Avoiding the Last Day in Governance

Transcript

So thank you very much all for coming and thank you guys to be here in this panel. So yeah um first of all um could you each of you uh briefly introduce yourself to the audience? >> I'll go. Yeah, I can go first. Uh, hey guys, my name is Mitchell Amodor. I'm the founder and CEO of Immunifi. We're the largest security platform in crypto. We protect about, you know, 90 92% of all TVL in the industry. This gives us a little bit of a unique view into these challenges because we've seen so many ways in which things go horribly wrong and a few ways in which things go right. So, going to have some fun.

>> Thank you very much. >> Hey, I'm Meeth, uh, founder and CEO of BlockFall. uh building on the capture which is uh the L2B for governance security uh and using the framework we use on the on the dashboard we already prevented two governance attacks uh basically preventing more than 150 million uh dollars in in governance attacks. >> Hi, I'm Arrow. I'm a longtime governance participant and governance builder and open source developer at Open Zeppelin. >> Thank you very much once once again. Um well um just first of all um this panel is kind of um avoiding the last days in governance because if we think about it

um Ethereum was made to you know to to deploy to run unstoppable unstoppable apps right so if we think about it when an app has you know some social stuff or governance bodies in order to you know to to maintain such protocol then the things not always uh can you know go go well. So things can happens in order to you know to to up everything because maybe the incentives goes wrong or another type of issues let's say. So let's first to go to the first question. So I want to say that um what do you see today that is the maybe

the biggest point of failures and governance the days there's something like specific are more worry about right now he was he wants to start well I can go first on that one we were just we were just chatting about the different angles in the back about what we could go down but if you ask me what I think the biggest angle is it's not the technical side you know it's not it's not the the discovery side I mean anti capture for example is a is a super useful tool. I've used it a number of times now that's really making a difference. We've seen on the technical side all the different ways we can approach it. But I think the the single biggest failure point for governance uh today in crypto is that we have bad governance models for achieving the

missions that we set out to do. The systems that we design are generally not very effective and we don't have the social technologies in terms of say the procedural layers like you might have with a board of directors or the ways of thinking about how you might construct such governance boards and governance systems and checks and balances. We don't have any of that in any mature sense. We don't have good uh social technologies is how I would summarize all of those for constructing these systems and and as a result our systems fail. The true source of governance and security is happening at the level of day one at at the time of their birth in architecture because the systems fail to make all the participants some of the

most talented people in the world do what they're supposed to do and the Dows fail and they die and it's sad and we can go and look oh wow the incentives were wrong from the beginning. That I think is the true governance failure point with everything else. I mean my colleagues here and I we're eventually going to solve it but that one that one's the tough one. Well, that's a great and you know big uh point of view of that and you guys what are your opinions on you know uh pain uh single point farers these days in governance I think there's a an awareness issue also between stakeholders delegates foundation to understand that this is like a critical vulnerability that can happen and it's

more about like black swan events And talking about black swan events, I think the largest thread currently on on talking just about like token distribution is the governance tokens that are that are sitting in centralized centralized exchanges. So let's talk about by bit or what if another centralized exchange gets hacked. You could basically take over any DA with the current distribution. So just like going straight to the the most like the biggest single point of failure in my view right now is making sure um these assets are safe like we have good

practices on that because if this happens on chain like there are some Dows that are gone. >> You don't mean by bit specifically mean exchanges in general that the and if you mean by bit specifically that would be very impressive for them. >> No no no I mean just a by bit incident. It's a way uh to to show that you can actually have like uh hacks on on on big exchanges, >> right? So there's such a concentration of tokens in the hands of such a few, you know, number of centralized players that you can execute effective, you know, tokenbased governance attacks across the board if you can get access to some of these things.

>> Yes. Is it >> doesn't this apply even without the hack? I mean we can look at by bit but b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b b basically just if you know Kraken or Coinbase or whoever may want to monetize their positions, can't they effectively empower activist token holders to go in and launch governance attacks whenever they want? >> Yeah, they they can actually be the activist token holders as well. Uh as as we have >> there was a recent uh vote on on Pancake Swap which was uh led somehow by like wallets from from Biden. um heard heard this from a Pancake Swap uh contributor. So >> So Binance came in for round two on the

biggest decks on Binance to go and manipulate the votes in their favor. >> Woo. >> And just confirming they're using user funds for that. >> They're using they're using user funds for that. >> So still just the detail we need to investigate there that but that's from what we heard. >> Brave new world guys. Brave new world. what expand about your opinions. >> Um I I think what's really interesting is um so we do have the issue starting from day one of the incentive structure is being wrong. But what really messes things up down the line is when you have these kind of negative actors who you don't want to be as involved in the DAO evaluating the token at higher than the positive actors because they're willing

to pull levers that white hats, if you will, are not willing to pull and therefore the token is more valuable for the negative actors and they're crowding out the white hats. Um, and then you get into a world that we don't want to be in. I would like to to expand on the incentives side because I think this is the most maybe the the most impactful uh thing that is we can discuss here. Um what we we can say right now is like uh everything can be you know set at the first point of like deploying a protocol if you are going to use a token. So that's the point where everything start to to happens in term of okay the future of the let's say the as the governance system basically is decided at the at

the first deployment of the of the token and distribution. So uh in that side I want to hear I want to hear your opinions of uh what are the things that you think that are definitively wrong and then what are let's say the principles to say okay if we want to improve the way that the governance can start uh we should do this this or this uh what what what do you think >> um I can start like the first thing that we've seen a lot is you created a governance token and now leadership is decentralized the community is decentralized you're giving over the protocol to the community and we've seen that doesn't work. Um so I think that we as a as as a whole have to do better and ensure that we have some continuity and

some leadership even once governance begins. uh depending on how that actually comes about maybe in the the new unis swap style where they have um I forgot the the form the the Wyoming DAO or maybe a foundation that's leading it but you can't just say here's this amazing project now every random person take over and keep it going please >> well I guess from the raw governance security perspective some some dows are focused focusing a lot on on giving incentives to delegates or like bas it on participation.

Meanwhile, the main problem is actually the economic security like the what's the the barrier of delegated tokens of of active tokens that are actually protecting the treasury against an attack and then you need to compare the incentives between how much uh treasury like liquid treasury and by liquid treasury I mean I mean ETH or stable coin D5 positions how much is that versus the delegated ated supply like the value of all the the delegated tokens. So that's that's just like a basic arbitrage and there there are a lot of ways in which you can lower the cost of attack by borrowing uh tokens

using derivatives using mechanisms in the in the governor contract as well. Um so that's like I think is the main incentive or metrics to be aware of to understand the the governance security perspective and going back to the point also how how Dows are reacting to it and trying to prevent it which should be more focused on increasing the the delegation the the cost of attack basically. >> Mitchell any opinions? Okay, I got a I got a I I've got a a slightly different thought. Okay, thinking about, you know, the lessons that we've learned. My my colleagues are totally right about the

way they're thinking about things, I think. But you know at the core of the lessons that I feel that I've learned from this experience and I've been a part of Dows for literally the last decade like the first ones I was I was contributing to was of course Dash way back when and NXT and uh those things were dumpster fires in terms of how we ran them and uh the reasons for those was not primarily because of technical uh challenges. The reasons were because we did not know how to run this type of institution and align people's interest towards creating something of immense value and scale and we didn't really understand what the cost of that would be. You know what kind of human cost?

How much uh well I'll put this in in in a founders's terms right when you build a business it extracts part of your soul and you never get it back. it and it's going to constantly ask for more. And the bigger it gets, the more and more and more more of your soul that it wants to pull out and inject into itself. And that's just that's just table stakes for creating something big and impactful and meaningful and operating at scale. That's just what it takes. And the way that we've structured our institutions in traditional equities and traditional companies and even of course in politics in general is all designed to navigate these foibless of human nature such that

we can go and successfully have nice things. We can incentivize people to create nice things. This is why companies are structured the way they're they're structured. This is why the board of directors works in the way it works. This is why we have various different kinds of companies and organizational structures in order to deal with that. But in in in crypto, we've only I think now over this last cycle learned that the simplistic approach of having uh economic voting stake being the primary means for allocating voting power and simplistic right kind of um I forget what the technical term would this would be but just democracy by the number of votes you have like these are not effective means at all of creating long-lasting

institutions that can create and build major wealth. And now the flip side of that is what we have learned is that the old ways and the old lessons for how to create effective institutions for how to create effective organizations whether that's as you know small as a I don't know a rock band and and as large as a a a massive state or a company these lessons apply just as well in crypto uh as they do as they did before. And if we can find out how to marry those really well, we're going to create some absolute magic. We already did with some of these crypto companies like the exchanges which have become world defining businesses, right? Tether, circle, binance. These are some of the

the most valuable businesses in the history of mankind. And there's a world where coming soon hopefully something like an Ethereum, Alido, um maybe a unis swap, god bless, a sky. Maybe these are going to be such dramatic leaps in social technology that they're going to create even more value, but we haven't. That's where where I draw the line like I I don't know that we figured out the principles for these more trustless systems and how to create effective value generating institutions from scratch there. I don't know that we have done that.

Yeah, I think in the end we are still experimenting uh this model and as Dows get more mature and acrew more revenue, we discover that some incentives do not make sense and create like more risk and so I think we are on the way to mature the systems. We also see a trend within Dows to um have more like accountability and create better incentives to to like also build these teams and make resources more more efficient. So it's definitely a structure that has some benefits and some risks we are we are not aware and I think it's the first time we actually have some way of sharing ownership and control over

something that is permanent permanently digital because you cannot compare like unis swap with binance because binance lives offchain right and and unis swap lives completely uh onchain and so this like dowo governance structure it's It's quite important so you can effectively have the the community. >> I don't think that's really true though. I mean, unis swap is a is an onchain business, but it's not exclusively onchain. It's not even primarily on chain. In fact, the most important parts of unis swap are the very team of Adams and his cohort in unis swap labs at least up until this point. And those are those were never a primarily, you know, onchain institution. They were a company, right? And that's how it's been

run basically until several days ago. actually like you know they didn't even pass a proposal yet and all of Uniswap's revenue has been offchain until now which was >> you know causing them to be a hund hundreds of millions of dollar company from fully offchain things as well >> just that's because of the front end component but maybe you can have another example like compound or other protocols that have >> even better examples right so here like it's an even better example because the thing that made unis swap work was obviously its team and Hayden Adams sacrificed ing eight years of his life now, seven, eight years of his life in order to build this thing. Without that, there is nothing. You know, Compound built the leading money market protocol

of of its time. It launched. They had a great tech. They did an amazing job. They deserve lots of respect. And then leadership stepped away and we all saw in real time how the protocol languished, not under explicit governance attacks, although there were explicit governance attacks in that time, which are interesting. you know, technical things for their own interest. But that's not why Compound is is like a a second rate um second, well, I shouldn't say second rate, but not not the leading money market player anymore. Like they don't dominate lending in the way that they once did. I mean, a crushes. And I think that is is more of an an incentive alignment problem, right? They did not figure out how to pass on the the mantle of successorship and as a result they were very

thoroughly outco competed and innovation at compound slow to a crawl relative to their competitors. At least it felt that way and they had a great product. I think they they were always a great team. But I mean speaking of aligning incentives like in the end at least as far as I see it this all is just people. We have some new wrinkles and some new particularities by putting things on chain by having permanent records. uh that is they're all completely transparent that you can interact with directly that you don't need the intermediation of lawyers and traditional state structures and that's really interesting and unique and important and and that's impactful but at the end it's still it's just people right who is the new founder who stepped into the into the state and is another example Maker Dow right makerd grew

obviously a lot did very well had some issues ended up going through a you might call it a a return to its root or a hostile takeover depending on whose side you're on. Uh with the founder Rune returning, he laid waste to the whole Maker Dow institution. He fired most of the teams, got rid of it all. But of course, now Sky is bigger than it ever has been. Is it all worth it? I mean, I think that question is still left open, but it's very interesting to watch. And it's all people, right? In the end, the whole, you know, pseudo Dow structure that they made, I mean, he got rid of it. Run got rid of it himself.

Well, all that is quite interesting because um my general thoughts and all of this is basically well maybe the world problem is how how we can avoid you know the governance stuff on top of the product that you are building so that users can you know be in somehow uh or have let's say previsibility or to avoid any changes over their roles or you know to depend of you know third party actors or people that are not always aligned to the to the to to the protocol, you know. Um, but yeah, let's say that anyways, we need to try to figure out how to, you know, how to make

all this to work for the current protocols that actually uh have a governance. You mentioned the maker D. We can also mention let's say arbitr um but my my question is um in that sense from the security point of view how we could um avoid as much as possible the potential governance attacks that we we might have because there are different uh different layers of that right like first one is you know token holders voting something that they should not other one is well if there's a security council so they can do things. So, uh, so my my question is there's a point where we can reduce all

you know all the kind of of attacks or you do you have a take on on that? >> There are so many choices. I don't I want to hear from my colleagues here first. I think they'll have something more interesting to add to me. But there are so many choices and kinds of attack. You're asking if all can be prevented. >> That's a lot. >> Yeah, it's a lot. >> Yeah. Um I I think ignoring the actual protocol level things because um for the most part immunefi fix that and open Zeppelin does quite a bit of auditing as well. Um but we have to have it be that uh like participants in government governance believe that long-term the governance the the protocol is increasing in value and as such they won't want to do extractive actions and the way to do that is you have a chunk

of people dedicating their time as Mitchell says and that's the way to increase value and the way to decrease value is to have a bunch of various different teams especially consultants who will you know work part-time on it dedicate a little bit but not be fully aligned. um and you know possibly chisel away at things and then people will see okay this is not increasing in value so I want to get my value um but when you show everyone that you're willing to do the hard work to make value increase then delegates token holders are happy to hold and be aligned with the Dow >> well um one thing that uh we could say is like um um you know we need you know people to to make uh some value to

provide value to the protocol itself or the way that they can uh you know to find alignment between token holders or stakeholders in general and the protocol right but we could say also that uh there's a cost in order to to allow because nobody do you know do things for free they needs to to to find what is the right alignment you know to to contribute in the short term mid-term long term and but let's say that we could or let's say that we might find the people that could do that for free. What could be, you know, the the first thing that they they should take from the security point of view?

>> I think if they're doing it for free, something's wrong. >> I think he's looking at us. He's asking for more work. [laughter] >> Um, no, that that comes down to right from the beginning incentivizing people and making sure that you have a way for the DAO to have longevity and support a team of people working on it full-time. perpetually >> looking directly into the hostile takeover problem. There are a couple of solutions that we need to consider but they are so intimate to the governance structure and like the token distribution scenario. So there are some Dows that might be in trouble uh because

of their governance implementation which expose them to some type of attacks and behaviors you will have a like hard time defending against. There are other situations in which the most concerning part is the token distribution um and other scenarios in which the the governance activity it's it's quite concerning. So low participation, low um and then also like economic conditions, right? Because with the low participation and eventually the market fluctuate fluctuates a lot, governance tokens, they are even more volatile and and so once the Dow makes more revenue,

gets more mature, you tend to have more assets like ETH and stable coin. these are fairly more uh stable than governance tokens. And so yeah, combining all these factors you get into a really really um risky scenario which is not usually considered. So first thing monitoring it's extremely important to be aware of those risks and then depending on the scenario security council governance upgrade um programs to incentivize delegation which is something we are uh leading and experimenting in the ENSO

and so uh it's basically solving these different risk like attack vectors or or factors metrics in which can make you more exposed to to these type of attacks. And ju just to like really well define uh what I mean by hostile takeovers is really like an external actor being able to take over and acquire like the the governance, the treasury, the protocol against the will of the the the community. Then you can also like question if it's his right or not because I mean he has some shares right um >> he is part of the community he is the token holder

>> yeah he is he is uh but he is he don't he can capture the whole down protocol with less than 51% of the the the share which will be super different from a corporate uh hostile takeover and also one one main difference and and thing to be uh concerned earned by is that hostile takeovers in the corporate world they can be reverted or I mean they are there are multiple uh like poison pills or other type of of of instruments and when you are on chain that's like one transaction away it's one proposal so there's nothing you can do after after the proposal passes

>> and Mitchell from the side of audits And yeah, we know that we can say that this is a just a little aspect of the wall, you know, governance problem. But um from the outside, do you think that there's something else that we could do in order to minimize some kind of problems? Do you think it's possible? It's reasonable to >> I have two funny things. Firstly, the dig at the consultants was very entertaining. Second, I'm always lumped in with the auditors. We we do mostly not auditing but we do a little bit of that too. I mean we have other colleagues here are more expert but but we do of course do code security and the whole life cycle of that and there's a lot more that can be done like the nice

thing about the governance problem is unlike when it comes to traditional code security which is the kind of system where you we we have quite a lot of constraints on code security that necessitate that we get things right the first time. um we have very little room for error that could lead to a vulnerability which occurs and is exploited in one block and leads to a very ugly outcome. But in governance uh it's a lot simpler. So I mean you still have all the the issues of course with the security of governance itself and all those contracts and you need to go and check them very thoroughly but they're not usually particularly complex and unlike um traditional I would say DeFi applications which have a lot more ideological or principled oriented

restraints especially around the control of assets. Governance is much more of a green field and so there are so many things that you can do to make a more secure system. Um obviously getting everything audited and putting under book bounties and getting monitoring solutions up like this is the basic stuff and you can get a lot of mileage out of that. Uh another thing that you can do uh a kind of a simple thing on the security side is you make everything very deliberately slow and then you kind of make a lot of these contracts modular in terms of how you design them. So even if you have hypothetical bugs, which you probably won't because it'll be very simple, it may only compromise one system. And more likely if you have a someone doing a social attack of some kind, well, you're going to have an

opportunity to see that kind of thing. And then obviously the inclusion of circuit breakers is another one. Of course, we're not describing a a trust minimized system here, but a a security council is effectively a circuit breaker, right? It's a a circuit breaker powered by a web of trust that the people say, "That looks suspicious. I don't know if we want that. we're going to we're going to stop that in alignment with the mission or the mandate that we've been given or or whatever have you. And you could very easily set up multiple of these in the governance process as say any legislature around the world or Senate may provide in in a variety of traditional legislative models. So there's lots of different solutions there um on on the security front that should work nicely. Um everything should be audited. You should

have a security council in place in my view. You should also have people, security people checking every single meaningful proposal that gets past a certain point. So in the same way, for example, we recommend to our customers every time you do a treasury transaction, you should go and review that code. Most of them can't do it themselves, but we can provide, you know, the best security researchers in the world to go do it for you to make sure there's nothing funny there. If you guys have a serious proposal that's making it through your process, you should go and and and get that checked. I mean, you should know how that works inside and out and how that's likely to interface with your system. the likelihood of an attack happening that way is low but there have been cases historically. So I think these things are you know what you can do on that

side in combination with really understanding your architecture and understanding what the risk points are in design like but to get really back to the core like the the biggest vulnerability is having a system that can be 51% attacked in governance in the first place. There's a reason why, for example, you know, traditional corporate structures came up with things like preference shares and, you know, various ways of of allocating responsibilities and powers in a company as did every government in the world, right? That comes up effectively with their own constitution. None of the two of which are the same. And just like I think that the real point of insecurity again is getting back to the architecture where we're like, "Oh yeah, this is going to work. We're just all gonna hand out 10

sticks and we're going to vote with how many sticks we have and this is going to be the way that we're going to govern billions of dollars in the future and everybody's going to be excited about it the same way we are in 10 years as we are right now. Like I mean that's your that's your challenge. Everything else on the technical side and let me touch a little bit about that. You know, DeFi security has been getting better and better and better year-over-year. We may have had this is the worst year for hacks on record for crypto. Make no mistake, okay? But it's primarily driven by CFI stuff. Where we look just at DeFi, we're at sub 1% in losses. This is a new record. Okay, we're doing really well. In a few more years, you're not even going to think to ask me this

question of how do we make the governance code secure? We're going to have a whole bunch of of of battleh hardened co code bases and we're going to have, you know, sub.1% hack rates on DeFi. And it's really all going to become a social problem because at the end of the day, the social attack vectors are the unfixable ones. There is no solution to them. they are always as my colleague here said intimate right to the to the the governance architecture and unavoidable >> well I'm very amazed with all the thoughts that are you know talk right here uh we have like uh 50 seconds and but uh there's someone that wants to make a question to the yeah >> if there's no m you can take

Okay. All right. Just a quick one. I don't know if it's going to be a quick one, but um so you kind of all agreed that security councils are something that it's something giving, right? Like it's something that will stay for a long time. Does any other solution like uh like onchain solution or other trusted body solution comes to your mind when we talk about what comes after the security council? because the title is about avoiding the last day in governance and the security council is like the the people that avoids that. So is there anything else coming after the security councils?

>> I haven't. So um in my view we should try to not have security consoles because the the the ideal DAO is the one that is permissionless to propose and permissionless to execute, right? [snorts] And so the goal is to fix the incentives that make the attack profitable. And that's kind of like the hard problem. Um token price maybe should go up to increase like the the the cost of the attack also you should increase the token

participation on governance to increase like again this cost of attack or some type of like buyback program as well. I mean there are different alternatives they they there there are different tradeoffs. buyback programs can also not be so good because maybe you should spend your your revenue in growth and not in buy backing your your your your token. Um and so yeah, my view is that we should aim for uh a DAO without the security council but just because of the nature of the situation it seems in some scenarios that is like impossible. Um so see that's my my my view on it. You ready for a different take?

Let me push back against his cyberpunky propaganda. Don't don't fall for it. It sounds so sweet. Um I mean he raises a really good point about how the ideal like DAO as it was originally conceived could could operate. But the reality is as we're testing these systems out in the real world, we're finding that the vast majority of institutions or organizations are not suited to be this type of DAO. Okay. Even the most trustless and the most permissionless of the systems, they have no governance at all almost except via miners and stakers. And we would see that in things like Ethereum and Bitcoin. And when you look and those are arguably like the most, you know, trust minimized or more trust minimized institutions. And when you look at okay well then why are we why are we even developing security

councils in the first place? How did that happen? Well, I was there for those decisions. I participated in those councils and they were there as a combination of number one legitimacy, right? specifically so that people feel safe about giving the big red button which is effectively a circuit breaker over to people over the whole system which is a lot which is a lot of vulnerability. There's a lot of sensitivity. So they they tried to find the people the most trustworthy people in crypto to have the unpleasant job of being the kings of the big red button. Okay. And those are security people by and large in my view. They are the most um they tend to be at least many of the most ethical upstanding uh and usually ideologically inspired people. They can be trusted with these important duties.

But it was a political reason not a technical reason why that choice was made. And in my view, a lot of these systems are just as well suited with more simplified uh circuit breaker type systems which you could say put in the hands of a business partner or a group of business partners or a group of investors that could also work as kind of representatives of the shareholders or a special committee much like you might have a special committee decide a CEO's compensation. So there's lots of alternative models from the security council that can also work to to mitigate risk. But looking even further, what's after the security council today?

We don't have very much but in my view we should have a lot and that's going to come like it or not with the introduction of reversibility technology over the next 5 years absolutely going to happen. The question is how is that going to be done? And there are going to be versions of the application of reversibility technology which a lot of major institutions are going to require to put serious amounts of capital on chain that are going to be more trust minimized that are more security council that are more like say you know if you know mold bug's idea of the council governing and selecting the king it might be a little bit more like that or it could be more like an open democracy or like an anarcho democratic model where everybody is one vote one one thing and there's lots of members like

people are going to try different things there and we'll we'll see what works and they're all very very exciting to go and And then on on the other side of that, you're going to have some and this is something I know a lot about. Uh you're going to have just arbitration. You're going to have reversibility and things that kind of go at at the chain level that provide a way to legally engage at the chain to reverse problematic or hostile actions. And those are going to be legally enforced things. There's going to be a big red button. It's going to have a bunch of security experts. and the security experts are going to do what the arbitrators probably commercial or the judges in some cases if it's you know under a particular sovereign are going to tell them to and I know this by the way because you know atmunifi we

built the first uh onchain arbitration system that's linked with the existing arbitration uh laws abroad okay that uses these existing arbitration treaties and this is something that people are looking for they want it there's a variety of chains that have kind of built these things that's starting to come step by step and uh like What's after the Security Council? Well, it turns out a whole bunch of things are after the Security Council because that's what the next wave of capital is demanding and requiring in order to move serious capital. We're talking hundreds of billions of dollars into this new infrastructure. So, that is like a a a short well a long short answer to what is actually a vast world. you're going to be in business forever because

there's going to be this huge world of governance challenges that people don't even know is coming to deal with exactly problems like this. They're going to be exciting and interesting and freaking weird in the kinds of problems that people have. But uh what's coming? A lot of things for every class of customer problem that you can imagine. >> Anything that you might want to to add? >> I think I think the two of you got it. It's okay. Yeah, I would only just compliment that um maybe that's a trend or not in which Dows and like big protocols get more institutional in some way but will always have permissionless Dow like there there will always be some Dows that are still aiming at that like

initial ethos which bring us right here right and they need to prevent governance attacks in such a way which is different from the corporate great way of it. So, I think that's my my my wrap-up >> 100%. I just hope they're more than, you know, internet monkeys, right, for those systems, but hopefully working with you, we'll we'll we'll make something of it. We should talk about that. Thanks, V. >> Well, I'm pretty sure that, you know, this panel you could continue for one hour bar, but you know, the time is up. So, yeah, thank you very much. Thank you guys for being part of it.