to to have both at the same time or are they always going to be sort of diametrically opposed and you know I' I'd love to hear all your opinions on this and and also like if you feel like they're they're sort of mutually exclusive then which do you feel like Ethereum should optimize So any any one of you can go first. And by the way, I have like so many other questions. We're running out of time, but this is sort of at the heart of what's being discussed. >> Nobody wants to go first. Kevin, you go first.

>> I'll be brave. Um, yeah. I mean, I think that there's really a question, you know, Banklist has this really famous essay at the conception of Banklist about uh ETH being a triple triple point asset. Um, and so, uh, I think that there's really a zero- sum game between the ultrasound money, uh, vision, which is like monetary premium versus productive asset. Um, which is reliable yield that DeFi and institutions build on. Um, so I I I think that like there's and you know there's a there's a real question between uh capital asset uh consumable asset and store of value. Uh, which of the triple point asset does Ethereum want to become? And um you know, as I said, I think it's a

political economy trying to come at to consensus at a at a and when there's a zero- sum uh trade-off between the two, there just isn't this is why you have not seen the communities merge together or like come together. It's just been the same tribes saying their their uh talking points. So, uh, I think that all core devs is going to have to decide, uh, between these two paths and not deciding to do an EIP is a decision in itself. So, I'm really curious to see where this lands, but it is an unstoppable force and an immovable object. Uh, all core devs and uh the the DeFi folks, we cannot choose for both of them.

>> Yeah. To add my CODs, I think it's less um ultrasound money versus productive asset. I think it's um ultrasound money versus like crops. Um I might be in the comp who's like kind of more crop focused. I'm like no, you know, 1% issuance is fine. It's lower than almost everything else in the world and it's good for security. Whereas other people are like we can we can get another half a percent another 30% you know Ethereum exists to be ultrasound money. And I think that's really the major two camps here. Um the productive like yield side I think is is worth noting. I think as for the investors in the trady side to me I think they look for like two

things. They look for like predictability and they look for security. Um predictability they want to see something telegraphed for years. Like proof of stake was announced in the Ethereum white paper was five years worked on. Everyone was like cool. Yeah. A lot of social legitimacy. both quantum again announced in 2024 will ship in who knows 29 or something um has a lot of legitimacy. I think something around a change to issuance needs to have that level of like we're working on it. You know there's a like a mark change this uh blockchain works completely differently now it is zero knowledge proof and postquantum etc. Um and then the other side is security. I don't think they want any concern that Ethereum could be insecure because I

think that would like you know not let them you know be able to take like a risk. Um so I think this is one of my fears around this like 0% and stuff is saying ah we don't need security if we have 50% it'll be fine. I think it's like a little too close to I don't know the Bitcoin kind of security budget crisis and things like it. And that's why I think a lot of them are pretty okay with tail emissions like 1% they're like fine maybe they have an incentive that they make fees like it's it's not all um security perspective like some of them have a monetary upside of it but I do think um if you look at all the more centralized chains they're tenth of the value of Ethereum and I think we shouldn't give up Ethereum security lightly um under the assumption that

like slightly harder money would would make the price go up. Yeah, and I I think it should be stressed that we did not design our security and our proof of stake for uh staking above 50%. Uh our credible neutrality is in question here. And um if we end up lending at a 45% ratio at first with a 3.3% yield, it's it's still a productive asset. Um but it's it's also giving the opportunity for other E strategy to emerge and compete against it and potentially the close to risk-f free yield uh can be a bit higher than that at the end of the day. But as you said, we are we are um at the at the crossroads of uh what do we want Eve to

be. Um if uh we cannot agree that uh uh Eve should be money and Eve should be a pristine collateral then uh we would be better off designing for a fully dedicated system uh and and figure out how to maintain a form of decentralization in this context because uh that's that's very much what's uh at the in question here. Do you guys have time to go over a little bit? Um Jerome, do you? Okay, great. So, um what you know, one other centralization uh vector that people talked about was the liquid staking tokens and I heard on bank list they were saying well or or somewhere I I don't remember actually you guys I

like cramped you know my research in because I was on vacation. I couldn't follow it in real time. Um, so like I heard people talking about potentially having an enshrined LST in Ethereum, which feels like it would be a cleaner way to resolve any issues about, you know, other ent like or if a small number of entities colluding in some fashion over the network. Jerome, you you look skeptical of that proposal. >> No, Ocean is skeptical as well. I'll let him go first. >> Okay, >> three. Yeah, I am skeptical of it. Um, one of the main reasons is these liquid staking tokens have to make delegations to people to run the stake. And there's no perfect answer. You can pick a couple

operators you trust. You can be really community max. You can pick like thousands of homestakers, but there's a trade-off space and there's no like perfect answer. So, I really don't think um one homogeneous shared risk liquid staking token is like a runner. But I do think it points at like a pretty important reason that liquid staking tokens exist and reasons that there's a lot of centralized staking and that's the um illiquidity of native staking that it's really hard to get your money back or it can be really hard to get your money back. Right now we have these um cues that are like pretty bottlenecked and they could be like subject to a bit of a bank run. At the best case scenario, it takes about four days to get your money back. And right

now, it well, sorry, it could be months. And this uncertainty is why a very large amount of stakers opt to pick an LST or they opt to pick a centralized exchange because they know that they can walk in and they can sell their asset whenever. They might have to take a little bit of a write down on it, but they're okay with that so long as they can have their money back. I think this is the biggest problem staking has. and is what we should be kind of focusing on more so than the ratio. And I think we shouldn't make just an enshrined liquid staking token. I think the like most credibly neutral thing the protocol could do is have a price to burn a certain amount of ETH and get your stake out of there. And

in good times that'll be pretty cheap. It' probably be around the cost to borrow ETH for the same length of Q. But then in times of stress maybe it's higher. But people can go, "Okay, cool. I can get my money back." And if we had this feature, there'd be a huge amount of, you know, risk conscious stakers that would stick to their ledger. They would stick to some cold wallet. They, you know, wouldn't put all of their money on an exchange or an LST. And that's really what I think we should be considering more so than forcing a ratio. >> Okay, I'm going to speed through these last questions. Um, I did also just want to ask how this changes sort of like how easily Ethereum can compete with other

chains or even other types of assets such as stable coins. Um, I know that I phrased that a little bit strangely, but I'll explain it. So first of all um you know given that Salana has sort of like seven plus percent institutional staking yield like if ETH's policy is a yield that will trend towards zero depending on the stake level like does that just hurt Ethereum's competitive competitiveness against other chains um you know it doesn't have to just be Salana uh but then the other thing is you know I heard Tun just talking about how he felt like really you know yield from stable stable coins is kind of where things are right now. Like that's where a lot of activity is. And I

understand like yeah, people want to hold their ETH like I'm not saying that they're going to like convert their ETH to stable coins just for the yield on stable coins, but you know, if you're just sort of thinking about like how how their economic activity is focused, like is that something that also um could just cause people to lose interest in ETH? So yeah, do you feel like it just makes Ethereum less competitive against against any other asset that it might compete with? >> Uh I think it depends on what frame you take. Uh the frame of like the alt layer ones, they're maximalists. Is that all yield is the same and that you should go where the higher yield is and we're the most efficient things so you should use

us. uh if you talk to an Ethereum maxi they'll say ETH is institutions are choosing Ethereum and ETH because it's the only network with 100% uptime and with this pristine block space that is validated by multiple clients and so we are a differentiated asset and by the way when you're staking on these networks you have to stake soul on Salana and ETH on Ethereum and so if you believe that this is the superior technology it's going to have a monetary premium it's going to advance in the future then this is a different differentiated uh product that's just optimizing for different things than like a super highly efficient centralized alt layer one. So it just depends on which frame uh you know the

Ethereum frame is that we have a differentiated source of yield and a differentiated asset and uh the other frame is uh just go for the most efficient highest yield uh thing. >> Yeah. I mean, I feel like basically somebody who isn't ideological. They're they're more in the highest yield camp. >> But so so let me just I just want you to like institutions are choosing Ethereum because they want 100% uptime for their stable coins. So this isn't an ideological thing unless you think that like having 100% uptime is is ideology. These are like fundamentally important constraints for a for a financial system. And that's why an Ethereum maxi will say that uh it's a differentiated technology and source of yield.

>> Yeah. Yeah. I'm like but of course they also say what p past performance doesn't you know uh guarantee future results. So, and I know this is a technical thing that you're saying, but it applies like >> so that you know they can they can um tout that achievement, but that doesn't necessarily mean that like tomorrow there won't be, you know, an issue. But anyway, uh if somebody was going to add something, >> I was Yeah, I want to quickly uh say a word on um >> Yeah, I just want to say a word on the on the competition. Um, Bitcoin is printing less than than Epher. Uh, it used to not be the case. Um, that's

that's another area that we will be uh getting back uh with this change. Um, but we cannot compare with uh with other proof ofstake chains that are contenders to Ethereum. We build every single matrix. And uh when you say uh 7% yield uh on this chain uh you really have to subsidize people to run the nodes maybe maybe it's a matter of a matter of uh the the hardware requirements the server that you have to wear to run and so on that are uh so expensive that you need to pay a lot for those people to to to run those kind of nodes. Um if you are a solo stakers you have a a bill in the in the range of the Androids. So um that's

that's all right like you can actually solo stake and not many chains at our level can can actually claim that you can have a solo stakers and and still uh and still run a node yourself. Uh so we have an opportunity to uh to pay less for our security uh from certain respect to even be more secure by paying less and encouraging Eve to go elsewhere. Um it's um yeah it's it's it's something that we should uh we should consider now uh from um from different perspective and should not compare to chains that are uh subsidizing a lot to get uh to get acquisition. Uh if we came to this kind of conclusion we should ask the reverse question like will paying three time more or four time more or 10 10

time more our stakers uh bring more adoption or more activity to ethereal manup. I think nobody is taking this kind of path right now. We are on the on a very important um moment in the ether firm life like let's continue to pay stakers as much as necessary but as little as possible so we don't dilute the orders. If you can continue to stake at.3 like this guy that says like at 2% I'm out or and so on and so forth and if we land at 45% ratio post uh post implementation then yeah let's let's do it. Let's limit the dilution and and and keep Ethereum securing KDB neutral because post 50% are credibly neutral credible neutrality is very much in

question. >> Okay, last quick question uh which is just a point that Oshene made in his long tweet which is he talked about how so he or I'm just going to quote him. He said we're a couple hard forks away from real-time proving and a switch to postquantum Ethereum. The cost model for this chain is vastly different than the one we have today. Proposing blocks will take a server rack worth of expensive GPUs and a testing with a postquantum signature scheme is also more costly than the existing scheme. So he makes the point that he feels like actually like yeah okay we can focus on this now but actually like not so long in the future we're going to have a whole different set of calculations to be

making and so maybe the focus should be that. So, you know, I'm curious to hear like if any of you agree with that point, like, you know, should Ethereum be focused on other priorities? Um, Kevin or or Jerome or or Oshene, if you want to add on what I said. >> I think it says more or less what I mean. But like when this debate flared up in 2024, I think the things that people took away from it was we need to build consensus for multiple years. We need to pick something kind of on the hill with a very legitimate reason to redo issuance. And I think the two obvious ones are postquantum and like real time CK proofs. Um my math is at

something around a 100 grand a year in depreciating hardware to produce blocks when we go that way. And right now the the current proposal says we don't need to pay for that. It's fine. And I think if we do that we we'll end up with like two companies that will eat this cost to produce blocks and you know possible hell. But I don't really know if that's super sufficient. I I think we'd be much better off just picking one of those two and saying, "Yeah, we're going to we're going to build consensus for a change then." >> Yeah. Um the the.5 issuance that we put forth in the proposal is um something that the protocol team at the uh Ephraim Foundation is saying. I think I think it's mostly just Drake saying this, but it's some something that we can commit

on ultra long term. We can say like, "Hey, we can we can do 0.5 and be fine with it." uh under lean. So from from um from a long-term perspective um [clears throat] lean is just around the corner like it's a couple of years away from now. This proposal is um making the change now because it's going to be lasting over the years. not having the capacity um politically eos at the ecosystem level at the industry level to have this this discussion now uh while it's going to be following up in the following years um is a big problem because that also mean that um three years from now when we are at the very moment when we need to change the issuance because like the

duties have completely changed we will have much more if stake much more entrenched position and uh companies that and and companies and uh and and assets that will rely on this kind of yield. And so this is why the timing is so important. Like we have a we have a window of opportunity for a smooth transition. Um and we should we should not let it close. Um so I'm I'm glad that we are slowly converging. I think I hope I'm not the only one that that perceive this as a slow conversion. Uh but from my perspective, we had a a lot of very positive discussion over the the past few days and I'm um and I'm sorry I cannot respond faster than than than I do right now on the magician thread.

>> I mean you could tell AI to respond for you and then people would be really mad. [laughter] >> Yeah. >> Um >> okay. Uh last thing that I just want to make sure. So Kevin, you said that basically this will be discussed on all core devs on Thursday. So um it it feels like there's not enough consensus around anything to make a decision. So what's kind of like the most likely timeline on which things will play out and any of you can respond. >> So all core devs is on Thursday and what's being discussed right now is what's going into the next hard fork. Uh I believe it's called Hegatha. I may be getting that wrong. Correct me if not.

Um, and so this [clears throat] is kind of like figuring out which uh items are going to go on the train, which is leaving the station for the heck of heck of the fork. If it doesn't make it in, then I think it's much less likely that it gets in at all. Um, and uh, you know, Laura, I'll just repeat what I said earlier, which is that there's no easy answers here. This is a political economy uh, question and so there's there's possibly many right answers, but I think this is the real question is how do you do monetary policy uh, in a decentralized network? And since Ethereum has such a network effect and uh such a mature very high Lindy network uh I think it's sort of leading the way on on how monetary policy can be done for these blockchains. So uh really

curious to see what happens but tune in to all core devs on Thursday to see the next step. >> Okay. But if it doesn't get into that one. So that one's supposed to go later this year. Right. So basically the options are um they imple they implement it uh to uh to deploy at the end of this year or what then then the decision is punted to the next one which would be probably early 2027 or or first half of 2027 >> every six months I think uh is how often there's a fork these days.

>> Okay. Okay. >> Yeah. Um I maybe I may be wrong on the matter and maybe ocean you can correct me. Uh the the old codev meeting that we are having this week um is um it's going to say like okay we have all of the we have those 66 different EIP suggested for uh for Hegota um maybe consider that okay this one is really not mature uh technically it's too complicated like we need more time and then set aside for future discussion.

uh and that's that that's what that's what this is what will happen on the on the whole cord like cordes will look at the different tips from a different perspective and say like okay this one is a this one this one needs more maturity this one needs to be discussed this one is clearly too early this one and and and that one and so on and so forth so what's what are the what are the outcomes here um maybe a cord come out and say like okay 8363 like too much uh too much uh on on the plate like let's not discuss that anymore like uh we we kill this right now right now and maybe some of them are getting pressured that to do so or or other situations I don't know but um um I don't think it's the likely outcome I think the likely

outcome is that they will decide to let the discussion continue um just to know that let's see let's wait for the next alldev to see if there's more clarity on should we or should we not do that uh but the very the very uh uh the the very date that you should have in mind is that uh there's the 26 6 of October where the proposed for inclusion which is the status of this EIP and it's also the status for the anti-correlation EIP that I hope will make it in uh on the 26th of October the cordell will decide if uh the different proposal are mature enough to be considered for inclusion uh which triggers u I think the beginning of the test nets and so on and the beginning of the implementation and so

on and the advantage of uh our EIP is that um however contentious it may be it's not a big technical hurdle to uh to implement. I'm not saying it's easy, but it's it's not hard compared to uh to other things. So I I wouldn't expect the cordiffs to uh to take stance on saying like we we should not discuss this further because it's just too contentious to whatever in the past they have uh let the discussion continue on very contentious thing including prop uh but let's let's see what the future uh has for us.

>> Okay. your own fit. >> Well, thank you all so much for joining in on this discussion. This was really interesting and yeah, I'm curious to see what plays out. I see arguments on both sides. Um, but I think that probably means it needs some amount of refining uh before before it gets adopted if it gets adopted. Um, all right. Well, thank you everyone and thanks everyone for joining the live stream. We will catch you next next we will catch you tomorrow. This show is forformational and entertainment purposes only, and my guests and I may hold assets discussed on the show. For more disclosures, visit unchanged crypto.com.

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