Bitcoin vs. Quantum: FUD or Autoimmune Disease? - The Chopping Block

Transcript

Bitcoin has this culture of trying to get rid of of fud. You know, I think this is a a good default position to have, but for some cases where, you know, it's actually not fud, it's some sort of autoimmune disease. Not a dividend. It's a tale of two coins. Now, your losses are on someone else's balance sheet. Generally speaking, airdrops are kind of pointless anyways. Um I mean it's trading firms who are very involved. I like that ETH is the ultimate Ponzi. DeFi protocols are the antidote to this problem. Hello everybody. Welcome to the Chopping Block. Every couple weeks four of us get together and give the industry insider's perspective on the crypto topics of the day.

So, quick intro. First we got Tom, the DeFi maven and master of memes. Hello everyone. Next we got Tarun, the gigabrain and grand puba at Gauntlet. Yo. Joining us today, we've got Justin Drake, beacon chain boffin, and the captain of quantum. Hey, thanks for having me. But it has been um Uh sorry. Can Can we restart Can I edit that? [laughter] No, this is live actually. >> no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. Go do do it again. Do it again. What's your What's your your intro? Hey, thanks for having me. Okay, perfect. And then I'm Haseeb at Dragonfly. We're early stage investor in crypto, but I want to caveat that nothing we say here is investment advice, legal advice, or even life advice. Please visit choppingblock.xyz for more disclosures. Justin, there are no do-overs on the blockchain.

So we >> [laughter] >> want to start with So, we brought you on to talk about quantum. Uh we are super late to the quantum conversation. But before we get into quantum, there was a big story that just dropped last night. So, we're recording this on Wednesday. And uh John Carreyrou who's known for having taken down uh Theranos uh famous reporter, uh he recently published a story about Satoshi Nakamoto. I thought we were not doing this anymore, but John Carreyrou was like, "No, I'm going to do one more. I'm going to do one more again." And he has written an exposé, a very long, very well-researched story about his belief that that that uh Satoshi Nakamoto is, drumroll,

Adam Back. So, what is his evidence that it's Adam Back? There were a bunch of little pieces. Let me see if I can reconstruct it. I'm I'm going from memory here. So, basically, one, Adam Back was uh largely offline during the time that Satoshi was posting uh during like the the the key period that he was posting a lot. Uh they talked about many similar things. So, there's a lot of comparisons of like this kind of stylometric analysis of particular topics that they like to discuss, Nutella and LimeWire. He they they talked uh frequently about libertarianism. There were there were a few other tells about specific Hyphenation. Proof of work with hyphenation.

>> [laughter] >> And then they did they did this at the very end of the piece is probably the strongest bit of analysis, which is this very big kind of decision tree or a sort of like a random forest analysis kind of thing where they basically looked at all these stylometric choices that they tend to make in terms of uh Britishisms, particular hyphenations, particular uh typos they make, ending sentences in also. Um lots of little ticks that they were like the only person that matches all of these things and is British is Adam Back. Therefore, it must be Adam Back. Then he went and went to uh the Bahamas or something to go like go confront Adam Back at a conference. And Adam Back said, "No, it's not me. Haha."

And apparently had a little glimmer in his eye that made it look like maybe he was caught off guard. And that's why John Carreyrou says, "Aha, that's it. Must be Adam Back." The end. So, that's the Adam Back thesis. Reactions. Was Was Was Bitcoin created by Adam Back? I thought the piece was not very good. There's like no new information in it. Like this is actually something we've been talking about for decades at this point. And I feel like they're they're kind of grasping at straws. Like literally >> used AI. He used AI. Oh great. It says in the article he used AI. No, no, no, no, but but also remember he he decided to write this because he watched that documentary that claimed Peter Todd was Satoshi. Oh yeah. And then he was like, "I think this documentary is wrong." So, it's like it feels like a little bit

also weird because of that. >> [laughter] >> W- Yes, I I agree. And also it's also like there's kind of a weak and they're like, "Oh well, Adam Back did his PhD in public private key cryptography and Bitcoin uses public private key cryptography." Like they literally say that in the article. >> PGP in that article is really embarrassing. I was like that was I will say I I heard through the grapevine Blockstream has some new product coming out and this is basically like a PR plant to hype up interest cuz no one else really gives a [ __ ] about Blockstream. You know, never never doubt the PR sub routine as a program of record.

>> Times? Why not? You You think You think Blockstream got placed in the New York Times? The New York Times hates crypto. Yeah, but like you have a guy who's a good PR person, you have a good angle. This is The PR person is like, "Hey, just so you know, my client is secretly Satoshi Nakamoto." It doesn't doesn't say that necessarily, but they can intercept someone. Um and that's been someone who's good good at PR and bad at PR. Okay, Justin, you said that you had not seen this story and you didn't know you didn't you didn't maybe didn't even know who it was. What's your reaction to this set of claims? I guess one reaction is that Nick Carter had this theory that AI would help with the discovery of of Satoshi because it would find breadcrumbs. So, I guess interesting timing. In general, I'm very

dubious of all these stories. You know, I've been in the space since 2013 and this kind of story has happened uh maybe a handful of times. I would also be very disappointed if Satoshi was Adam Back. Why would you be disappointed? Let's unpack that. I don't know. I just think he has wrong takes. For example, on quantum, uh the topic to draw. So, he uh you know, believes that quantum computers that can break cryptography are at least 20 years away. Uh and I'm willing to bet a ton of zinc cube with him on that. Mm. I It was striking actually because in the article they point out that Satoshi himself acknowledged the quantum risk back when he was posting. So, Satoshi actually didn't understand quantum computers. Um so, maybe that is one point towards Adam Back being [laughter]

Satoshi. So, >> Wow, Justin's pulling out the daggers. Damn damn damn. Satoshi was talking about, you know, replacing SHA-2 as it being vulnerable, but you know, these hash functions are actually not the the point of vulnerability. It's ECDSA that's vulnerable. Right. I mean there there is uh well, we can tell us about this. >> I think you're going to say you were disappointed cuz Adam went to Epstein's Island, but that's a whole other topic, I guess. That would really that would really sour Justin might not even know that. I feel like Justin's not the kind of guy to read about stuff like this.

I do listen to your show. Oh, you do listen to our show? >> [laughter] >> So, unfortunately, you do know this. Okay. Sorry. I'm sorry I'm sorry to have inflicted that on you. >> Wow, Haseeb, insulting a fan. It's it's >> Yeah, well, you know, what do you know? I Okay, so I First let me let me say a few things. Well, I read this last night. I was like, "Oh man, this is like red meat for the internet. The internet's going to get all over this." So, I didn't I didn't actually see the full reaction from the internet. It It It felt like So, Adam Back has always kind of been in the conversation as a potential Satoshi candidate. For those of you who don't know who Adam Back is, he is uh CSO of Blockstream. What is his What is his title? Something like that. He was the

inventor of Hashcash. He was a very early cypherpunk. Um he's one of these people who is always written into lineage of Bitcoin. Very clearly, he was an influence on Satoshi. Uh Satoshi cites him. He's the creator of Hashcash, which is the origination of the proof of work function that that became proof of work in uh Bitcoin. You know, Bitcoin pulled together a lot of different ideas that Satoshi clearly He He credits Adam Back in the Bitcoin white paper as being one of the sources of the ideas that that led to the generation of Bitcoin. So, clearly Adam Adam Back was in the intellectual lineage. He's one of the progenitors. He was in the room where it happened, so to speak. Right? He was in the cypherpunk forum. He was uh one one of these guys I think he was, you know, back when cryptography was regulated as

a munition. This is one of the things that he mentioned in the in the piece. Very famous story, you know, the RSA algorithm supposedly was illegal because this was a munition and you couldn't export it. And so, he would get t-shirts printed with the RSA algorithm, which you can, you know, write in just I don't know, 10 lines of code or something. Uh they would get t-shirts printed and you put it in his email signature, the RSA algorithm as a as a form of civil disobedience. So, he is one of the OGs and he's been around forever and um he's one of these people who you know, he's kind of a dinosaur in certain respects. Like he, you know, is is kind of a Bitcoin he's a Bitcoin maxi. He's got laser eyes now. I think I agree with you, Justin, that it would be very

disappointing that Satoshi became like a laser eyed dude who got a job at Blockstream and is like part of a a a dash. That is kind of lame. >> he was a he was a co-founder just to give him credit, but you're right that like it's lame. Yeah. It's Well, but it's like what are they doing with Bitcoin? Like what is Blockstream doing with Bitcoin? They're like creating like lightning things for institutions or some whatever. I don't I don't even know what they're doing what they're doing anymore. But it's it's just like kind of a >> made a satellite.

You remember? Yes, [laughter] I do remember that. Like so that you could access Bitcoin from anywhere in the world or whatever. It's just kind of a it's like, "Okay, well, if that's who Satoshi ended up becoming uh >> It's a little sad, I guess. >> He's just kind of disappointing. Yeah, it is a little sad, right? Compared to like Hal Finney of like, "Oh, he like sort of died before he could see the beauty of his creation." It would be much more satisfying if it was Hal Finney. If it's Adam Back, then it's kind of like, "Okay, well, that's do we now have to revere Adam Back? Do we have to like go look at him and be like, he's the guy who we all have to look for to for advice?" Like if he actually is Adam Back, how would you treat Adam Back

differently, I guess, is the question. Justin, I mean, starting with you. I mean, you you you you work uh at Ethereum uh the Ethereum Foundation. How how would you treat Adam Back differently if you knew that it was confirmed that he is Satoshi? I mean, the only way to confirm would be for him to sign, you know, a transaction with one of the private keys he has. >> Let's say he signs. Oh boy. I am willing to keep an open mind. Um >> [laughter] >> I mean, I >> I mean, I just I honestly I think it'd just be kind of depressing. You know like Oh, wow. Wow.

>> That's like how I would feel. Yeah, tell me tell me Justin, tell me more. Yeah, I mean one one thing that we are starting to do actually a different foundation is talking to Blockstream more specifically in the context of quantum. So, um they have just in case >> Like it's [laughter] it's a good time to start building the relationship. Basically, the strategy that we have for quantum is to try to build an industry standard and if we can get Bitcoin to use the same solution as Ethereum, then that's a de facto industry standard. And to the credit of Blockstream, they actually have now four researchers working on hash-based cryptography, which is the direction that we're going down.

And they have some some really strong people including Mike Kudinov who we wrote four academic papers with as well as Jonas Schnorr who's been an OG in the space and is a a very good cryptographer. They've also hired you know just a couple months ago these two two brothers and I think there's been a wake-up call internally to Blockstream and and they are taking it seriously. Tom, how would you react if it was confirmed that Adam Back was Satoshi? I I really don't think about this a whole lot. I think obviously the danger with Bitcoin is just like tying it to it's supposed to be kind of this like stateless personless entity and then when you imbue it with like a

physical characteristic, it becomes like a lot less attractive and so I I think that that's kind of the the big concern is just like hey, everything kind of now gets tied to this person's personality versus just being the sort of immaculate conception of of the asset. Yeah, it is in a way like the the original prohibition in religion is to make idols of men. And we as an industry have kind of made an idol of Satoshi. It's like it's it's almost like hard not to create this hagiographical aura around him and the immaculate conception of Bitcoin.

And if if Satoshi is a dude with business interests with laser eyes with 800,000 followers and with like particular views and political affiliations and so on, it is it it's it's a weird it's a weird shift for the industry to have to grapple with of that like oh no no, this was made by like this guy and he goes to conferences and like gives talks and like likes these coins and doesn't like these coins. And Satoshi was an extremely open-minded person. Like he at in the at the very beginning was considering building you know a a marketplace on top of Bitcoin.

There's like traces of this in the early GitHub repo. He was also a big fan of you know projects like Namecoin, I believe and I think he would have absolutely loved Ethereum. And so that I guess is a negative on Adam Back potentially being Satoshi. Yeah, it's also it's also worth pointing out some of the weaknesses in the article. It's not like this is a slam dunk case and obviously there's a lot of people that Not at all. Yeah, so like the the the stylometric analysis so stylo- stylometry is basically looking at these ticks in writing style in order to determine certain characteristics about this person. The the stylometric analysis that they did, he kind of like took it into his own hands because the initial stylometric analysis was inconclusive and he says that very

clearly in the in the article is that the original stylometric analysis they did was unable to decisively say who this was within the Cypherpunk group. There was like you know like 20-something candidates that they felt like were equally close and actually Hal Finney was considered to be basically equivalently close stylometrically compared to Adam Back. But then at the very end, he sort of does this like his own kind of choosing a decision tree that like gets the answer that he likes of oh, people who put also at the end and then people who do the double hyphens and people who do this and people who do that, which obviously if you do that manually, you can get any result you want if you have a you know sufficiently large decision tree to play with. So, it's a little bit of a he he he sort of

like I I respect the fact that he was very honest about the fact that the stylometric analysis initially was inconclusive, but then he kind of just does a different one just kind of yellowing it like almost p-hacking his way into a stylometric answer to get what he wanted, which is the principal criticism of the article, which is why I don't think it's actually conclusive that Adam Back is I also I also feel like stylometry is this kind of pre-L thing that's like romanticized as a way to catch a criminal. But like in the current universe, I just don't think like who gives a [ __ ] about stylometry anymore. I can generate I can convert styles very easily and it costs me almost nothing.

>> but like in 2008 >> yeah. I I no no, I know I know. I'm just saying I'm just saying like there's also this kind of funny nostalgia romanticism of catching a criminal here that like I think is part of the storytelling if you read the article. >> But but you think stylometry doesn't work or are you just saying that it doesn't >> I'm I'm I'm just saying I think if you read the article, there's an aspect of it that's like entertainment and this stylometry thing feels a little like pushing you know like really focused on the entertainment aspect and like less on the accuracy aspect. Right. I mean I I don't know that much about stylometry, but it strikes me like that sounds very plausible as a way to identify people.

>> saying it's not. I'm I'm just saying it's like not something where it's like uniquely identifiable and so you know, it's like it I think it has a romanticism. >> Yeah, Satoshi did have tells of like mixing British and American English spellings. He had like inconsistent hyphenation of words. There were there were a lot of things that I didn't realize that Satoshi was not that good at at covering his tracks about leaking bits of information about himself. Which like of course you know the forum >> the next Satoshi now that they have AI can hide themselves much better.

That is very true. So yeah, today it's it's a way way way easier to basically hide any of these stylometric ticks about yourself just in the depths of a prompt. Okay, so I'm I'm glad to hear Justin that you're working with Blockstream on the quantum stuff because one of the big stories that we wanted to cover and part of the reason why we wanted to get you on the show was to talk about the big quantum story that has emerged in the last couple weeks. So so rewinding a little bit and let me maybe give a little bit of exposition. So your role in the Ethereum Foundation is you are one of the chief researchers who's been working on the post you know Ethereum 2.0 transition. You were you were big in the original beacon chain then the beam chain and then now working on the post quantum transition for

Ethereum, which has gained a lot of steam lately. Now there was a big dual sort of paper drop that took place a couple weeks ago. The first paper from Google and the second from a company called Ore Atomic. Google, this paper was actually co-authored by you Justin Drake as well as Dan Boneh and then the Google Quantum Security Team. And what they demonstrated and I'm going to ask you to go back over everything I say to correct it in case I'm wrong but my understanding is that basically what they discovered was a a very very large improvement in the quantum efficiency of Shor's algorithm. So Shor's algorithm is the algorithm that is going to be used by quantum computers to break public key cryptography. So it works against RSA,

ECDSA, all the classic crypto that people use to do public private key cryptography, which is the foundation of how wallets are secured in crypto. That is what's under threat by quantum computers. And Shor's algorithm is the way that you can get an exponential speed up in these algorithms. So that that makes something that would take millions of years to break on classical computers can be done in potentially minutes on a quantum computer. This attack it was assumed that that Shor's algorithm it was known to be the way that you would break these things, but it was thought that it would take you know millions of qubits of physical qubits in order to be able to break ECDSA 256, which is what is used by Ethereum, Bitcoin, you know most of the major cryptocurrencies. And this attack showed a 20x improvement

in the number of qubits that would needed meaning only 500,000 physical qubits you would need in order to break ECDSA 256 using this improved algorithm for for Shor's algorithm. This could be done in minutes. Roughly the estimate was 9 minute attack window in order to break one of these keys. And it's it's important to note that Bitcoin is probably the most vulnerable of anything to this attack because 1/3 of the supply of Bitcoin has exposed public keys meaning that the public keys in the raw have been either one they're their keys that existed before the modern address format, which slightly you know moderately protects public keys or two the public keys have been exposed in the mempool at some point, which you need to do when you're signing a transaction. Now the other thing that was that was striking about

this paper was that they didn't release the actual circuit that's used for this quantum this quantum algorithm. Instead, they generated a ZK proof using SP1 that they knew of a quantum circuit that had these properties, but they didn't want to release it under the assumption that it was too sensitive, too dangerous, too scary and that this this is is almost like a alarm drill that hey, just so you know, we know this and we can prove that we know it, but everybody needs to get their [ __ ] in order ASAP in order to solve this. The second paper very briefly was also on Shor's algorithm, but it was using a different architecture called neutral atoms, which is my understanding is a little bit more engineering wise a little bit further

away, but they showed that only 26,000 physical qubits would be necessary to to practice the same thing in roughly 10 days a much longer attack period, but this would be a another huge improvement over the 500k qubits that were required to solve to to break ECDSA 256. Now all this together has led Google to claim that they now see a quantum transition timeline by 2029. A lot of people have been saying historically no way you're going to get these before you know the mid-2030s even the best case scenario. Now people are saying who knows.

It could well be that by the end of the decade, we have viable quantum computers." Okay, that's my brain dump of what's going on. Everybody's kind of freaking out over what this means and how people need to get their [ __ ] together to get everything in this industry post-quantum, otherwise, it's going to be a quantum apocalypse. Justin, talk to us about your involvement in this paper, how you interpret these results, and should we be scared? Right. So, I don't think we need to panic. The 2029 uh timeline is just an internal one uh within but now, you know, this 2029 data is starting to spread, for example, to Cloudflare uh that was released today.

And that's also 2029, the date that we have picked within the firm foundation as a target to upgrade all layers of Ethereum to be to be post-quantum secure. But, more likely than not, uh we're looking at post-2030, but of course, it takes time to do these migrations, and sometimes there's a user action that's required, as is the case in in in blockchain. So, starting to plan now is is is definitely important. Historically, when you look at Shor's algorithm, it's been like heavily optimized over the last two decades or so. In 2014, we were talking about a billion qubits in order to to to break a key. Um now, we're talking about less than a million, and you know, through the the Google paper, but then the Ouro

Atomic paper brings it even down further to tens of thousands of of of qubits. And really, when you look at a quantum algorithm, there's there's two layers. There's the abstract logical algorithm, which is what Google improved, and then there's the specifics of the quantum architecture that you're using. Um and this is what Ouro Atomic is looking at. And there's this platform called neutral atoms um that is kind of the dark horse in in quantum. Over the last uh you know, few years, they've really been able to show that they can scale ex- extremely gracefully. You don't need these fridges that consume, you know, megawatts of power. You don't need this crazy cabling. Um you can have your lattices with like thousands of qubits.

And one of the superpowers of neutral atoms is that it's all-to-all connectivity. So, you have any qubit that can connect to any other qubit. And the reason is that you can physically move them in space to put them together, kind of have them kiss and entangle, and then and then kind of move them around. And this this superpower is also the main drawback of neutral atoms, which is that because there's physical movement of qubits involved, it's actually very slow. Uh it's about a thousand times slower than the superconducting. So, the the the stuff that Google is is is currently looking at is the the superconducting platform. Uh they can break keys, or they estimate that they would be able to break keys uh in the few minutes. We're looking at several days, roughly a week, on the Ouro Atomic

platform. And you're right, like the the release of these two papers was was was coordinated. I think partly because some of the Ouro Atomic folks were ex-Google, and they had a little bit of a relationship uh going on there. And the other thing that's happening is that Google has um made it public now that they're going to be investing and looking at heavily into neutral atoms. So, historically, Google has been very open-minded on the the the quantum like physical qubits that they use. And now, they're making kind of a potentially a a mini pivot, or at least a a fork and exploration on on both platforms in parallel. And to your point around um the zero-knowledge stuff, one kind of

new aspect to the mix is that US the you know, governments are starting to be interested in in these results. And you know, Google has made it clear publicly that one of the reasons for going down the the zero-knowledge path is because of of some pressure from from governments. And yeah, like I think the the natural assumption going forward is that we should assume that um this pressure will uh will keep on increasing, potentially even in in in in competing jurisdiction of China, where they're also very strong on on on on on on quantum.

And yeah, the the the race is on. And at this point, I'd say there are very very few experts that believe that uh we can't build a quantum computer. So, it it's happening. We have to to to to migrate, but very few believe that it's it's happening before 2030. Okay. Um Um many, many questions. Uh first, was this ZK like non-disclosing the circuit thing, was was this your idea? Did you add this to the mix? They wanted to do a a ZK proof. And uh originally, they had this very complicated approach where they would like write their own like circuit and and and and do things the hard way. And I just told them, "Hey, there's this this new thing called ZKVMs. You know, there's some commercial ones that are available.

Some of them are very easy to use, and they just happened to pick SP1." Got it. Okay. So, what what was your involvement in in the paper? Like, what At what point did they bring you in, and what did they want you there for? Yeah, so they brought me in very late in the game. They had basically written the whole paper. Um I joined them about a month ago, and I essentially did a a review of uh of the whole paper, made a bunch of corrections, especially on on on the Ethereum sections. Also added a few paragraphs for things that they had missed. But, I think my main contribution was just uh being a co-author and like helping spread the word. I think yeah, similar thing with

Dan. So, they they brought Dan and I roughly at the same time. And and we made relatively minor technical contributions, but I think it it provided a bit of balance and and legitimacy to a paper that could otherwise be seen potentially as being, you know, overly aggressive to the blockchain space. That's something that they were worried about. But, also just, you know, helping spread the word. And um once the article was uh so, the paper was published, one of the the PR people within Google kind of looked at all of the articles that were that were published and and and and spreading the word. And the vast majority actually came from the the the crypto space. And

you know, we had various tweets that had millions of views. And I I think it's been a a massive success, partly because of the the involvement with crypto. Okay, so you're saying it's been a massive success, but the message has been received very differently in different pockets of crypto. So, you know, most notably, Ethereum obviously has been pretty forward. You guys have had a post-quantum initiative for quite a while now, and I think that to much kind of industry audits. But, if you look at Bitcoin, you see a very different reaction from the Bitcoin space, as we were just alluding to with Adam Back.

What's your reaction to the Bitcoin reaction to this paper? I mean, Bitcoin has this culture of trying to get rid of of fud. And you know, I think this is a a good default position to have, but for for some cases where, you know, it's actually not fud, it's it's some sort of autoimmune disease. But, the the good news in in this specific case is that we do have a technical solution. Uh we do have many years to do the upgrade. And so, I actually think it's it's a reasonable outcome to, you know, saying that we you know, shouldn't be rushing this. There's no need to be uh super alarmed. Um and in the context of the firm foundation

doing all of the heavy lifting, technically speaking, for them, it's just a a copy-paste a copy-paste job. I think one of the big difficulties for for Bitcoin is that they uh need to resolve you know, what to do with the Satoshi coins. There's like 5% of the supply, about a million Bitcoin, that either needs to be burned, or will be sell pressure. What I expect will happen is that we're going to see a fork where the community can and the market more broadly can can decide which way to go. But, it looks like um some of the the Bitcoin holders, for example, Michael Saylor, are in favor of burning, and they could potentially, you know, heavily influence the market in the

shorter term. And >> [snorts] >> basically, >> Well, I guess we'll have to see what Adam Back thinks. That might be the biggest tell of all. >> I I love I love the speculation on the this because it's it feels it just sort of feels like Bitcoin learning about having stake implicitly. >> [laughter] >> In some way. Sorry, I'm like I mean, does anybody actually think that they're not going to burn Satoshi's coins? Who really thinks that they're just going to be like, "Yeah, it's it's almost like the DAO hack, you know?"

Like, who actually thinks people are going to be like, "Yeah, we're just going to give a huge portion of supply to like North Korea or something, or China, or some Yeah, who thinks that?" So, Nick Carter believes that there is a possible outcome where the US government is the first to build a quantum computer, and they have some sort of legitimacy to salvage the coins and put them in some sort of a fund. And if Satoshi were to come back to life, uh or or maybe if the US government could just appropriate the coins. Come back to life.

Okay. Interesting. >> [laughter] >> Is this actually what he said? Well, that's what I understood in in in in one of his podcasts, that he they would basically be quarantined in some sort of a fund. And you know, Satoshi would have some sort of legal claim if he were to come back. And in in the meantime, no one will steal them. Suddenly, Adam Back is Satoshi, and then he's like, "Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah, it's me. It's me. It's >> it wasn't it uh Hal Finney um uh cryoed? So, like, you know, if it's Hal Finney, and you know, he gets Yeah. >> I see. I see. Okay. So, but but how would you prove how I mean, what would be the sufficient proof in a post-quantum world that you were Satoshi?

So, there is, you know, for some subset of addresses a potential way to prove ownership without the private key. And basically, what you want to do is look at the seed that generated the the private key. Now, unfortunately, the Satoshi's coins came before I believe it's the BIP32 standard Yeah, yeah, yeah. You had the master, right? Yeah, yeah yeah. But, it's possible that you know, there was some sort of like default implementation back then that had some sort of like master seed and then you could you could show that like these these these addresses are correlated in in some like very structured way. So, I wouldn't completely rule it out that there is a way to prove ownership.

Mhm. Okay interesting. Tarun, what's your reaction to um Bitcoin quantum denialism? I think I was someone who is reformed over the last couple years and like I say that as someone who almost started a quantum computing PhD in 2011. So, I like I spent a lot of time in that space and then basically was like I don't think it's going to happen soon. And then kind of once I was in crypto I was like okay, crypto exists because we kind of I made that assumption so it's going to happen soon.

I think the interesting things to me are actually more some of the technical things that have improved these systems a lot. So, like you know, one of the real problems with qubits historically is for every one qubit that does real work, like real computation, you have to have a ton of these auxiliary qubits for error correction because like as you go through the computation, there's like a ton of errors and you know, obviously since the early days like Kitaev and others, right? Like came up with all these kind of complicated error correcting schemes, but people didn't really it was hard to implement and had like a lot of practical considerations. It reminds me a lot of like how ZK like

sure in the '90s in theory people did understand this you know, a lot of stuff related to ZK, but it it just took a lot of million tiny optimizations compounding together before we kind of got the the modern proving systems. And so, I I I think quantum computing has always had this problem where like it's like promised the moon up front and then it just takes 20 years for like a lot of these incremental updates to happen. So, sorry. I'm giving my own personal like how I got to now I kind of believe in the Q-day stuff. And I think it's actually very interesting that people are thinking about quantum algorithms the way they think about normal code optimizations in a way that like people

didn't before, right? Like Shor's algorithm 1993, 1994, right? So, it's like been around forever. But, I think the a ton of the optimizations actually look a lot like the ZK optimizations are the stuff that people kind of have over time more recently realized is like the way to kind of make these things practical. I think it's actually very interesting you know, just from a sort of anthropological standpoint of like hey, this thing promises the moon, but then it's like death by a thousand cuts before it actually can achieve that. And I think like that story is like what we're probably going to be telling if I zoom back zoom to 2030 and look

backwards. And I do think there's obviously been tons of research on post-quantum cryptography. I think the main problem with it is this is just like huge key sizes and like it's not it's not it has a lot more practical problems than it does like theoretical problems. Like I think we understand a lot of post-quantum cryptography reasonably well, right? Like NIST has a contest for the the choice of of post-quantum, but it's sort of weird to me there's still denialism, but I can see why. If you don't understand that it's like you know, you can you can easily take the the tact of like well, what's the largest prime number a quantum computers are factored 15. Who cares, right? Or you could take

the tact of like well, actually there's a bunch of little optimizations that will let you like have a a more like sigmoidal jump curve in in like capability. It's not going to be this kind of gradual thing. And I think that's understanding that is like important to to understand the denialism is like people don't think it's going to have this kind of like AI like very fast growth curve, but it actually kind of seems like that. That's my opinion. What's your what's your take on quantum? Yeah, I mean I know much less than Justin and Tarun. I I guess I kind of think about historical comps and like it kind of reminds me of like way back, you know, people used to use MD5 for like hashing passwords and then okay, gradually over time we

these these sort of demonstrations of being able to do collisions with like very less and less compute became more mainstream and then we just transitioned away from MD5 to using SHA. So, it's I feel like quantum is analogous in some ways in that like it was rational to dismiss it maybe 10 years ago with the evidence that you had, but like as more evidence gets presented to you of like yeah, this is more and more likely like you should kind of you know, update you know, your your assumptions around timeline. It feels like maybe that's kind of the moment that you know, the Bitcoin community is is having right now or maybe you know, crypto overall, but I yeah, I I'm very curious to see also just I was interesting to see how much cryptocurrencies were being prioritized in this

Google paper given that like hey, it's obviously still somewhat niche in the grand scheme of things, but maybe just like the most directly targetable bounty for someone who has like you know, a sufficiently powerful computer especially sufficient ability to implement Shor's, but I don't know. It does feel a little bit weirdly parallel to like climate denialism where it's kind of like okay, well, this leads to a lot of conclusions I don't like. So, I'm pretty sure this is wrong. And like no matter how much evidence mounts, like there'll always be some way to explain it away.

It like the reality I mean I don't I don't mean to be a doomer cuz I've I've historically been pretty skeptical about quantum booster kind of you know, fears. But, it does seem like pretty unequivocal at this point that this is a this is a big change in in timelines. And that it should be pulling up everybody's expectations about when we need to make a quantum transition. The other thing is that like quantum transitions, they're really so much more painful than updating hashing algorithms. You know, like we've already had multiple updates to hashing algorithms in many different blockchains. And you know, obviously nobody ever used MD5, but you know, even moving from whatever, moving moving from SHA-2 to Keccak or whatever or moving you know, like Monero moving different proof of work

algorithms. This kind of stuff is pretty painless. It doesn't really bother you that it was different in the past just like a little you know, if block passed this thing then do this, otherwise do that. Changing the public private key cryptography is an absolute [ __ ] nightmare. So, now for Bitcoin like it's in a way Bitcoin is the easiest because they have this purely political problem. Which is what do you do with Satoshi's coins? What do you do with all the coins that already have their their public keys exposed? That's a very economically momentous question. Even if you assume that Satoshi is dead, you're like what do you do with these coins? Now, it's no longer 21 million if you black hole these coins and like is that a weird violation of the narrative? Maybe, maybe not. Who knows? But, then you have even

on Ethereum land like you know, I've gotten in some trouble with Ethereum people for saying this, but like Ethereum has a much harder time upgrading the cryptography cuz the is everywhere. The cryptography is in smart contracts, it's in multi-sigs, it's in admin keys. There's like EC recovers everywhere in the Ethereum state and you got to figure out what do we do with all this? Like how do we make sure that it gets taken out? Even if there's a migration path a lot of this stuff is like hardcoded. A lot of stuff is like yeah, you there's the admin key cannot be changed or there will be bounties even if it's like only a few percent of Ethereum addresses that actually are themselves exposed if they don't upgrade. There's a lot of stuff on chain. Just like in state that is potentially exposed and and and can get

compromised if a quantum computer is able to break those keys. So, Justin, I'm curious how you guys are thinking about that side of it. Is beyond just okay, how do we tell everybody to upgrade? What about the stuff that can't be upgraded that's extremely difficult to upgrade? Yeah, it's a good question. I mean, there is a fair point that within Ethereum there's three layers of the stack that need to be upgraded. There's the consensus layer with BLS, there's the data layer with KCG, and what you alluded to has seen the execution layer which is itself you know, a mini Pandora's box. One thing that I expect will happen is you know, the the security councils where you have admin keys to be one of the first to upgrade.

And part of the reason is that if you do have a security council, they have the ability to upgrade. So, upgrading is kind of possible almost by definition. And there's a very easy trick which is to have a dual signing or hybrid signing where you keep the ECDSA infrastructure and you add the additional post-quantum signature. So, that even if there's a bug in the implementation, even if it's a rush job if you will, you're you're you're you're still no weaker than you previously were. And the main downside is that you're going to pay more gas.

So, you might be paying I don't know, five bucks of of of gas instead of like less than less than a cent, but the the good news is that these these upgrades only happen you know, once every six months. So, so it's not a big deal. So, for example, you know, we've been talking to the to the off-chain labs folks and it's possible that Arbitrum will will upgrade the the security council at some point. And interestingly, because um Arbitrum is an optimistic roll-up and they don't have all of the stock infrastructure that they they would need to upgrade, they would their infrastructure would be you know, post-quantum secure just by upgrading the the security councils.

One of the things that Tarun mentioned is the the size problem of the of the post-quantum cryptography. So, if you look at ECDSA, both the the signatures and the public keys are extremely short. They're 64 bytes and 32 bytes, respectively. Whereas, if you look at the the signature sizes of NIST standardized post-quantum schemes, they're at least 10 times larger. So, Falcon, which is the the smallest signatures, they're 666 bytes, which is more than 10 times 64. And so, if you were to naively do a switch and just go with NIST standardized solutions, it's just not going to work. So, Bitcoin, for example, would go from 3 TPS to something much, much lower, something closer to to 0.3 TPS. And the the solution that I think blockchains will

have to embrace, uh essentially all of them, is uh what is known as uh signature aggregation. So, you take multiple signatures, all the signatures in a single block, and you aggregate them. So, a typical Bitcoin block will have 10,000 signatures. So, at 64 bytes per signature, that's 640 kilobytes. But, in a post-quantum world, it would be, you know, 6.4 megabytes or something crazy. Um so, instead, what you what we suggest is you should have a a proof that shrinks everything into uh a succinct multi-signature, if you will, uh that's on the order of 100 kilobytes.

Ironically, for Bitcoiners, moving to post-quantum cryptography will be a scalability increase because they'll save the half megabyte from from uh the ECDSA signatures that they're that they're currently paying for. In terms of, you know, what will Ethereum do with, you know, the one, two, maybe 3% of of assets that that that that will get stolen, what I've been advocating for is basically maintaining the hard property rights and trying to build, you know, the strongest money possible and not being interventionist. And I think we have the luxury to do so because you know, we don't have Satoshi's coins, and we don't have another million coins that are from the very, very early days, back when, you know, Bitcoin was monopoly

money and and people had very, very bad hygiene with with their with their private keys. So, I I would estimate that there's basically an order of magnitude difference in terms of coins that could be stolen in Ethereum versus Bitcoin. And this gives us an opportunity, in some sense, to be one-for-one with Bitcoin, where, you know, we had the DAO intervention, and they will have the quantum intervention. Mhm. So, you you think there's no way that they keep the Satoshi's coins? You think that all of them suddenly it's going to be black holed? I think there is a way. Like, one possible outcome is that we see the the neutral atoms platforms kind of winning.

And what will happen is that, you know, some big addresses would get drained, uh but there's not that many, you know, big addresses. And then, Satoshi's coins are actually spread across what is it, like 20,000 addresses, each of which have 50 Bitcoin, because he was mining in the early days, and back then the reward was 50 Bitcoin. And if it takes a whole week to crack one address, that actually it would take many, many years to kind of clear off uh Sat- Sat- Satoshi's coins. And so, there is a possible outcome where quantum computers start breaking some of the keys, and the market impact is actually not too bad. Right? Like, Bitcoin like losing whatever, 30% in value, and then people start thinking longer term and don't want to uh

jeopardize property rights, and and would rather not intervene. So, you think it if it's staggered over a long enough period of time, then maybe Bitcoin will just eat it? Assuming that it's like a relatively smooth distribution of those tokens into circulation. Interesting. Interesting. Okay. I could see that. Well, speaking of admin keys, uh as we were just talking about in these multi-sigs, we wanted to come back to the story that we were alluding to previous week. I think uh last time in the show, as we were just wrapping, we got news of this Drift hack. Drift, of course, being the perp decks on Solana, uh the largest perp decks on Solana, it got hacked for 285 million dollars.

And we now know a lot more than we did at the time. I think it was still fog of war at the time that we recorded our last show about what >> it didn't happen like 3 hours before we recorded or something, 2 hours. >> Yeah, I think that's right. I think that's right. Um we now know a lot more about what exactly happened. So, just some some quick uh high-level facts about the attack. So, about 285 million was drained in the span of about 12 minutes. Uh it looks like the on-chain staging from the attacker began about 3 weeks earlier. They were funded with some ETH from Tornado Cash. They basically manufactured a fake token called Harbin Vote, uh CVT. They put liquidity in there, they took over the admin keys, and they used the admin keys to change the collateral properties of this, you know, [ __ ] token they

created to allow it to be uh basically extremely legit collateral to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and then, using a margin account, effectively borrow all of the assets that were sitting available for borrow on Drift. So, essentially, the idea is they had some fake token, made it worth a kajillion dollars, borrowed all the assets in the exchange, and then ran off. So, this has led to a lot of cries for, okay, what the hell happened? How how could this compromise have taken place? There was an admin key, or sorry, a security council that had a two-of-five multi-sig with no time lock.

Uh for those who don't know, a time lock is basically when there is a change to the protocol, a time lock is an automatic timer that prevents that change from going to effect immediately. And it's considered to usually be best practice for uh these kind of security councils or admin keys to have some time lock in place in case there is a compromise of this of this kind that, you know, any change gives people time to say, oh, something's about to happen, get your money out because the admin keys have been compromised. Uh there was no time lock in the case of of Drift. So, they they came up with an incident report, and we learned something very surprising, which is that it looks like, according to uh forensics which have been done by CrowdStrike and a few others, that this was first and foremost

a social engineering attack that was perpetrated by North Korea. Particularly, the way in which the social engineering attack took place is that 6 months prior, there was a quant trading firm that met the Drift team in person. Uh they met at multiple conferences, deposited a million dollars of their own capital, and built trust over time uh that they were going to be one of the users of the protocol, and they needed some custom integrations. Apparently, they they were not North Korean nationals. This was some kind of third-party firm that maybe had some uh relationship or were paid by North Koreans some way. They uh supposedly, the attack vectors involved a malicious code repo that the Drift team ended up collaborating on, as well as a fake TestFlight app. Simply opening a file,

folder, or repository in the editor of a VS Code, that uh was the editor that they used, was sufficient to silently execute arbitrary code with no prompt or indication to the user. This attack was attributed to a group called UNC4736, which is the same group that attacked uh attacked Radiant Capital. Um so, it's one of the subsidiaries of North Korea, and has led to a lot of people saying, holy [ __ ] that is the most insane attack I've ever heard. Sounds much more sophisticated than we were expecting in terms of the in-person degree of trust building and uh compromise. Very different from what we were previously expecting of of a lot of these attacks that that took place in entirely online. And it's led to a lot of people saying that, hey, how do you

defend against an attack like this? Uh now, that said, Tae, uh who I who I quoted earlier today, pointed out that actually one of the one of the big issues with Drift was that any EDR solution, EDR stands for uh endpoint detection and response, any EDR solution, which is kind of like enterprise-grade uh device management, would have caught this attack. Because there's, you know, the the this this thing was clearly very invasive malware that uh took place through this through this attack supply chain. But, the way in which the supply chain was activated was incredibly, incredibly difficult to uh to to detect.

Thoughts on the Drift hack? Actually, Justin, I'll start with you. You know, seeing an attack with this kind of sophistication, what do you tell people in the ecosystem how to defend against something like this? Yeah, I mean, I invite people to be much more paranoid. I have had experience in multiple security councils, and I was generally the most paranoid person. I had you know, there were things there's a Telegram group with a coordinator, and there's like all of the the committee members. A coordinator would say, "Hey, can you please sign this message?" And then, people saying, "Done, done, done, done." And there was

almost no due diligence. And so, I'm actually surprised that we haven't seen more hacks uh that that that target the the security councils. In terms of social engineering, that's that that that's very difficult. I guess that's just a an educational thing. Within the Ethereum Foundation, we have a a dedicated ops team that that that that helps us with um with with security, and um it's just it's just a a very long process. In terms of uh North Korea sometimes exploiting bugs, uh that is, you know, a very, very scary thing. And, you know, in the last few days, with all of the bugs that are being found with with uh with AI, I've I've just been checking for upgrades to

to to Google Chrome and to to my operating system basically every single day, and just you want to up- upgrade these things as quickly as possible. One data point is that the Geth team is receiving about 10 security reports per day, about one of which is valid, uh roughly speaking. So, they're getting one valid security report per day, which is extremely scary. And some of the reports are like critical things that have been the code base for, you know, roughly a decade. So, we're in this inflection point where all of the bugs are Something like a a few weeks ago. I don't know exactly, but uh Yeah. Okay.

Huh. Is this from, you know, the new unreleased Anthropic model or from the labs or is this just coming from like random people pointing flood code at stuff? >> Random people. >> Okay. Interesting. Interesting. Yeah. And you know, I was also chatting with the the Lighthouse team and it's a a similar situation for them. So, you know, in the last few few weeks they've been putting out these kind of emergency security fixes. Uh I don't know the details, but uh yeah. I think as an industry we're just going to find all of the bugs, you know, fix all of them. And then the the step after this, which I'm very excited about, especially in the context of Lean Ethereum, is formal verification where not only uh the software has no bugs, but it all you also have a proof that

there are no bugs, which is the the ultimate end game. Okay. So, I'm I'm I'm just going to bundle this with the uh Anthropic story because this has also caused a lot of consternation among people. >> Today was security all the way down minus Adam Back. >> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, you know, um he doesn't believe in security so or doesn't believe in quantum, so that's the connection there. But so, there's a the story about uh this project called Mythos. Uh Mythos is a new Anthropic model, which is it's called it's called Mythos preview, which is their preview version of the model. It is a model that they decided that they are not going to release.

They are instead running a project called Project Glasswing, which is an initiative bringing together a bunch of enterprises including AWS, Apple, Broadcom Cisco CrowdStrike Google JP Morgan, Linux Foundation, Microsoft. And what they are doing is they're giving access to Mythos preview to only these groups. And the reason why is that they found that Mythos preview is one of the largest jump in capabilities they've ever seen, specifically on cyber attack. What they what they claimed is that Mythos preview was able to find vulnerabilities in every single major operating system and every single major browser.

They found a 27-year-old bug in in OpenBSD that would allow them to break OpenBSD wide open. They said they did not explicitly train Mythos preview to have these capabilities. But they were able to get uh 595 tier one, tier two crashes, some tier three, tier four, and 10 tier five control flow hijacks on patched targets. They had a north of an 80% success rate in getting it to uh uh attack uh major operating systems and browsers. They There are some crazy stories in their model card where they talk about it escaping a sandbox and emailing its own researcher while the researcher was out eating a sandwich in the park. It it has stories of them uh breaking out of sandboxes and taking actions that uh were ostensibly

disallowed and then concealing that it ever tried to to break those things. This thing basically looks like the most powerful security uh uh researcher ever created. Almost certainly this is better than any security researcher anywhere in the world. And it is so powerful that they're just like we cannot let this out in the wild because it will lead to just total pandemonium. And so >> Yeah, CrowdStrike stock went down a lot after their announcement. >> Is that right? I didn't see that. This is actually we literally talked about this on the show where I said like all of these open source pieces of software will have to go under the stewardship of large corporations because it's just like the amount of compute that you'll be able to direct at these things

relative to the amount of usage is going to become more and more lopsided, right? Like they basically gave I think 100 million in free compute to all of the companies to run uh within Glasswing to run uh Mythos preview on their software or software that they use. And all of this seems to be just a sign of where things are going. Is that okay? Anthropic is here now. Maybe it won't be long before GPT GPT 5.6 or six or whatever is there. And then what about Quinn? What about Kimmy? What about What about all these open models that are just going to be like, well, you know, we just stole on Mythos preview. We like hacked some guy in so or you know, we got access to Mythos preview. We just stole on it and now we've got, you know, 90% of the benchmark. Uh and it's it's open source.

So, like where is this going? What's coming next? Uh Tarun, what's your what's your take on all this? I I think I agree with Justin. Auto formalization, I mean, obviously I'm a little biased here, but I think auto formalization of like being able to prove theorems about your code is going to be just necessary in a world where code is cheap to produce. Like verifiability is the only thing that's expensive. And being able to verify Lean proofs, being able to verify other forms of formal logic proofs that code does exactly what it says and there's not some side channel is going to be much more important. I think when I started in full-time crypto in 2018, I probably came in with two beliefs, which were like,

uh quantum computers aren't going to break elliptic curve stuff. And then also uh formal verification is going to be too hard. No one's going to be able to do it. And I think both of those things I think I have changed in eight years on. And I now think that that is going to it's going to become the standard. So, why was I surprised there weren't any crypto companies in Project Glasswing? Cuz it also seems like the largest, most lucrative sort of, you know, attack candidate for someone who has access to these models. And so, I don't know. That was kind of disappointing to me that like I mean, for for some of these things it's like, you know, monetizing the actual, you know, attack is like a little bit trickier, but for obviously for crypto it's more direct. So, seems like something that as we're sort of seeing

there's a lot of scrutiny around. Yeah, I don't know. I I again, I want to kind of be in this like, you know, nothing ever happens camp. Like again, I kind of compare it to like even even earlier, you you know, software development, web development where it's like like standards were were so lax. Like nothing was encrypted and like apps weren't sandboxed and it was just like, yeah, that's just the way it is. And then over time, okay, now there's you know, this becomes widespread enough and attractive enough that like, okay, we need actually more standards to make this software secure by default. And I want to believe that maybe we're going through that cuz same kind of generational shift, but this actually feels like very very different in some ways. And now obviously also just the in install base and the depth of software is orders of

magnitude larger than it was 30 years ago. And that's kind of the scarier part. Um is just like everything is now connected and online and exposed in some way. I mean, it's it's scary that the prophylactic against this kind of capabilities jump is Anthropic being nice guys. And like basically being altruistic in the way that they're trying to do you Project Glasswing is like kind of, you know, invite only. They're vetting everybody who's getting access. They're giving free credits to just harden software in preparation of what's coming. Because this is coming. And um I I I wrote a tweet yesterday where I where I I I compared it to like this is like COVID, but for software.

Where essentially it's like lab leak level this is going to go everywhere. It's going to attack everything. And if you have not inoculated yourself against it and like gotten the shot, you're you are [ __ ] You are absolutely [ __ ] If you do not have Mythos preview level uh defensive security pointed at your software proactively looking for vulnerabilities, then something that's this smart is going to find them. Right? It's it's literally like, you know, we're we're a bunch of children like writing software and then putting it out on the internet and like going to some CTF and saying like, hey, I I wonder if you guys will be able to break this. And the answer is like, yes, we definitely will. We definitely will be able to break it. Almost everything, you know, think about everything in crypto. I mean, Justin, what you're telling me is

that like kids just vibe coding on cloud code are finding vulnerabilities in Geth every single day. What is this thing going to find? Which is probably going to be just like a menagerie of bugs that each of which could could cause enormous havoc in their own right. And on some level like the like, okay, you go break some software. Maybe you can I mean, what's weird is that like we've gotten to this point where in the stock market if a company gets hacked, mostly the stock barely responds. You know, it goes down like 1, 2% maybe. It's like, oh, it's bad. You know, if you're CrowdStrike and you like take down the entire world for a few couple days like happened last year, it's like, oh, no, you know, your stock is down a little bit.

Please fix it. Like crypto's not like that. Crypto it is another level the amount of damage that can be caused. Uh Justin, you just to to wrap up the show, I just want to get your reaction to like what should we expect from Ethereum in a world with Mythos is running around? Well, in the short term we're going to be relying on client diversity. So, even if there are bugs, generally speaking, they're uncorrelated, meaning that they're not the same bugs. Exactly. So, client diversity has saved Ethereum multiple times and this is why we have this perfect 100% uptime record over the last decade. And this is something that's especially valuable right now.

But you as you said, we're very lucky to have altruistic actors on our side. And um ironically, it's possible that AIs, especially once we have formal verification will do the opposite thing for diversity, which is that it will make it at least much less valuable. So, historically, the main reason why we had diversity was to to hedge against bugs. But in the future there there will be no need for that. And so, we we kind of need to rethink the value of diversity. And in my opinion, big part of that is is is governance. I also think that, you know, because AIs will be able to produce code which has zero bugs, the the the the social layer will change

quite a bit. So, today we have relatively beefy teams, like 10 people teams that are building these these clients. In the future it could be like two or three people. And they would mostly be potentially engaged in you building a community, engaging in in in governance, what the memetic layer, or, you know, just shepherding the the the project technically with the the heavy lifting being being done by AI. Um one of the things that that Tarun said is that, you know, he didn't expect ECDSA to break. There is a potential outcome here where it's not quantum computers that break ECDSA, it's actually AI. And the reason is that AI is becoming extremely good at mathematics. And it will soon be better than

any human mathematician or all the human mathematicians combined. And it's not implausible that a highly structured object like an elliptic curve, you know, could have some sort of mathematical shortcut to solve the discrete log problem. And so part of the rush in some sense is not just to make Ethereum post-quantum secure, but it's also to make it post-AI secure. Huh. First time I've ever heard that. It's fascinating, but we do uh we are on time, so we have to end. But uh Justin, maybe we'll we'll bring you back if we ever get uh a paper about the discrete log problem.

It might be a might be a good excuse to do this again. But Justin, thanks for joining us. And we'll see you guys [laughter] I see Tim shaking his head. We'll we'll see everybody back next week. Thanks, guys. Bye. Thanks, everyone. >> [music] >> Hey. >> [music]