Debunking Neoclassical Economics, Private Debt and System Breakdown
De Week van Bitcoin · 19 Oct 2025 · 1:38:48
Paul Buitink sits down in person with Australian economist Steve Keen, author of Debunking Economics and The New Economics. Keen argues mainstream neoclassical economics rests on flawed foundations such as supply and demand curves and diminishing returns, and that economists miss crises because they ignore money and debt, following Hyman Minsky. He calls the euro a mistake, says public debt matters less than private debt, and argues a rising gold price signals people sensing a system breakdown. The conversation closes on climate change and other risks to humanity, where he is pessimistic.
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From De Week van Bitcoin; community: Reinvent Money.
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you're saying you're assuming everybody's an idiot. And I said, well, did you see the financial crisis coming? He said, no. I said, well, on that basis, on your own definition, you're an idiot. >> France, Netherlands, Germany, they would be better off having their own currency. >> I I think we should, the euro is always a mistake. If you eliminated all government debt by having the Treasury, the central bank buy all the outstanding debt tomorrow, then the bond market would disappear and the banks would scream like crazy saying, "Is us more bonds, sell some of those bonds back to us." You don't want banks to be creating money to drive up asset prices. You want them to be creating money to create assets. People are sensing a system breakdown. And in that world, things
like gold, assets of that nature do well when there's social breakdown. And the thing is, you should be trying to address the social breakdown rather than celebrating the rising price of gold. Very, very rarely do humans solve a problem preemptively. They experience the problem and then try to survive the aftermath. And that's what I expect. [Music] [Applause] [Music] Hello everyone. And my name is Paul and welcome back to Reinvent Money. Today I have an amazing opportunity to sit in person with Professor Steve Keen.
Hi Steve. >> Good to be here. >> It's what seven years since last time we had a chat. >> Yeah. Yeah. We um had also an online chat like 5 years ago but seven years ago when we were in Thailand. Yeah. >> Um yeah. But you live in Holland so therefore record this in the studio. >> It's always much better of course than than online. Um you are um at the moment a visiting professor also in Amsterdam at the University of Amsterdam. >> Yep. Teaching of course they're in the mast's program. Only a small amount of teaching but quite a lot of fun with cars homes is one of the very good academics here.
>> Nice. And we're going to talk about economics of course. Uh we're going to talk about some of your books. I have one here. I got a bunch of them at home. Um this is the new economics. Um but of the first one I ever read was debunking economics of course. Um let's let's start um there first and and um I'd like to give you the opportunity again to debunk mainstream uh neocclassical economics and then we're going to talk about our financial system which is like the main topic of of uh the reinvent money podcast where we talk about money and power. >> Um I'd like to get your most recent insights on on um what's going wrong at the moment in our financial system and how we can alleviate that or how we can solve some of our challenges. And then we're talking afterwards we're going to
talk a little bit about the bigger picture like challenges that humanity faces at the moment such as nuclear war possibly or climate change some of these things that you're also very concerned about uh because in in our little talk in the car over to our studio I uh you're a bit gloomy um let's see if we can get get some positive spirits out of you today. >> We have to work hard but give it a try. >> Yeah. So let's first talk about um economics. uh what um do you believe is is is the main thing that uh most mainstream economics e economists get wrong?
>> Well, their entire framework is wrong. I mean I I've taken like the the term we use to describe the dominant school of thought and economics these days is neocclassical and that actually was the previous school was called the classical school. These guys are the neocclassicals. Um but I call them toll make because fundamentally they've got a a model of the economy which is as acc less accurate about the and less correct about the structure of the economy than tomake astronomy was about the structure of the universe. Uh but one if if you have a like if you have the the toll situation for astronomy we know that there are no crystalline spheres. Uh we know that the heavenly bodies are not
perfect. We know the Earth is not the center of the universe, but for 1500 years, that's what educated people believe was the case. And with that paradigm, they did a damn good job of enabling themselves to predict where the planets were going to be, you know, in in the vast in the indefinite future. Um, so they had a model which fitted the data and was completely wrong. And I think economics is the similar sort of situation. Uh it it all starts from a theory of microeconomics and there there's it looks convincing the intersecting demand and supply curves you know everything happens where the two lines cross that sort of thing and it's got a superficial appeal to it it's it's an easy meme for people to have the way that they organize how they think
about the economy in general but when you look at the foundations what lies behind the demand curve what lies behind the supply curve it's complete rubbish. the uh the the theory itself is internally inconsistent and people don't realize this unless you read the very deep literature which of course I've done. So people think oh you know makes sense you it's more expensive when you increase output supply's got to increase in price and uh demand's going to be get larger as price falls so there'll be an equilibrium between the two etc etc but when you take a look at can the theory itself explain why the curves are there why they intersect where they do and why the intersection is is stable and equilibrium it fails on all those fronts
and uh it it what it means is it's a it's a convincing model which is completely wrong about the structure of the economy and then you take guidance from that model and apply it to the economy and my god you have economic catastrophes. Who would ever have thought it? So it I'll give the probably the simplest one and I'm actually writing some pieces about it right now. Part of the theory says that the cost of production rises because what they call diminishing marginal productivity. So what's supposed to happen is you have a as you add more and more workers to the same number of machines ultimately you reach a ideal situation where you get the ideal ratio of workers to machines but if you want more output you've got
to go past that point so you have too many workers for the machines they each had a bit more output but prod productivity falls over time that is a mythical conception of how a factory operates what you find is factories are designed by engineers uh to work be most efficient at maximum scale of output. Factories deliberately have excess capacity for two reasons. One, you're in a growing economy. So there'd be if you made a factory which was a new new factory which is 100% utilized on day one, it's too small. So you've got to have spare capacity with so therefore there's you you do not have you're not at the point where you've got too many workers per machines. What you have instead of lines, you have idle which you'll turn on when the production expands enough to justify adding those
machines. But you're not you you're not going to reach the point where you have too many workers per machine. And that's if you read it in economics textbook, that's what they teach you. What that means is firms have constant or falling variable cost per unit. They make a markup on top of that to set their price. There is no way that what they call marginal cost ever equals price. And therefore, what you get is is firms don't uh compete with homogeneous products. Another assumption of the theory. So like you know you and I drove here in a car. Okay. Now, what's a car?
Okay. A car is a three or four-wheel uh uh enclosed personal motorized serious durable transportation device. Do you own one of those? No. What What's your car? It's I've forgotten the brand. >> A Volvo. >> A Volvo. Okay. But you could have a Ferrari or a Lamborghini or a Prada or whatever else. Um products are differentiated. So a huge part of the the story that people get locked up in is imagining there's such a thing as the supply curve for the car industry if that's so what's the equilibrium price for a car. It's a silly bloody question.
That's what it is. So all these things mean we have a mental framework which is completely wrong about how production actually occurs and then we try to manage production and that happens the same story. We use exactly the same model to model banking and then we try to control the monetary system. So if you got if you got a wrong model, you're going to make stuff ups all the time. And that's what I find is just commonplace. And the pity is it's such a superficially appealing theory to tell people in fact the foundations are wrong means they've got to change their entire mindset. And most people aren't capable of doing that.
>> But that's the most amazing thing that the one thing economists don't seem to understand is money itself. >> Is it a bit like a fish in a water that doesn't water? Then basically, you know, a fish doesn't know what water is. And it it goes right back to the early neocclassical. So we date the neocclassical school from the 1870s. But if you go back, you can the basic idea of the neocclassical school as opposed to the classical. It's the neocclassical things. Value is subjective. Okay? Value is a utility. So it's the pleasure that I get from drinking this that determines how much I >> Which makes total sense in my view, >> which makes sense. It sounds appealing.
Okay. Um but if then the price is subjective or objective that comes down to the issue does the price reflects my satisfaction from consuming it. But it also according to the theory reflects the fall in satisfaction for the person who sold it to me. Okay. Their utility falls as they give me their stuff. Mine rises and that is the factory producers not getting a decline in utility because I've bought this product off them. Okay. they they have they're they're quite happy to see the product go out the door. So it's the foundation ends up being as the classical sku used to say things exchange at their cost of production.
Okay, profit is still feasible in that situation but it's the cost of production that sets prices not utility. So the the the standard idea that Marshall teaches and he says that analogy most people have probably heard that say whether supply or demand sets price and quantity or which one sets you know does supply or demand set set quantity and price. Marshall said you might as well ask which blade of a scissors cuts a piece of paper the up or the under. But in fact when you when you do the analysis and look at how firms actually operate the the result is the cost of production sets the price. Firms put a markup on their cost of production
to make a profit but it's the cost of production that sets price. Demand sets quantity. Okay. They are independent in that sense. So utility determines how many you sell. Okay. But not the price at which it's sold. That's >> as I can I can confirm that if I decide what the price of my product should be, I have to take into account what it cost me to produce it. And you and you in put a markup on you. Your markup is, you know, what are my competitors doing? What markup can is my product better or worse than theirs? Uh uh what's differentiates me from my rivals? That's real world competition and that's interesting and it's fascinating and that's what we should be studying.
Instead with this myth of homogeneous products, people uh the little mathematical exercises which only work if people factories run by idiots who you know don't have enough machines handy and let things get crowded. If you read a textbook explanation of a of a factory, for example, Manure, which is one of the textbooks that I savage in my my writing, manure it talks about uh Hungry Helen's Biscuit Factory. And of course, Hungry Helen, you know that company well, don't you? You've shoed there many, many times. It's the figment of his imagination. And in that figment of his imagination, he has people lining up for machines and bumping into each other. It's it's a keystone cops version of what factories actually do. You might start that way, but you don't stay in
business if you remain that shambolic. So the model they have is a shambolic system for producers who don't know what they're doing, don't have enough machines. It's crazy. Yeah. But that story, people fall for it and they don't realize they've got themselves locked into a set of ridiculous assumptions that are just not about the real world. So that's our starting point. With an economics like that, everything we do guided by mansion economic theory is going to be a mistake. and and some u economists um argued or or criticized your book saying look maybe they're oversimplifying um reality but perhaps you're oversimplifying their models because >> no I mean again we were talking about money and I got a bit distracted there
but if you go back to see where the ideas for money came from it's from Jean Baptiste say who was a a neo neo sort of proton neocclassical friend and rival of Ricardo's and he he Ricardo was saying cost of production sets price. Uh um um Smith say was saying utility sets demand and price but as part of his argument he said that uh producers don't want money producers want goods. So a producer though they have the air of wanting money for their goods do in fact want merchandise for their merchandise.
That's the argument he made. In other words, capitalists don't wish to accumulate money. Now call me crazy but I think they do want to accumulate money. So what you got with say is not a model of capitalism. It's a model of petty commodity exchange where there's no accumulation of wealth over time and no desire to accumulate wealth. That's not capitalism. Okay. So it's an unrealistic vision of a capitalist system. And as part of that unrealism say claimed that people don't want to accumulate money and therefore they treat money as what they call a veil over ba. So if you remove the monetary system, you see capitalism more clearly.
But to me, removing the monetary system from capitalism is a bit like taking the wings off a bird and then saying, "Let's see if the bird can fly." I'm sorry. It needs the wings to fly. If you don't have the wings as part of your model of a bird, you're never going to understand flight. And if you don't have money as part of your model of capitalism, you're never going to understand capitalism. So I've as well as critiquing mainstream economics I've also developed the software package to enable me to model the monetary system properly. I call >> named after the one economist that did understand >> Minsky. We've actually changed the name recently because it's it's also got a data analysis side to it which is we're targeting the business intelligence market with a graphical tool for analyzing multi-dimensional data far
more flexible and far more powerful than pivot tables. So we're calling it Ravvel now, but it still includes all that modeling component. And what it does, and this might sound crazy to anybody who's worked in business, it implements accounting. It simply has a double entry bookkeeping tool we call a godly table after win godly. And when you put the uh when you have a like a theory of a monetary system, neocclassical economists talk about supply and demand. We show assets, liabilities, and equity. And I can actually say if that's what the structure of the of the marketing the monetary system is then your predictions are right. But this is actually the structure or your predictions are wrong.
>> Yeah. I think one one clear demonstration of the fact that most economists don't understand u money is that most of the people in their profession didn't see the 2008 crisis from happening. >> Totally blind. Yeah. >> You predicted it. I did. You're famous for that. Um but also Minsky was able through his >> if if I had read Minsky I wouldn't have predicted the crisis cuz while >> Tell me more about Minsky. >> Yeah. So Minsky um his parents were um Menchevik communists. They escaped Russia to get away from um Stalin. I'm not sure whether they met in Chicago or they left came to Chicago together. But he was raised in the middle of the Great Depression by two parents who were
communists. Okay. uh but not not the Leninist style who said you got to go to socialism. The Mencheviks believed you had to go through a capitalist phase first of all. >> The more the moderates socialism but Marx's ideas were that Markx believe you had to have capitalism first before we could reach socialism. Lenon has said okay we can just leap over the capitalist stage and go from a feudal structure. We saw what a disaster that was. So the Meniks were more realistic. They would have been targeted by the Leninist if they'd stayed. So they move to move to America and then the great depression occurs and the the and that would be you imagine how much that would have been discussed in his household. So Minsk's uh question that he asked himself when he became an economist is
can it a great depression happen again and if it can happen why hasn't it happened between the the end of World War II and the 1980s when he was doing his most prolific writing and he said to explain that we have to have a model that can generate a great depression as one of the possible states of a capitalist economy. Unless your model can generate that it's not a model of capitalism. Well, if you look at what the neocclassicals do with their so-called dynamic stoastic general equilibrium models, they don't have money or banks or debt inside there. So, the things that give you a financial crisis are not even part of their model.
So, Bernani spoke to the American Congress when he was governor of the of the Federal Reserve. gave his presentation to Congress in I think it was it was July I think of 2007 and he gave them predictions about what a great year 2008 was going to be 3 weeks before the financial crisis began >> and he's supposed to be a student of of the great depression >> but you you read I mean this this is where people people have this superficial understanding that's why I go back and I read all the originals people say you know have you read yes I have read okay uh but he wrote had a book called Essays on the Great Depression and that was his like his calling card sort of applying for the
job as being governor because he said I'm the expert on the great depression. Well, as expert on the Great Depression, you'd think you'd read some of the other people. So, Hyman Minsky and Charles Kindleberger are two people a lot of people in finance would know the work of Charles Kindleberger. >> This is pretty the entire consideration that Bernani gives to Kindleberger and Minsky in his book. He says Minsky and Charles Kindleberger have argued for the innate instability of a capitalist economy, but in order to do so, they have deviated from the assumption of rationality. I read Kindleberger two years ago in in my summer break and I loved it so much, but um I cannot understand why someone like Berneni
wouldn't would not have read that book because he he he probably flicked through it. Okay. Okay. But what this is this is a sentence literally that's a sentence. Kindleberger and Minsky have predicted instability but had to deviate from the assumption of rational economic behavior. There's a footnote and the footnote then says I don't doubt the importance of irrationality in ordinary life but it seems to me the best research uh approach is to push the rationality postulate as far as it will go. That's the end of his discussion of Minsky. Okay. So he doesn't even read interpretations of the great depression that don't fit in a neocclassical framework. So from a neocclassical point of view, what could have caused the
great depression? Answer, the Federal Reserve. And he criticized the Federal Reserve for reducing the money supply by not boosting the money multiplier and not converting gold inflows into reserves in 1928 and 29. >> Yeah. But he missed bank credit completely. >> Missed bank credit completely. Totally missed it. And then of course that's what I look at. So as soon as because Minsky focuses upon the role of private debt in both causing booms and crashes, the first thing I looked at uh I I got asked to get involved in law law cases and expert witnesses back in 2005. So I'd done my PhD on modeling Minsky's financial instability hypothesis back in the '90s. Finished it. Then I wrote debunking economics. I got involved in
battles with neocclassicals over some of the claims I made in that book. So I sort of let the debt ball drop for a while. I hadn't looked at levels of private debt for it since the early 90s. And then I took a look at the ratio of private debt to GDP in Australia. And I'd said I'd written a line saying the ratio of private debt to GDP has been growing exponentially recently. Now, as an expert, you're not allowed to make hyperbolic statements. So, I better go check and see. It won't quite be exponential. I'll need to modify the word a bit. Then I plotted it and the relationship between a pure exponential curve from 1965 I think through to 2005 when I was writing the book fitted to a correlation coefficient
of.99 something you know good enough I said and I said bloody hell that ratio is rising exponentially I don't have to change the word wonder what's happening in America I downloaded the flow of funds data the same thing not quite as extreme but from 1945 through to 2005 the same basic story I I think the correlation was 0.92 with a pure exponential of the ratio not the level of debt but the ratio of debt to GDP and I thought this ratio can't continue rising at some point it will have to turn around credit will therefore probably go negative so rather than credit adding to aggregate demand it'll be subtracting from aggregate demand when that happens we'll have a crisis >> and is that a so-called Minsky moment >> that's the Minsky moment so I I that's
the like the verbal analysis that I did and then when you look at the actual data you see that the the level the rate of change of private debt in America from 1945 until 2005 was always positive. So credit was always adding to aggregate demand and income over that period of time. And then it went from being equivalent to 15% of GDP. So plus 15% additional demand coming from credit in 2005 and by 2009 it was minus 5%. That's a 20% of GDP turnaround to demand coming from credit. So partly what I've had to do to make all these cases I I made the claim that credit adds to aggregate demand. Now neocclassicals say that's not true because if Paul then
Steve some money Paul can spend less and Steve can spend more and the aggregate demand cancels out. That's the loanable funds model where banks don't originate money and debt. Banks enable savers to interact with borrowers and they might charge a fee for the service but that's all the banks really do according to the textbook. That is, can I use a technical term here? Yeah, >> that's >> Yeah, you can use your French. >> That's Okay. What the banks do, banks create debt and they create money at the same time. And when you have that happening, the increase in assets on one side, which is the the bank's assets of loans increase, they increase their liabilities at the same time. And the person who borrowed that money didn't borrow for the sheer pleasure of being in debt. They borrowed to spend. So they borrow the money, they
spend it. Therefore, that increase in credit becomes both part of aggregate expenditure by the borrower and aggregate income by the person they spend that borrowed money on. And that's I've done the mathematics to prove that now. So, it's something I didn't know back in 2005, but I can now prove that mathematically. And what that means, it justifies the explanation that a high level of credit will increase demand. And when credit goes negative, it puts you into a not just a recession, but potentially a depression. >> Yeah. and Minsky um he had in his in his work he defined three phases uh how how you get to that eventual Minsky moment you have hedge phase the speculative phase and then the Ponzi phase >> yeah I don't particularly use that a great deal I mean that's more the sort
of thing you do with if you do a multi- aent model for example you might have you know you might have three sorts of agents hedge agent speculative agent Ponzi agent that's quite feasible I just work at the aggregate level but that's the basic point he made is that people's expectation change over a business cycle. Now again, one fantasy thing that neocclassicals argue in favor of and it's built into their macro models which is why they don't see these things coming is what they call rational expectations. Now you you're you're rational, aren't you? >> Uh yeah, but I have a factors around me.
So >> but your expect if you so says you have rational expect. Well, yeah, I'm rational. Yeah, my expectation would be rational. When you look at how they define rational expectations, it actually translates as capacity to predict the future accurately using economic models. That's what they know rational. Nobody's rational. That's garbage. It's that is actually definition of capacity for accurate prophecy. They say when they say you're rational, aren't you? They mean you think you're Nostradamus or Jesus, don't you? No, maybe Muhammad. Okay, it's it's a distortion of what the word rational actually means. And then if you go back and take a look where the idea came from and again this is the sort of reading that I do all the time. It came out of a paper by a colleague called John Muth
when he was trying to get rid of what's called the cobweb cycle explanation for cycles in the price. It's called the hog cycle in America ups and downs of agricultural prices and he wanted to get rid of the argument that the market was unstable. So he said all the farmers are rational. That means they have models of the economy in their head that are the same as my economic models. Therefore they can predict the future. So this move up and down the demand curve. They're not doing this crazy cycling. But as part of it, he said his justification was and this is where what I've got I've just realized only recently. They will make an assumption to hang on to the conclusion of the theory. They'll make an assumption that contradicts the fundamental theory. So for example, their theory of pricing is things are based on utility. Uh to have
utility something to have a price as well as having utility something to have a price it has to be scarce. So if water's, you know, cheap, you can drink water from there's no price. Even though there's great utility, you pay a price for this because it's produced and there's utility. So it's scarce. Okay? So scarcity means it's going to have a price. Now, if something is scarce, you're only going to buy it until such time as the marginal utility of buying it equals the marginal cost from buying it. Okay? So if you we're talking in terms of information, for example, information's obviously got utility.
Okay? It's also scarce. Therefore, the rational agent should only buy information until such time as the marginal utility of what they gained from the information equals the marginal cost of paying. So, from a neocclassical point of view, information knowledge should be bounded. We should be boundedly rational because it's simply stupid to pay the infinite amount of money you'd need to pay to have perfect information. What does Muth say instead? He says it was at one point information is scarce and then he should have carried on with my stuff. He is information is scarce and the economic system generally does not waste it.
Therefore I assume information is either free which is crazy or people pay an infinite price for information which is crazy. So there's the basis of the definition of rationality that they use is an irrational thing. Either information is free, which is nonsense, or people buy more information than they need, which is also nonsense. So they end up contradicting their own theory at the foundations. And that means that people who learn this stuff at a superficial level. Yeah, I've got rational expectations. You're being conned because when you work down to the bottom, the person who reads that conclusion literally contradicts the theory you think you believe in. So that's why I've said it's just got to be thrown away. It's it's as useful for
describing a capitalist economy as the tomake model of the universe was for you know plotting flights to Mars. >> And could you argue that at the moment information is becoming more abundant and and freer for example um >> oh you you also get for free is disinformation. >> That's true. >> Okay. What's the effort involved is you know it is crazy to have that assumption. So what they used rational expectations for was to eliminate the issues they should actually be considering. Whereas Minsky back to his idea about uh expectations you know the the hedge speculative and Ponzi phase most people say that have different types of agents and so you're going to get an increase in Ponzi over time. What
I do is say there's a business cycle and and this is also in Minsky is working. So he said that the way you analyze a capitalist economy is to take it at a point in historical time when there's been a crisis in the recent past, but you've actually recovered from the crisis. So people expectations are still scarred by a disaster in the recent past, but you're now at the stage where the economy is starting to recuperate. So in that situation, firms and banks are going to be unwilling to take on too much debt. So the only projects they're going to consider are those which are conservatively funded conservative estimations. But because the economy's recovered all those projects are going to succeed. So what then happens is people look at the results and think gee
if we'd had a high level of leverage you would have made more money. So we actually let's take on some more debt now. Because you take on more debt you finance more investment. You get a self-fulfilling prophecy which propels you upwards. But then what happens as you go towards the upward stages? You're causing a boom. Workers get wage rises. You're borrowing money from the banks. You got to pay interest to them as well. Your expectations don't quite work out. You then find at the peak of the the bubble, you're not making the profits you expected. You cut back on investment. You go down through a cycle again.
>> It's a bit like bad times create good people. Good people create good times. Good times create that classic car. What was the cartoon? You you've probably seen it with a bloke saying this one this this product is a good buy and saying bye goodbye good bye bye bye bye bye bye bye and then and then this is crazy uh uh what I've forgotten where he gets out of it but he says I'm going to see you later or uh uh uh sell I say this this stock will really excel >> cartoon yeah >> sell sell boom boom and bus cycle so Minsky was correct about that being the nature of capitalism but he tried the nature of of of humanity. Maybe even >> capitalism amplifies it. Yeah. Because you don't make the same personal gains
out of other social systems. So capitalism will amplify that instability and we get cycles and with that that vision he anticipated booms and slumps and then I >> capitalism amplifies it or is it more like that the monetary system as we've built it amplifies this? It's both >> because like capitalism on a more of an Austrian school basis with with hard money perhaps would have less um dramatic peaks and and >> yeah you got to invent hard money in the first place and this is the other thing I mean our historical models of money are also false just where money originated. So but you would you know the Austrian um you you're still going to get a a boom out of the system. the the Austrian idea pretty much argues
banking system doesn't create money. Okay. Now, if you didn't have the banking system creating money, then yes, you would have smaller bubbles. So, the the fact that money is created by the banking system is what partially causes those feedbacks because you borrow money, you get extra debt, but you've got the money to spend, so they get more turnover. So, there's feedbacks between the system. >> So, in that sense, Minsky and Austrians are on the same page that an excess of bank credits would lead to a boom and eventually bust. >> Yeah. But the Austrians think it can be controlled by the rate of interest. And and what the basic point that that Minsky makes is that when you expect a capital gain of 20 and 30%. Interest rates of four and five and six and whatever percentage you like aren't going to change your mind all that much.
So what the Austrians leave out, not all of them, the neocclassicals are much worse on this front. The neocclassicals leave out uncertainty. They assume you can predict the future. Okay. when you have live in an uncertain world then the possibility of gain that you expect from you know capital gain can be far greater than the rate of interest you have to pay for the money. So to try to control the level of economic activity by modifying the interest rate which is what central banks do is which means you see this so fast because you'd have to put the interest rate up enormous amounts to get rid of those expectations of huge capital gain. So it tends not to be it's not so much a control mechanism, it's a battering ram. If you want to smash somebody in the face with a high interest rate, then you can you can
eventually crack a bubble, but you certainly can't fine-tune the system. But the Austrians, I think, would like the market to define what the interest rates should be. Uh and on the other hand, we have the neocclassicals who believe central banks should um set interest rates, at least short-term interest rates. What does Minsky say about who should um decide on interest rates? >> Well, the interest rates are pretty much controlled by the by the central bank in terms of bond rates. Um Minsky is actually similar to Smith on this front. He and Smith actually argued for controls on the rate of interest because he's Smith's argument there was that if you you should set a maximum rate of interest slightly above uh like a whether the market rate might be 8%, you
set a maximum of 10. said anybody's willing to pay more than 10 is most likely what he called a proflegate. Okay. I've forgotten the other team he term me. This is Smith. But the idea being that you don't want to give money to people who are willing to pay projectors and profit. He called them projectors. Ponzi schemers fundamentally we'd call them today. So only Ponzi scheme is going to be willing to pay higher than a controlled rate of interest. So the the rate of interest certainly in our modern system is set by the central bank. And once the central bank sets the rate for short-term interest and and bonds, that tends to be the reference point for the remainder of the system. So it's not a market system in that sense. And if you if you thought the the the thought that
the price system can control the instability of the capacity to create money is just nonsense. It's far more volatile than that. And you get feedback effects that are left out of the equilibrium thinking that goes with that mindset. So, uh, Minsky would argue even if you try to have market interest rates set, there's no way that would stop the instability of the capacity to create money that comes out of the current system. But if the argument is that um, neocclassical models are basically too simple to fully grasp reality because reality is very um, complex. Couldn't that same argument then be made about your um model as well? Because it's is is society, the economy, the human mind not too complex to to put into this is
where technology has enabled us to model complex systems far more accurately than was possible in the 19th century. Uh and economists have excluded themselves from those developments but their obsession upon equilibrium modeling. So if you the the the real starting point for the capacity to model the uh complex systems properly was the development of the computer and you can see particularly J forester playing a major role in developing what's called system dynamics but the you can now model something as complicated as the weather for example in a set of computer programs which where we we will people attack weather forecasts these days but they're so much more accurate than they were 50 years ago. Okay. So that you can actually have
a simulation of a complex system and then get guidance from that. Now economists because they're stuck in this equilibrium fetish that they still have haven't used any of those technologies. So like the dominant model that central banks use and treasuries are called dynamic stoastic general equilibrium models. There's nothing general about equilibrium. Okay. the system the a real complex system is always out of equilibrium. >> I've yet to find an equilibrium. I I cannot I tried to find it if you were there. Yeah, I know.
>> It'll last 30 seconds maybe at most if you're lucky and probably wrong about it anyway. Okay. So, that's the the fact we can model complex systems is something which economics could have adopted if they didn't have the fetish about believing the system is an equilibrium. because of that the the number of people who actually use genuine dynamic methods in economics is mainly my friends. Okay. No neocclassical that I know of and I know I've read a huge amount of their work. >> And you're a postcian, right? If we if we could label them called post, it's just because the I mean in some ways Kane's was a reaction to the unreality of the economics of his day. So the fact it's called postyn is because he was like a a center for those critical
discussions in the 20s and 30s. Uh but what then happened was the neocclassicals reinterpreted him using the work of John Hicks and what's called the ISLM model as a as a volian. So that happened and the people around canes were horrified. People like Joan Robinson and Nikki Caldor and Kleski and so on. So they said oh that's not Canes we're the real ones. We're post Canesanes. were after you guys. >> Why not neo neoconsians? Like you have the neocclassicals and why not the neoangens? >> They were the canes was a he was a funny a funny kettle of fishes. Brilliant writer, brilliant thinker, but hadn't quite escaped from his Marshallian foundations. But he was surrounded by people who rejected Marshall. People
like Pierro Schaffer, Joan Robinson, Caldor and so on. So the postcanesian tradition was more of a deviation from the mainstream than Kanes himself was. And what happened with the with Kanes was he sort of attracted the mainstream for a while and they deviated away back to their original thoughts through John Hicks. So the neocanesians, neocclassicals, they're all the same bunch. Uh they basically still accept a vrazian vision of how the economy operates a general equilibrium vision whereas the postcians are into effectively general dynamics non-equilibrium complex systems. And that's and you can model much more effectively with those tools now than you could with the
neocclassical tools. >> I can imagine that I mean it's a fact that we are much better now able to forecast the weather than let's say 50 years ago. But the economy is even more complex of course than than the weather system like if Trump sends out a a tweet he can crash stock markets. How can you model that? >> You can't model all those details. You're going to always be having generalizations and so on. But if you're leaving out the major factors that cause instability, how can you model instability? Now, the neocclassicals make a series of decisions that say we don't have to include the banking system in our model, and we don't have to include that banks create money in our modeling.
>> Yeah, that's an oversimplification. Of course, >> it's it's a travesty. There's there what's called simplifying assumptions. And and this is what neocclassical that's just a simplifying assumption. I I had a funny interaction with a neocclassical, a young neocclassical at a conference in Brisbane, the Western Economic Association conference a couple of decades ago and he was reacting to my explanation of Minsk's financial instability hypothesis. I'd seen him present earlier so I knew if he came to my session it could be fun. And he's sitting in the front row and he finally can't contain himself and he finally says, "But but but but you're saying you're assuming everybody's an idiot."
And I said, 'Well, did you see the financial crisis coming?' He said, 'N no.' I said, 'Well, on that basis, on your own definition, you're an idiot. Why shouldn't I model the economy of consisting of people like you? I was actually I realized how rude I was being. So, he didn't say it quite as loudly as I should have said, but he chased me out of the room afterwards and finally said, "We've got to make some simplifying assumptions." And I said, "Mate, you've got to learn the difference between a simplifying assumption and a fantasy." But is it also maybe your Achilles heel then that sometimes you can come across as rude and perhaps a bit arrogant towards like the mainstream economist.
>> The second the second chapter of my first book debunking economics is no more Mr. Nice Guy because of my predecessors in the non-orthodox stream had been trying to persuade neocclassical economists and they're getting rejected and ridiculed and so on. I thought screw this being polite hasn't worked so I'm going to be rude. My actual nature is quite polite as you know from >> I know personally but you put me on the wrong side and I can be as >> unleash the beast here. >> Unleash the beast. Yeah. And um so I I get it if you follow Minsk's logic and his models that it's possible to and it was possible to predict the credit crisis just looking at credit growth and all of that. But uh here we are in 2025 and it seems now more focuses on public
debt and and not so much private debt because I was >> which is completely wrong >> because this morning I was checking um US private debt to GDP ratios. They actually went down since last time we talked. So um >> but it's still above the government debt ratio. But to what extent do we have now a private debt problem still or uh do we have a public debt problem? >> It's a private debt problem. It's always private debt. I mean and this is again this is why you've got to get the accounting right. That's why I invented a ravel with Minsky as it used to be called because it lets you do the double entry bookkeeping and see what the actual dynamics are. And when you do that you realize the public sector debt is not what we really call debt. Okay, public se if debts, you know, I sign a
contract with you. Uh, you give me, you put an entry in my bank account. I then have an obligation to you. I've got to service that debt. I can't print notes and hand them to you and pay my debt back that way. I can't get my wife to bail me out. I get into difficulties, etc., etc. That's private debt. Public debt when you look at how it's created uh is the the initial if a government spends more than it takes back in taxation then what it does it puts more money into private bank accounts than it takes out of private bank accounts. Okay, that's that's a deficit means you're putting more money in people's private bank accounts. How is that balanced? According to the neocclassicals that's got to come out of another private bank account, which is
not the case. They the the the the balancing item for the government spending more than it takes back in taxation are the reserve accounts that the private banks have at the central bank. So if the government spends more than it takes back in taxation the amount of funds not money in the reserve accounts at the central bank go up then the government has to sell bonds it's required to by law. It's not a >> it's not needed per se >> not a technical requirement but it's a legal requirement. So when you sell those bonds, how are they how are they sold? They're sold at auctions run by the central bank where you've got to have an account reserve account to buy them. So the funds that enable you to buy those bonds are created by the deficit itself. There's all sorts of
time issues that turn up and timing and so on. But if you look at the what actually happens when the bonds are sold in the initial auctions, not the secondary market, but the initial auctions, the amount of money in reserve accounts goes down. the amount of money in the bond in the treasury account goes up. Okay. So the reserves uh when the reserves are used to buy the bonds it changes the asset that backs backs the money that was created by the deficit. It doesn't actually take any money away. So in that sense it's the the sale of the reserves or the use of the reserves to buy the buy the bonds is using funds that were created by the deficit or the government. in the first instance. The only the the central bank can swap
reserves for bonds. That's open market operations do that. But to actually create reserves in the first instance, the only process that does that is the government running a deficit. >> So what you get out of that is government debt is not a problem. It's and if it was a problem, there's a simple solution. The central bank can buy all the bonds. >> Yeah. And this is basic modern monetary theory. >> Yeah. in that I've got my criticisms of modern monetary theory that's I've been trying to be polite about them for a long time but they decided to be rude to me so I'm being rude back >> what's your what's your main criticism >> over there actually had a shoot on international trade I think they're crazy like the trade argument is completely independent of their monetary argument and wrong and I've given up on
I've been polite for a long time and not taken that particular issue on but they decided to provoke me so I'm just earning the favor >> so you're at war with another school for now >> unfortunately I don't want to be Because it it's to me this is a sign of humans weakness. It's a generally like you were saying earlier about human nature rather than necessarily a capitalist system. Humans form paradigms ways of thinking about the world and they will do it in such a way that often comes from a gurus like Marxist. Markx comes out with a labor theory of value and all the Marxists are pro that because it argues for capitalism collapsing etc etc. Um they then they swallow everything else
Markx comes out with as well. Okay. Uh they they don't say, "Oh, that's a good idea. That's not particularly good, Carl." They send it top the whole damn thing. And that's what happens with modern monetary theory and the argument on trade as well. Brilliant argument about the government money system. Silly argument about trade. They adopt them both >> because we're tribal in the end, right? We choose a tribe at some point and then we accept everything from that tribe. We see that also with in politics, of course. people like Trump and then they forgive about always sins and and they like everything does >> but if you look at for example let's let's focus on US debt and French debt let's start with French debt there since France is not a sovereign money printer they uh with they are
actually constrained right public debt in France is a problem >> it's a funny it is a problem but the funny thing is I've just worked with Durk Hence recently who's knows his stuff on the structure of the European and central bank. And it turns out that I thought the ECB was actually involved in the physical arrangements for bond sales. So that the ECB was needed to get approval, for example, for the French government to run a deficit. Turns out that it's not the the central bank, the ECB handles the what what they call the tier 2 uh assets and liabilities. It handles those, but the actual deficit is still financed through the central banks. So the French central bank uh can handles the auction for French bonds.
All the transfers of money from the French treasury go through the central bank in the first instance. So it is possible for the French to run as much as a deficit as they like. It's only the the ECB can sort of spam. ECB is like a headmaster. Okay. Can come and say you're a very naughty boy. We can't stop you. Okay. So it's the headmastery behavior of the ECB that restricts what the French could do. They could decide to issue those bonds anyway. >> But when the French government issues bonds, they're uh at first bought by private entities like banks, right? It's not like >> but this the primary auction. Same story as for the American system and the primary auction there are plenty of reserves available to enable those purchase will happen. It's what happens
on the secondary market becomes a struggle. >> Yeah. And that's exactly when also in Holland we have the Dutch central bank just operating on that market itself without supervision in that sense by so is it is an issue for the French for the well the master treaty is a huge limitation but it's like a headmaster saying you've got to do this not actually restricting your capacity to create debt in the first instance >> but in in order to thrive as a country you believe you have to be monetary sovereign so So France, Netherlands, Germany, they would be better off having their own currency.
>> I I think we should. The euro was always a mistake. Okay. Um because it meant you can't use foreign, you can't change the value of your currency to accommodate different rates of inflation in different parts of the European Union. So Germany has always been ever since the VHimar days, low inflation. Italy always higher inflation. Before the Euro came along, if you had German car makers competing with Italian car makers, then you know as you know Mercedes got cheaper and the Lamborghinis got more expensive because of because of inflation differences in the two countries, you could have a devaluation at the LERA and restore competitiveness.
So you could still have viable competition between German car manufacturers and Italian car manufacturers without the euro there. That's gone. Okay. So what happens over time is the higher inflation in Italy, Italian cars become less competitive. More and more Italians are buying German cars rather than Italian cars. You therefore get a trade imbalance between the two and that means euro actually flow euro created by the Italian government end up in German bank accounts. Okay. So that's the weak. If you're running a trade deficit within the euro, then you're you're transferring your money creation to the country you're buying the imports from, the exporting country comes out ahead.
And that and that's the analysis. I'm doing a bit of that work with Durk right now. So that's the danger that it means that you the sorts of things that an exchange rate could prevent happen inside the Euro region and it therefore rather than it's supposed to be more control but it actually ends up being less control because you've taken away one of the mechanisms that used to exist for correcting imbalances. >> Yeah. So it's been a bad deal for uh for Italians also just if you look at happiness in the in these days you see that happiness Italians were >> generally happier before the introduction of the euro then of course it's >> I mean what what what the what I'd love to see having done is the one of the
hassles about different currencies you you got to go and convert your money you know that particularly was bad 20 or 30 years ago >> modern technology that's not a problem at all >> but equally the central bank could say okay we're what what the European central bank could have done is say Okay, we're going to continue having LRA for Italians and marks for Germans, but we'll do a conversion between the currencies when you travel at absolutely no cost to you. Okay, you get exactly the exchange rate between the two. There's no loss of money. That would have been feasible and that would have then enabled to have the level of uh you know mobility and crossber cooperation that the euro European central the European Union allows. could have had that without people being screwed by the
>> conversion of currencies. >> That's that's a good solution. But you say um Germans, they were used to low inflation, Italians to high inflation. Would you then argue that a money system is eventually also a cultural manifestation that the Germans they like their hard money and Italians perhaps were better off with their more elastic money? >> Yeah. And like the and and like the elasticity of money is one important characteristic that makes it capacity you part of where the capacity for technological development in capitalism has come from. Uh but yeah without if you if you're going to have those different national characteristics you have to have different national monetary systems and by making one monetary system you scrambled the whole damn thing.
>> One size fits none. >> Yeah exactly. >> I talked the other day to Yanis Fufakis I think is one of your friends. >> Good mate. Yeah, we we might differ on some technical details, but we're all wise friends. >> Yeah. So, I I talked to him online. I'd love to meet him one day in person, but >> he's a good bloke. >> He's been trying to sort of correct uh the situation and and he's trying for for in a way for a political union or for at least for a a um to reform European democracy. Um but I also got a sense that right now he's sort of he's giving up on that in a way and he says look it's probably better off if if countries like Germany and the Netherlands that would just leave the Euro zone. So he's it seems like he's
giving up on on reforming the euro and >> yeah I mean we we we've been trying to reform something for 20 or 30 years and it still exists becomes a bit frustrating after a while. So you think rather than saying like the poor countries should leave the rich countries should leave. Um, >> so they should do that. You think they should do that like uh soon or how? >> Well, I mean, one of the reasons that the Netherlands is so developed compared to um Italy and Greece and so on is because it's running a huge trade surplus and then it uses that trade surplus in the place of what would be the restricted government deficit it's allowed to have. So, the trade imbalances are a huge part of what causes that trouble. um you you'd lose that advantage. If you left the euro,
then whatever currency the Dutch would have would increase in value, increase in price, and you'd lose the cost advantage you've got. But it would just, you know, you've got to unscramble the euro egg somehow. And it might be easier to get the rich to leave than telling the poor to leave. >> Yeah, you can try to unscramble the egg or just throw away the omelette, right? I think we're stuck with a few analogies that are going crazy here, but it is is a huge problem and all that I mean to to to not only give away the capacity to use foreign exchange variations to stabilize different cultures but to also put restrictions on what the public sector could do as well. It was a doubly bad deal.
>> Yeah. But I feel like if we keep on uh continuing this project um pain will only grow. So, uh, breaking it up right now would be painful for everyone involved, but probably breaking up in in 10 years would be even more painful. So, it's >> the longer we delay, um, this this inevitable outcome, the the more difficult it will become. And >> but the trouble is, I mean, the current political I mean, for example, the European Parliament is the only parliament where politicians can't draft laws. You know, the whole thing is that it was an anti-democratic proposal. So the European I've forgotten which which part of the European Parliament the the bureaucrats draft the laws and the politicians can discuss it.
>> Yeah. The commission the commission drafts the law. >> The commission drafts the laws. So it's not even a genuine democracy in the sense that the politicians aren't allowed to even draft the bills. They can modify them but they can't draft them. All this stuff is it shows how anti-democratic the original ideas were. And if the concepts had been correct, then you could have got away with it. But the concepts are wrong. So it's actually stuffed you up even more. and and should uh let's say Germany or the Netherlands a smaller country go at it themselves like introduce a national currency or should certain countries form a block and do like a >> you can probably I mean a block is feasible because you have to be
geographically close to each other to to do that and economically similar as well. >> Yeah. So in that sense the Netherlands and what Germany used to be I think Germany's declined pretty badly over the last 10 to 15 years but that would be possible. Denmark and and the and the Netherlands make sense. Uh you know you you can do blocks to some extent. Um but the main thing would be enable yourselves to have adjustments for your your currency valuations. And the easiest way to do it was say we're going to pull out create our own currency and have a the zerocost conversion for anybody converting from euros to you know guilders I presume and guild is the other direction make the cost zero. Yeah
>> and that enables you to have the larger uh economic cooperation area without having a single currency. I know you're a big proponent of central bank digital currencies. Um, of course, if if implemented in the right way, in the US, Trump is very much against the whole concept and he's focusing more stable coins. We'll talk about the US later, but uh in in Europe, they're they're moving forward with introducing the digital euro, the CBDC within a few years. >> Um, do you think it makes sense in Europe? My personal view is that given the fact that the euro is unsustainable, it doesn't really matter much and they should just digital project instead of building an extra layer on top of it.
But what's your view on on that? >> Well, I mean the only thing that the I like about digital central bank currencies is that it's an alternative payment system to the private banks. And that's one reason that the central banks haven't gone ahead with it. They're worried about undermining the profitability of the private banking system, which is obviously is a serious worry. But the private banking system has done so badly. It's finance bubbles like the subprime bubble in the states. Uh level of private debts been dramatically increased and nobody's benefit, you know, none of the recipients of the debts benefit. Uh so there's all these arguments saying we
should have a payment system that goes straight to individuals. And if you have a digital currency, then the payments can go at the they don't have to go through the private banks, they could go through the central bank. So that's one feasible reason that I like the idea. Um but I'm also concerned about, you know, the viability of our payment system, the private banking system in the context of global warming and climate change. And I think at some point, I know I've lost half your viewers that way, but I'll put up with it anyway. um the the dangers are that our payment system could collapse the private system. So I want to have something which is could survive back up.
>> Yeah. And that's one reason I you know that's but I think at the same time some of the economists who put forward the idea of central bank digital currencies were in favor of abolishing cash because they wanted to try to use it to modify people's consumption >> like a rob I don't want people who don't even understand money in the first place to be abolishing cash. The rogoff doesn't understand money. >> Sorry, >> Rogoff. Can it rogue off? Because in his book, the curse of cash, he is also in favor of abolishing cash. >> Yeah, it's nonsense because I mean, you know, the if if neocclassical economists actually understood the monetary system, then I could handle some of their proposals, but they're completely wrong about it and they want to change it at the same time. They have no idea of what
the impact would be of those changes. >> Yeah. So, let's talk about climate change uh later in the conversation, but I first want to I get it. In Europe, you say basically most countries should just either themselves or through an alliance settle their own currencies. And in that scenario, central bank digital currencies could add something to uh to a new national system in order to constrain banks and uh and credit growth. But in the US then uh there's also a lot of people that worry about the US debt being now 37 trillion and 120% of GDP >> which is about 30% less than the private debt level.
>> Yeah. So private debt's 150% of GDP and it was 165%. >> So in your view, private debt is still the big problem. >> Then that's that's the limitation. The public debt is a record of how much how many bonds the government's issued over time. Okay. It's it's not that it's borrowed the money. It actually creates the money. And this is one reason that I the neocclassical obsession with the private debt is mistaken because their obsession only makes sense if banks are intermediaries of loanable funds. And I can model that in my Ravvel software and it takes me 30 seconds to go from their vision that in which the uh the banks are just intermediaries who don't actually borrow don't actually lend and therefore of
course in that situation they don't buy government bonds either. So in that situation when you model the world they've got yes a government deficit leads to a catastrophe guaranteed. But when you say the banks actually lend they also buy government bonds the catastrophe disappears. So the private private debt is the dangerous one because you you can't repay a private bank with money you print. Okay. >> I've tried but this doesn't work. >> Doesn't work. They tend to they check the notes too carefully. Bastards. Um whereas with the government doing it, I guess the if if the government wanted to eliminate all all its worries with private government debt, the central bank could buy the lot tomorrow.
This this is the thing you your wife can't buy your private debt and get you out of having to service it. But if a central bank buys all the outstanding bonds and all it to do all it's got to do is say $40 trillion worth of bonds. Okay, we're going to put 40 trillion in your reserve accounts and you're going to transfer the bonds to us. We're going to put 40 trillion as the assets we've got. Problem solved. And then because the central bank is actually owned by the Treasury, one of two things happens. Either the Treasury stops paying interest on those bonds or the central bank gets the interest and remits it back to the Treasury.
>> But so if you're worried about government debt, let the central bank quite a lot. What's >> it's a bit like what what Japan has been doing for decades, of course. >> Yeah. 250% of GDP. Uh it it's got other issues, a demographic decline and so on, but government debts is not a problem and they've shown it by getting to two and a half times GDP. America's freaking out about one. It was about 40% of GDP when the financial crisis hit as they ignored private debt which was 170% of GDP. So all this stuff I if to just you know think think clearly about it. If if somebody you own the Treasury owns a central bank could buy all your debt tomorrow and therefore you owe your debt
to somebody you you your debt is owned by somebody you own. >> Yeah. >> Have you got a problem? >> So ultimately then the Fed will probably uh over the next few years or so buy up a lot more of of the the US government debt than uh especially if BRICS nations also for geopolitical reasons start selling more then >> Yeah. And the Fed will just absorb that. >> Yeah. The I mean this this is why they say don't fight the Fed because when again this is where you've got to do the double entry bookkeeping to understand this but because all the private banks have their reserve accounts at the central bank. Um and because the central bank itself doesn't have to maintain positive equity. The central bank can lose money. Doesn't matter because it's
yeah part of the government system. It can be replenished by the treasury. they can literally buy all the outstanding government debt tomorrow and that in some ways if I was central bank governor I'd do that okay just to say okay now what are you going to complain about and the answer would they say we're going to complain about the fact that you're not issuing bonds because you've taken all the bonds away from the bond market and that's our our biggest playground and you've emptied the playground we want our we want our bonds back daddy so I >> right because the differential system is using the bonds as cornerstone so they they need the bonds as they need them.
So if you actually if you eliminated all government debt by having the treasury the central bank buy all the outstanding debt tomorrow then the bond market would disappear and the banks would scream like crazy saying issue us more bonds sell some of those bonds back to us. Yeah. So it's ironic if if you think about it in a serious sense making that a particular analogy it's not a problem if if part of the government could buy all the government bonds and like when you look at the level of government debt in America as well about half of it is owned by government agencies anyway.
>> Yeah. So the actual actual amount like the the recorded level of government debt is about 100% of GDP. About 20% owned by the Fed and another 20 or 30% by the government departments. So you say well who's you actually own the debt to that's not you. It falls by a factor. >> It used to be much more of course but countries like like China, Russia have already um reduced their le their relative positions a lot over the past few years. So what's the main reason why the Fed is not buying up more bonds? Is that on the one hand because the banking system needs those bonds or also because uh they fear like they say that it could lead to more inflation?
>> It's because well partly the they know the the financial markets need those bonds for trading for the whole bond operations also because they're staffed by economists who don't understand the system which helps but like a major part of it is pension funds and so have bought all these bonds. If the if the central bank buys bonds off the private banks, that doesn't change the amount of money in circulation. But if they buy bonds off non-banks, pension funds and rich individuals, that does increase the money in circulation. The given why you've got to do the accounting properly. So if you did do that, if you all the outstanding bonds, you drastically increase the amount of money in non-bank finance.
>> So it could be inflationary. >> What what would actually most likely cause and this is what's happened of course it would inflate asset price. >> Exactly. Because the financial institutions are required to buy financial instruments with the money that they have. So if you took all the bonds away from them, they'd have a huge pile of cash that have to spend buying assets and they'd buy real estate and shares and you'd have a asset price bubble, which of course we've had. >> Yeah. Because that was one of your main criticisms with regular QE, quantitative easing. It led to um even more inequality and the wealthy got wealthier because asset prices the prices went up.
Yeah. Yeah. >> And that's why you're a big fan of uh people's QE or modern debt jubilee using a using a government's money creation capacity not to make the rich richer but to reduce the level of private debt. >> Yeah. And how would it work in practice? >> It would be again ex exactly the same way that a government deficit works. The de the government creates money by going to negative financial equity for itself and that creates identical positive financial equity for the remainder of the system. But you could do it in such a way with the modern debt jubilee to say give everybody say $100,000. Let's use the America as our example and you get that money on condition that if
you're in debt you pay the debt down. >> How would you monitor that? How would you make sure that would happen? >> You'd have you've got bank records. Okay. Yeah. you don't actually know. You you you have all the accounts. If anybody got money paid into account who also had a debt account, then you could say that money now has to be used to pay the debt down. But if you don't have debt, and this is why they call it a modern debt jubilee, because in the old days of debt jubilees, you the debt is off, but anybody who didn't get hadn't borrowed money wasn't part of the action. With a modern debt jubilee, everybody gets the same amount of cash. So, Ripet Murdoch could get 100,000 and I'd get a h 100,000. Okay? I know who it would matter who the money would matter
for. >> Buffett would also get but you then pay your debt down by that amount. You could actually almost eliminate private debt in America by doing that and then it turns up as government debt. Now that has all sorts of secondary effects because one of the reasons people don't spend much these days is they're worried about paying their debt. So the velocity of money has slowed down over time because individual thinking oh I've got to hang on to this money for myself. >> It's gone up since co that the velocity >> not a lot. Not a lot. It's far below what it was back like the the average rate of turnover of dollars in America up to 1972 or 73 was 1.8 times. Okay, it's down about one now. Okay, now if you could the large reason for that decline in velocity is people are much
more in debt than they used to be. So the response of individuals in debt is to spend more slowly. Now that means the individual accumulates money in their bank account but they're not creating any additional economic activity. They're actually reducing it. So the fact that you save money doesn't mean there's money saved collectively. Okay. You slow down the rate of turnover of money. What it means is and this is Kane's point about the widow's cruise is that by slowing down the velocity of money you reduce GDP. Yeah. It's like the paradox of thrift. >> Paradox of thrift. That's right. So if you could actually get rid of the people's fear of the huge amount of private debt there in eliminated the velocity of money could go up from down about one to about 1.8 again. So in this case by reducing the level of private
debt you'd increase the level of economic activity and that's you know that that's a major issue we've had over the last 40 years the rate of economic growth has slowed down. All sorts of problems about economic growth in general but a huge reason for it is the level of private indebtedness. you get rid of that private indebtedness and you'd get back to the attitude people had in the 50s and 60s. You didn't worry about the amount of private debt you had because it was a small amount of debt and you could service it fairly easily. So the mentality we had in the 50s and 60s in America in particular, the sort of can do and let's you know get out and get this stuff done. That's been eliminated by the mountain of private debt and all the obsession with public debt is completely ignored. the real
problem which is the level of private debt >> and uh but that would also be potentially inflationary then. >> Yeah. Yeah. Because >> so how the other side again this this is again where having a knowledge of the actual structure of the economy rather than neocclassical myths. So the neocclassical micro myth is that firms are constrained by rising marginal cost. So if you actually increase the level of economic activity that would cause prices to rise. supply and demand will tell you that and it's wrong because most factories in America in particular in this situation now have substantial excess capacity. They're not using that capacity because the demand's not there but they've got capacity to expand. So like in America if you go back to the
1960s the statistical average level of capacity utilization of American factories is about 90%. Now it's about 70%. So you I'm not saying you can hire all the workers that are necessary there but the machinery is idle. So it's possible to expand the level of economic activity and if you do it you reduce prices you reduce costs because uh again for the average firm the real firm they've got they've got fixed costs of course which are fixed costs per year it's not a you've got a everything's got a dimension by time. Let's say you got a factory which can cost you 10 billion to make and a billion dollars a year of fixed cost to maintain it. All that sort of stuff as you increase the output that
billion dollars is divided by larger and larger number of units of output. So your fixed cost fall your variable costs are constant or falling. Okay. So if you can expand output you actually increase your profit margins. You can actually even reduce prices as a result of economic expansion. So it's it's other things you're going to cause asset price inflation and that that's more of an issue. But if you know the actual cost structure then the fear that increasing money supply is going to cause inflation can be wrong. >> Yeah. I mean you also had as a solution then I think the proposal that people should uh people without debt that would also receive the cash injection should use part of that to buy corporate shares for
>> that sort of possibility is there. So you um you give there's a whole you know the this is one thing like the guy was Gary's economics and the UK makes a large song and dance about picity as well inequality it's huge the the whole system for the last 50 years has boosted the wealth of the rich and pushed down the wealth of the poor. This is why I say we've got to correct that mistake. Okay. uh it's great for the wealthy for the time that it uh occurred but we've got a you know slerotic capitalist system these days where it was a vibrant one in the 50s. We need to return to that situation if you reduce the level of private debt. That's one way to go about it. But you'll also people who've missed out would get a cash injection
which means they can buy shares which means you get more of a stake in the system than the people have at the moment. And of course, a large part of the conflict we can see in the states is people no longer have any sense of a stake in the system. They can't afford a house. They're locked out of the housing market. Houses are too expensive. They're not in the share market. They're not benefiting from all this stuff. This is a way of correcting that mistake. Interesting. To summarize, so we need to alleviate private debt, removing the shekels of debt by introducing people's QE and and not worry so much about public debt. If need be, the Fed can just uh absorb most of that just like Japan has done over the years.
>> Yeah. >> And and um but what kind of other monetary reforms would you u propose in in US then because we still have Minsk's problem here where there's thereabouts of uh of of credit growth? I mean, you you've got to banks have been allowed to lend whatever they want to lend for and like what banks did during the subprime obviously is lend massive amounts of money for mortgages to people who should never have been given the money because the short-term feedbacks were great for people involved the whole big short situation. So you you you you don't want banks to be creating money to drive up asset prices. You want them to be creating money to create assets. Okay?
So I would uh put limitations on the amount of money that banks could lend for buying houses. And the the idea I call that the pill, the property income limited leverage. Uh banks have pretended that they based the lending on the income of the borrower. Now my father was a bank manager in the 50s and 60s. If you didn't have a 30% deposit, you didn't even get to go to meet him. Okay? These days, the Australian government's giving a 5% deposit, meaning they're encouraging more and more people to get in there. I would I would limit the amount of lending that can be done against a property to some multiple of its rental income. At the moment in um the UK, it looks like houses in in London uh cost 25 times
what they can be rented for on an annual basis. That should be and the mortgage therefore is going to be say 20 times. I think the mortgage should be no more than 10 times. But you don't want to drop it like a like a brick like that. I'd put a rule saying at the moment, this year you can lend 20 times the uh rental income. Next year it's 19. The year after that it's 18 and we're heading down towards 10. That was obviously going to reduce the amount of leverage people can buy get to buy prices and that would make make house prices fall >> and then you would sort of avoid the speculative bounty phase of Minsk's model then.
>> Yeah. you get rid of the you you could no longer have banks funding asset price speculation and giving you a monetary bubble out of asset asset price inflation. So get rid of that and and banks should and this is this is the defense that Schumpeder made of the banking system. He said banks provide money to entrepreneurs. No, they don't. Okay, they should. Okay. But the reason a bank won't give an entrepreneur uh money is that five out of six entrepreneurs are going to fail. Okay. So if you just gave debt to entrepreneurs, you'd lose let's say you gave the same amount of money to five six people, you'd lose, you know, nine out of 10. It's it's easy that way.
You'd lose 90% and you get interest on 10% which is a terrible deal. But if you could actually take an equity stake and a silent equity state, I might add. I've had plenty of people who are capitalists and entrepreneurs saying the last thing I want is a bank person actually on their board making decisions. But let them take an what I call an entrepreneurial equity loan at EEL. Okay. So the bank would still make loans to entrepreneurs. Nine out of 10 could still fail, but the one who succeeded could be Nvidia. and then the bank would benefit from the capital appreciation which at the moment they can't get because the principle of the loan is all they ever get back. So you there ways you can modify what banks can do to mean
that banks would actually potentially provide funding to entrepreneurs which is what that's what banking should do. So I take it then that you don't agree with positive money and all these reform groups to completely uh cut the wings of the banks and and and make them intermediaries again like like the neocclassical thing. >> The neocclassical a lot of the the intentions of things like positive money is to make the banking sector behave the way the textbook say they do. That's true. >> Um >> it's feasible. I mean I'm when you see the extent to which banks have mismanaged the power they have in the society over time that makes me more willing to say let's take the power away from them if we can do it. Um but this is like Richard Verer's point which
Richard and I have our conflicts but I think he knows his stuff on private money. >> I like Richard a few times. >> Yeah. He um he argues that the the German regional smallcale banking system is a large reason why Germany was successful. And what you then have is bank managers knowing the local people, knowing who's creditworthy, knowing who's likely to have a good idea versus a stupid idea >> with skin in the game. >> Skin in the game. And they then finance the local. So there's a there's a reason for having a private provision of funds for investment which I can understand that. But equally these days you could do it through crowdfunding. I mean banks if you go back far enough when banks actually
seriously analyzed who they should give money to in terms of existing corporations. Some of my friends for example a mining engineer he became a major um bank official because he could understand mining projects and therefore they used him to assess mining projects. These days uh people are saying is there a building on that block of land? Yeah, we'll lend we'll lend somebody to the house because there happens to be, you know, a block of land there with a with a shack on it. Uh the intelligence that banks apply to making loans has declined over time.
It's all point scoring and asset valuation and that sort of thing. We need them to actually saying who's a worthwhile person to give money to for investment. What's a good investment idea? Now, we could do that through the private banking system, but these days with, you know, I've got my complaints about crowdfunding, but the fact that it exists, you can we can say, "Okay, we're going to give everybody a certain amount of money which they can only use to crowdfund entrepreneurs, and then you make the decisions, and you take it away from the banking system, and then you can have that as a latched on to the sort of proposals that positive money makes because I don't want a bunch of government bureaucrats deciding who gets that money. I do want the intelligence of the private individuals involved, but
the banking system is so compromised that that's another potential way to go about it. But these things won't happen. >> It's such a preferred system because the um also in Holland most of the income that banks uh make is because of their real estate lending. Exactly. And the moment prices go up, um, it's it's it looks better to issue another real estate loan, which makes the price go up again, which makes it more interesting to So, it's this positive feedback. >> Yeah, it's an amplifying. It's an unstable amplifying. There's in system dynamics, they talk about positive and negative feedbacks. I don't like the terms because positive implies good, negative implies bad. if amplifying and dampening feedbacks. So when the banking system provides money for people to buy
properties, uh that's an amplifying feedback because it will cause prices to rise which causes to happen again. And it's just like you know the sound system where the the sound system and microphone's too close to the speaker and bang you get you know that horrible that's what we've allowed the banking system to be. It's that's a badly designed acoustic system. You want to have a dampened system inside there. So these ideas are ways about you dampen that behavior and you'd also get the money to people actually do creative things with it. Rather than driving up houses, we invent a new form of locomotion or a new way of tapping energy. That's what we need.
>> Yeah. And most of your solutions are based on trust and cohesion within a country or community or internationally even. Um currently we see a lot of distrust which is also reflected I think in for example the the rise in the price of gold. Um I also read David Greyber's great work that 500 years >> I think he was one of your friends right because he he passed away a few years ago >> was really yeah a big shock when he >> and and he um he explains how money came about how it was um especially uh when we were still tribes and everything was based on trust and >> but right now we see a lot of mistrust distrust between countries and and that's uh people are are therefore
investing in gold central banks are doing that as well >> um how do you look at with with your um >> it's a sign of a dysfunctional society. >> It's it's hardly a good sign that people are making money out of speculating on non-financial assets like gold. Uh it's a sign that you know people are sensing a system breakdown and in that world things like gold assets of that nature do well when there's social breakdown. The thing is you should be trying to address the social breakdown rather than celebrating the rising price of gold.
Yeah, it's it's a canary in a coal mine in that sense. It's a barometer. Yeah, >> it's a gold canary, but nonetheless. >> Yeah. Um, but do you see you've been advocating for some of these solutions for decades? Um, and like I said at the start of the conversation, uh, in our in our time spent before the conversation, um, everything seemed quite gloomy and and, um, you've become a bit of a cynic in a sense, but do you still see room for your solutions to be implemented? No. >> And this is one thing about being, you know, having cracked 70. I've been trying to reform economics since I was 20, okay? And you're 50 years later, you see it's even more extremely bad than it was when I began attacking the economic
theory back in the 1970s. And you see all the people talking about reforming the monetary system or reforming taxation system and so on. None of them have happened. our capacity not to reason sensibly about the dilemmas we face is gigantic. So I think what what happens is we're going to have a catastrophe and then we'll try to fix it up in the aftermath. So I warned about the global financial crisis starting in 2005 a bit late obviously but nonetheless I did but if you said hey we shouldn't allow banks to lend for asset price speculation you could have stopped the bubble before it started. Now that didn't happen and it is because if you go back when that was feasible the 50s
and 60s we had these crazy neocclassical ideas about banks being intermediaries which is false. We had the correct understanding back then we could have stopped it happening in the first place. We didn't. We now have to deal with the aftermath. And I I find humans you know like very very rarely do humans solve a problem preemptively. They experience the problem and then try to survive the aftermath. And that's what I expect. >> And that's the same thing you expect with with climate change then because that's one of your other worries. I think that those are the two things you you focus on most, right? Our our monetary uh challenges and and how that can be solved and and climate change.
And I guess also our >> inability to really do something about it. But could you um explain uh again maybe briefly u why it is so important we uh do something about that? Well, um I didn't want to work in climate change. Okay, it was not a conscious choice to do it. Um but what I wanted to do was have an economic theory that understood the role of energy. So if you look at conventional economic theory, it has output being produced by combining labor and capital and what they call technology. Uh now that's always been a flaw to me because you had to have a role for energy somehow somewhere in your model. And so
I spending it's you needed a model of production which explained the role of energy. We didn't have it. When I finally worked it out, it was by simply a little insight that came to me um in working in a colleague's home which was full of statues and that was labor without energy is a corpse, capital without energy is a sculpture. So rather than energy being an additional factor of production, which is how neocclassicals think about it, if they ever do, energy is an input to both machinery and humans without which they can do no work. Now that once I did that, I then thought, okay, now I can have a look at what's being done on climate change by economists because I felt like I had to make a positive contribution before I
did it. Then I read Nordous's work and Richard Tol's work to mention a Dutch person. Greatest load of I've read in 50 years of reading garbage by economists. That's being polite. >> Cuz Nord is a Nobel Prize winner, right? He >> He doesn't deserve a Nobel Prize. If if if your if your six-year-old submitted what Nord wrote and got published in the Economic Journal in 1991, the best I wouldn't let him go to school until he changed the essay. >> Could you summarize Nord's main points? >> Well, his main point is that a roof will protect you from climate change.
>> Okay, that's his main point. His first paper is called to slow or not to slow. not not his first paper but the first one where he tried to quantify the impact of climate change called to slow or not to slow and it's in the economic journal which is sort of number three journal in the world and in that he assumed that 87% of the American economy would be unaffected by climate change because it takes what he called carefully controlled environments 87% of the economy okay he included all of manufacturing all of wholesale and retail services all of the government sector, all of the finance and insurance and real estate except for some coastal houses and mining.
He actually had mining would be unaffected by climate change to get that 87% figure. Now, somebody must have tapped him on the shoulder and said, "Oh, William, what about open cut mining?" So, the next time he published a paper on that topic, he said, "Under mining is unaffected. underground mining takes place in carefully controlled environment and reduce the damage percentage from 87% to 85%. That showed that he thinks that you're only exposed to climate change if you're exposed to the weather. Yeah. So basically he says there there's you have to make there's there's cost involved with climate change if the climate changes it could um have uh all sorts of economic impacts on on on us. At the same time, he says
there's cost involved while uh trying to um lower emissions and so you need to find a balance there. You need the balance is completely wrong because he basically says um you only u activities that depend upon the weather are going to be affected by climate change. Now he he he said 3% of the economy was going to be seriously affected which is basically agriculture and then 10% might be moderately affected and 87% not affected at all. But that's not what climate climate change uh to me it's so childish that you have to say listen kid we need to teach you what climate actually means. Climate is not just the weather. Well, the the main
way I can put a a brick through his arguments is that he he said that manufacturing will be unaffected because it happens in carefully controlled environments. Well, there's no factory that has all the inputs it needs. It's got to get inputs from other factories. That means that so your model might have output as a function of labor and capital. The real world's got factories everywhere that needs goods from other factories and raw materials. He assumed that that would be unaffected by climate change, which would be only true if roads and railways and airplanes were unaffected by the weather.
>> Yeah. >> Okay. That it is it is juvenile. It is so bad that the fact that it was even published is an insult. And so, but that's the basis of all the work that have been done since by neocclassical economists saying that climate change is going to have a trivial impact upon the economy. They're completely dissociated from the climate scientists. And therefore, what's happening at the climate, which the climate scientists know downside more about than economists do. What economists are saying will have a minor impact upon the economy, has scientists terrified.
And the best example of the gap between them I can give is that um the the the there was a survey of roughly 2,000 economists who work on climate change and they asked about what's the impact of a 7°ree increase in temperature by 2220. So trajectory towards 7° warming by 2220. They the the average prediction they made was that GDP in 2220 would be 25% lower than it would have been in the absence of global warming at all. Now when you convert that to a rate of economic growth that's saying a trajectory towards 7° of warming reduce the annual rate of economic growth by 0.14%.
>> Nothing which is nothing. Okay. Now you look at climate scientists and they say anything over 5° we can't we we we don't know whether humanity will survive as a species. So on the one hand you got economists saying 7° tiny drop in the rate of economic growth. You got climate scientists saying 5° we probably go extinct as a species. That's the gap between what economists are telling people and most people don't again they don't realize and see where did these numbers come from. They think the economists have taken work of scientists and put a No, they haven't. They've made up their own numbers and they're crazy.
>> But help me out here. Like in the Netherlands, for example, um we're taking all sorts of measures in order to lower emissions and to basically help out uh in the world with uh um reaching at some point lower emissions and and there we're trying to stop the warming of the of the planet. But if it seems like we are doing um much more than most other countries which actually leads to companies for example leaving the Netherlands because it becomes too prohibitive and too expensive to produce here because we add all sorts of taxes on energy and all that. Um is is that a smart way to deal with this problem because it it leads to uh people getting very grumpy to economic slowdown economic
we're actually shrinking the economy in that way is in that in that way you could end up with with a poor country in Netherlands without having contributed to to climate change. >> Those the sorts of arguments that show we don't know what they're all talking about either because it's all about cost and benefits that sort of thing. It's an existential threat. Okay. It it it's so hard to deal with people on this front because people have this the same sort of naive idea about the climate that economists themselves have. You know, it's 7° warmer. I remember having some bloody famous economist talking to us in in Australia back when I was doing my master's degree and he said, "Oh, if
it gets warmer, I'll wear one less cardigan during winter." That's how we assess it. what we are actually playing with are the circulation systems of the entire planet. Now the most dangerous one of those for the Europe is the called the Atlantic medional overturning circulation or amoch which is a great >> it's well it's not the same thing but that's what people identify it with. But if that breaks down then temperature in Europe would fall by 3° per decade to about 10° colder than it is now which would mean Europe becomes uninhabitable. Okay. Now, that's not a costbenefit calculation.
You don't want to have glacias over Stockholm, okay? But that's what we're playing with. So, it's the scale of damage we could do to the circulation systems of the planet are is immense. And people are just simply not aware that that's what we're playing with. So, if you if this if if we again, we we didn't know how complex these systems were when this research first began. So if you look back at 2008, one of the first studies to say what are the tipping points that higher temperatures could cause the expectation for the people who were then focusing upon the AMO was that it would take 3 to 5° of warming and it might take two or three centuries. Most recent research
says 1.1°ree is enough. Maybe one one between 1.1°ree warming to 1.8 could trip the AMO and it could happen in the next 70 years. Yeah, but people would say say for example in Holland if you would have followed Al Gore's advice you would have he should have left the country because we would have been flooded by now. And of course they didn't Al Gore is not a scientist for Estoner. These are stuff people take out of the press. You got to read the actual original papers by the economists and by the climate scientists to see what they were claiming. Um nobody was saying sea rise is going to be at that scale. In fact, sea rise, I don't even talk about it most of the time because obviously it's going to take a long time for West Antarctica to melt. Okay, Greenland, we're talking
centuries for the melt to occur. But it's the things which could happen almost instantly that are the the scary ones. And one of those is is the Amok. Another is, again, you're going to love this, damage to the ozone layer, but this time not over Antarctica, over the American plains. And the the guy who discovered the hole in the ozone layer has argued that if we get past 500 parts per million in the atmosphere of carbon dioxide and other warm >> 420 or so. >> That's right. Okay. Then the a it will basically cause a storms to penetrate from the troposphere which is where we are to the stratosphere taking moisture and broomemide and chlorine with them
and that will increase the destruction rate of ozone by two orders of magnitude which would mean you'd lose the ozone layer which means it would be dangerous to go out during the daylight. But let me let me rephrase my my point because I I understand that as humanity we need to cooperate in order to um tackle those problems even though it's it's of course uncertain and when what will happen exactly but for an ordinary person in Europe or or the Netherlands for example he sees his economy being uh destroyed basically because we're taking all sorts of measures while other countries especially the US for example they of course Trump withdrew from from from Paris um treaty we see China still opening up new coal um power plants. So
does it make sense or do you understand for an ordinary European >> Oh yeah like in a way Europe is is doing too much um destroying its own economy people get upset you're not going to sell no >> that vision vision to to the organization >> we should have done this 50 years ago >> okay and this is when you look back and see where the limits to growth came out 1972 the main person who sabotaged the reception of limits to growth was William Nordhouse he rubbished the theory without knowing the technology techology behind the uh estimates that were made by the MIT engineers. People think it's a bunch of hippies who wrote the limits to growth. It's a bunch of MIT engineers who wrote the limits to growth report using the latest technology at the time. And they
predicted basically if we didn't start acting by 1975, which is now 50 years ago, then we'd face a breakdown of the ecosystem sometime in the 21st century. Now we did nothing. So if we started doing it 50 years ago, there's a slight chance we would have avoided total breakdown now because we've done nothing of significance for 50 years. We're going to wear the consequences. And people still think we're talking two and three centuries in the future. We're talking the next two or three decades. And in if that does actually if you do get for example the amot breaking down then you okay the Dutch people saved a large
amount of money by not doing about climate change and now they've got to go and ask ask some Africans if they can move in in Africa. Um the the the potential for catastrophe is enormous and people are naive about it. They say oh it's going to cost too much to make an adjustment. Yes, that's true. And the potential for anarchy and and civil breakdown is is immense, you say, which could lead to all sorts of other problems because even maybe there's safe countries to to to live once that happens. But once we have also uh western societies breaking down that could lead to even world wars and all that, right? So basically in the end even if your only Europe goes down at
first, then the rest of the world is going to be affected as well. >> That's right. So it is it is just totally misunderstanding what climate change actually means and not realizing how what a existential threat it is and therefore we're trivializing it and saying oh you should pay for it I'm not going to pay for it ultimately it happens and basically doesn't matter who paid for it because you're both dead. So the classical prisoners dilemma in that sense >> in a sense I mean prisoners dilemma charact caricatures these sorts of dynamic situations but yes it's something which the only way we can really address it as a collective decision. It's also one of the reasons why you admire Elon Musk despite all his his um
as well because he wants to colonize Mars and I think that could be done in your >> That was my get out of free jail card because again like I I really do think because we've trivialized what we've the dangers of climate change. We're not aware of the dependence of the economy upon energy again because of economists. We don't realize how close we are to a complete breakdown. I thought it's going to happen. There's no way our decision processes are going to save us. The only uh hope to maintain intelligence over time is to have an outpost that's not on this planet. And I thought Musk might get us there. Now with all the garbage he's done over the American election and you know everything else, maybe the
Chinese will get there before he does. >> You're 72 now. Final question. If if Musk would ask you in 8 years to join him on a mission to Mars in order to at least instead of have a proper monetary system there, would you uh >> Yeah, I would. >> You would go along. >> I'm 72. I mean, I've seen all I can see of the planet. My bucket list is basically to stay at home, but if I got an offer for Mars, yeah, why not? It'd be an interesting place to die on, just as Musk himself says, preferably not on impact. >> Good one. Well, thanks so much, Steve, for your time. It was a pleasure talking to you again. Since you're in Holland, we should do this on a regular basis.
>> Absolutely. Yeah. Yeah. Um, where can people find more about how can they support? >> Oh, yeah. Cool. There's three there's u I'm giving online courses now, by the way, which are being marketed through YouTube. So, there's a I I've got to apologize for the marketing. It's over the top. It's not the sort of thing I'd put together, but it does lead to an online course with me that has about 800 people have signed up so far, and it's a fabulous discussion group. I really enjoy the people who are part of the group. So, that's stevekain.com. Uh but the main if you want to support me directly then I have two uh websites. So Patreon which is ww patreon.com/profstavekane and then substack which is profkane.substack.com.
I'll put them all in the show notes. Uh so thank you Stephen. Also thank you for the audience. Uh please don't forget to like the video, follow me uh follow this channel and um and support Steve and what he does and u talk to you again. Uh Steve, >> that'd be great. Okay. Thank you.
