30° AVC Subcommittee Meeting | Stability Scope Bounded Mutable Alignment Artifact | Maker | SeedGov

Sovereign Finance AVC · 25 Jan 2024 · 55:15

Pablo Veyrat and Mrsisyphos join Sovereign Finance AVC to discuss stablecoins and peg-stability modules. The agenda also covers stability fees, Spark, Smart Burn Engine adjustments and scope parameters; the publisher notes cuts caused by transmission problems.

Speakers

Topics

From Sovereign Finance AVC, hosted by SEED Org.

Transcript

[Music] [Music] [Music]

hello everyone welcome welcome am to to our 80s all 80s following Sovereign Finance ABC welcome ecosyst and actors we're going to start our 30th ABC SubCom meeting yeah we have first of all we have to mention uh we have two 80s following Sovereign Finance there so shout out to them uh Pipkin and Julia Chong and I see they're already here we have our 80s blue Clocky our ABC members we have Maran we have p compar is also here so Jack here so thank you for being

on time we're going to start with to my perspective the most complex scope which is disability go for that reason we have um brought guests that have way more knowledge that can explain this specific topic which is the PSM and we're going to discuss and not in that I really hope not in a that technical way um but we find it relevant now with all the changes that are happening in h that has been approved with Run's proposal that was approved on on Monday and so let's start with that I'm just want to make sure that both of our guests are

in [Music] here I see that already um pabl is here so I'm going to introduce him first so Pablo hey it's from it's a co-founder and co- contributor for angle protocol uh first of all thank you so much for your time thank you for joining here um and so we're going to start I think that the best uh first you you could int introduce yourself um a bit and also about the work that you've been doing and maybe tell us a little bit about angle particle and then we can really go deep into the topic for today sure so yeah my name is is Pablo as you said co-founder of Angel angle we are a

decentralized table coin protocol like what maker is um and we are focused on the Euro so our stable coin it's called AG Euro it's the largest decentralized Euro stable coin the Euro stable coin Market is unfortunately not as big as the USD stable coin Market we have um approximately like a 40 million in TV at the moment but the the underlying infrastructure on which the stable coin is built uh you know it could work for maker and I'm glad to be here today to uh to go over the different designs for stable coin for psms because it's a subject we have spent a lot of time on

at angle thank you so much Pablo for your introduction just a reminder please everyone mute your microphones uh so we can really listen to to our guests and please I encourage you as well if you have any questions for today's topic uh you can let let in the comments in the chat I see I notice that our second guest is also here so I'm going to introduce him as well we have Mr cisos I think that's right from

karari and I think that's the perfect timeing so can you please introduce yourself uh very briefly uh maybe also you we have also have a guest from Kari but maybe for new people also explain us a bit what is h what C Parky focus on and then we're going to start with the questions I'm G to double check um Mr cisos or CFOs can you hear me yes I can okay so uh can you please introduce yourself and then we can together with

Pablo we're gonna have you answer some questions sure yeah of course um so I'm SOS and part of Kaki organization contributed to Kaki is a team that's contributing to treasury management and asset management with different we have no noses balancer C swap um en in little bit of Lio and a and I'm currently within karaki focusing a lot of contributing and helping a to reach its uh its mission

perfect that was very brief explanation um so just to give a brief um like a context with every I don't know if even our guests are probably they are more aware of us of what is happening in in in maker and we try to focus on the part of the modification on the cash table Co that there now there's going to be just usdp we're going to go very deep that in later but just uh if I really would like to know um the audience Insight on this specific issue that do you think this is beneficial do really don't think so if we focus on the um Run's uh argument for this

modification it was like this is was a shortterm decision uh that he's aware of having just one cash table coins not viable and that um he is looking for a solution for the long term and actually that's what we want to focus on here like we as this ABC are kind of like looking for solution but for that we also need more people understand about this this is also the rational behind having to um I'm gonna call an expert to talk about this so I have some questions in here um but of course we're going to see also the chat and to kind of like participate in here oh hello there Maxine

um so the first question is do you think a stable coin can work without a peg without a PSM so I'm G to go first with with you Pablo um so I do think that a stable coin can work without a PM but for me you need a Redemption um mechanism in some way a good example of stable coin that works super well without the PSM um is that of liquidity uh you know when you own L USD you can redeem some uh volt uh like against collateral held in some volts this may be bad for the ux in the sense that if

you're the lowest collateralized volt on liquidity people may just like redeem unquity de Trove and get your e back but um it's a way to contract the supply uh in case in case where people burn want want to burn the stable coin the issue we're seeing with protocols which do not have a PSM and one example is that of Libra uh which is a CDP only protocol is that you know like getting a stable coin at Peg when you don't have a PSM like when you CDP system it relies on indirect arbitrages you know like people oh I'm going to repay um to repay my debt uh for less than $1 do even though it it costed me $1 to get the debt sure

I I don't think I got the question though would you mind refacing it sure yeah let's talk about the disadvantages of um makers PSM and how you would um what would you do to in order to to solve this what would should take into account well I think um really maker PSM design was very Innovative and and actually effective for what it was deployed um and and this community probably knows it's Sly more educated than me on on the PSM and and what some of the challenges that you face in the recent times but I think that some of the events um that may have that proven that there

could be new iterations um that can solve some of these challenges right and I think you know this is some of the reasoning behind you know some of the featur features sorry that um the the go stability module that that's being worked out has um like one one clear example of that would be um that I think you know PSM when it was implemented um they didn't have a clear way of like capturing some of the value of the peg mechanism it was enabling right or the Arbitrage that that it was kind of originating um that's one of them I think think the other one um in and

again I think we're going to talk a bit more there's going to be time to talk a little more about it a GSM ler on right but I think another aspect of um the PSM that that you know probably deserves some thinking and and that we're going to take into account future iterations is the the capacity to um either put boundaries whether that's for Price action you know or what have you that will enable or or disable the PSM right um to maybe put um a boundary on the impact that events like the one for the svb bank could have right and not only in D but the whole

ecosystem but thank you uh I'm just want to mention something uh please do not limit yourself when you're explaining uh I we believe we seriously believe that this is very relevant that we should be discussing and uh since not everyone it's it's very technical since not everyone is an expert like this is the opportunity that we are also learning more and so just to to point that out that you can um I'm not asking for anyone to be brief only the introduction but now yeah you can you can talk as much as you as you as you want um so now I'm GNA go with the same question I'm going to repeat again about the disadvantages on maker PSM so Pablo what do you think about this so I have

thought a lot about this one um I think uh c s quite well on the fact that um the the the issue with uh maker system is that there are bonds in like what can be minted with one asset you know like you can limit how much is minted of die with usdc on a given day how much is minted on with usdp but these are not relative bonds uh so for instance uh like the makeer governance has to be manually updating uh the bonds uh and it doesn't like smoothly adapt as the system grows so it's like an an edge uh remark an edge disadvantage but still one the big big disadvantage for me um

is that you do not get a claim I mean there are several of them uh first when you own a die you do not get a claim on the basket of assets which are making up the PSM um which means that uh you know when I own die I I don't have a claim on the reward asset so maybe putting reward asset on the side I don't like one die doesn't give me like6 usdc point4 usdp for instance depending on the composition why is it a problem because if things go wrong if one of the Assets in the system theeg um then what people are going to do people are going to like Swap all the like let's take the usdc example Swap all the usdc towards D

and then swap that D toward gusd which means that maker which is supposed to be diversifying its reserves or not if you want to go all in usdp but well you should be diversifying your reserves you end up only with a weak asset which is deping and if you have like the automatic scenario the automated scenarios um and it goes within the the bond idea of C but like price bonds here um in the sense that if you have automatic blocking features that prevent people from or that detail people from swapping uh from die with usdc when usdc is dep pegging or for burning die for usdp when other assets are dep pegging then you are making your users far

better off and the system is far more predictable in case of a black one event because black one events will happen like you shouldn't build a system like a PSM without taking into account the fact that will hit the fund at some point and uh you need to have like this this uh this fullback system so there are no back systems there are no Redemption features and there are like manual limits these are my main reproaches for die price stability module the ways to solve this like this is how we like we we we have built the the angle price stability module with like trying to improve of our these flows there are some um you are losing on some aspects when you try to uh make it all weather when it comes to okay um

how am I going to be resilient to a usdc de situation for instance angle price stability module is slightly more gas expensive and it scales the cost scale linearly with the amount of assets which are supported in the backing but we you get a guarantee when you hold an AG Euro angle Euro stable coin that you are really owning a basket of uh assets uh like of Euro stable coins or of Euro assets um and not that you don't have a claim on the weakest of all the assets which is for me the case when you own a die when you own a die you hold the weakest of all the Assets in the price stability module so it's here we are not

talking about very weak assets you know it's like usdc usdp gusd so it's fine but you never know yeah and I think that some of that what B is saying you know depending on your perspective um that you could think one of the other challenges the PSM has is if if um like all all the usdc is gone right um and and you want this to still be active right now with the current configuration and one of the things that you'll need to that the maker Community will need to think about is how um like getting one of the real world assets that's part of the collaterals and maybe

regain usdc to um maybe swap it for another PSM coin or or replenish some of the the um the modules us thec right and that could be that could be a slow process um and you know there's there's a we of time there where PSM would be maybe not usable or you know there could be other risks um so that that could be that could be I guess another challenge um with with a PSM yeah I think that of course it's important to make the PSM sorry it's important if psms are like it's not a problem if these are not usable from

time to time because like something is going wrong with one of the assets and you want some clarity um I believe that redemptions feature enabling users to get a claim on the basket of collateral and still go out if they want to go out or take their loss um you know you it's it's important to enable this uh at any point in time um if if possible because this is what uh you know you don't want if if something goes wrong you don't want your users to be blocked you know like defi protocols they should for me leave the ability to leave at any time um and it's it's not a good ux uh to have people locked in at some point

because some some collateral deviates if people want to live then it's fine but let's give them a fair share of their of their ownership on the collateral and this is for me the way to implement like the real vision of what the decentralized table coin should be you know like the decentralized table coin it's a liability um for the sake of the protocol that should give you right a claim on the assets and the asset here are the collateral and by having a Redemption feature on a PSM you kind of make this Vision true and you know guarantee the fact you know it's it's like bankruptcy remoteness like implemented uh at the core of uh of the protocol

I was waiting if anybody El wanted to to to say something else okay I'm like here literally like taking notes of what you guys are saying so I can keep up with what you um everything that you are you're saying and so okay we have mentioned you have point out literally point out the the challenges with uh makers current situation with the PSM and so now let's compare it not not comparing but let's know uh get to know more about the design that of each of your PSM uh we find it interesting to to know what is it like and so we're going to go one by one so um yeah Pablo you first if

you can tell us about your own model of PSM like your PSM design sure um so like basically Ang transmitter was built to improve over so it's called the transmitter and gpsm um it was built to improve uh over the flows we were seeing in maker um basically uh so it's it's a PSM like maker when everything goes well which means when stable coins are trading at Peg like you can mint AG Euro with one EUR worth of stable coin at any time you can burn one AG Euro with against one euro worth of collateral at any time um

if one stable coin in the backing is deping like the Min price diers from the bur price like uh the the protocol will buy the stable coin at the lowest value possible so if for instance Euro or like in the case of that if usdc is worth 1.01 because dollar well the protocol would still buy um would still consider a minan price of $1 uh but it would consider a burn price of 1.01 and if there is one stable coin in the backing which is dep pegging um like if usdc starts to be worth uh I don't know 99 Cents while the protocol is no longer buying usdc like it's it's blocked or

you need to buy for like one divided by by 0.99 worth of usdc and like you won't be able to burn like the protocol will apply a penalty on burns for all the other collateral assets of the protocol equal to the deviation of the usdc price with respect to its peg this means that if usdc trades at like 90 cents um we will apply a 10% deviation penalty to all the people trying to burn their AG Euro for other stable coins in the backing like in the PSM this is a way to deter people from doing the trade like usdc to die die to gusd which was obvious during the usdc deeg uh

situation so this is one thing the other thing is that the protocol implements a claim feature uh a a Redemption feature like you can burn your stable coin which means uh getting your for with your AG one of the collateral assets that are in the backing but you can also redeem your AG this is how we call it which means getting a portion of all the assets that are in the backing so if in the backing there are like 60% usdc 40% USD usdp then with one die in this case you would get 6 usdc point4 usdp uh and it's a way to ensure a fair Redemption a fair redistribution of the proceeds of the

protocol if there is an under collateralization scenario if the protocol loses something you can still redeem your AG your your die at the fair value of the backing without needing for a governance to take some decision um and without creating like unnecessary Arbitrage on what going to be the fa outcome of what governance is going to implement so these are like one the main features and one other feature that I can mention it's that um the protocol comes with Dynamic uh limits on each collateral so the fees are Dynamic based on the exposures the protocol has uh to its Assets in the backing like usdc the protocol may say I don't want to hold

more than 70% of usdc in the backing and then so the the system will prevent people from minting die with usdc if the Mint leads to more than 70 person in exposure and this way you can set a system which dynamically incentivizes market makers or Traders or just anyone looking to buy die to set the system uh in a state where the exposures of the assets of the protocol to its underlyings has been thought in advance and you don't need to manually rebalance the reserves it's the market that is rebalancing for you so it's a lower cost uh and also a more trustless uh a more trustless experience um whatsoever and

that scales with the amount of stable coin so it works with 1 million 1 billion 10 billion in assets and the management and you at no point in time you need a governance to intervene for this rebalancing provided that you don't use like two exotic assets I'm G to go now with you Mr C but but first uh just to point it out out that then the following questions GNA be related to okay and can we I don't know if the word is implemented but can we also have something similar to your models implemented here in with the maker PSM so just you can you can that's uh that's the point you know

like it's journalized and maker could like use the code it's been audited uh uh and implement the same uh for maker and and I think it it would be beneficial for for the the whole maker ecosystem I mean like it would live die better off but it it's not the only design that is built on this like gyroscope and other USD stable con using Sim uses like we use similar ideas um and I guess it's going to be the same for aigo but I let saos uh uh iterate on this one thanks thanks po so yeah there's probably lot of things that that are in

common um so the GSM is really a Pex the PEX stability mechanism it is inspired by maker BSM design to exchange you know go with other tokens at a preset uh ratio I think the the or at least I find is the sign it's um kind of special um because it includes some configurable functionalities such as you know modular price and fee strategies which I think resemble a little bit what Paul was mentioning that kind of help you know influence and determine the conversion behaviors of these assets right as well as um is a variety of you know safety

oriented functionalities such as the ability to freeze swaps you know based on external or or market conditions so if I were to kind of um touch based on what some of these are um like start with the price strategies you know it allows the or it gives the the ability you know to the Dow to adjust the pricing ratio between go and these other St coins so the easiest way to think about it is you can have a strategy that's a fixed plan um ratio between let's say go and C like one to one but it can be dynamic uh based on price oracles Market you know it can have bonding curves like the

one I think um was also describing um stable swap curves Etc so right now um there's an act AP to deploy the first um first two GSM uh modules that are going to be with usdc and in usdt and both of them have a price strategy of one to one between Goan and the other C right but it it is um flexible from that regards um which by the way I don't think I've mentioned this but um this GSM modules are but another facilitators right which facilitators are the ones are the the smart contracts control by that are

allowed to meet and burn go right and the other functionality um is the fee strategies so the the gsms and better with the capacity to have again dynamic or fixed uh strategies for the fees and the the in this case it's going to be a flat fixed fee but it can it can be dynamic I think that's important going back to some of the comments that I mentioned before um you know a fee strategy also allows the do to have the conversation of um you know how much it can participate and capturing the value from the the Arbitrage and from the

pegging mechanism um but similar to the price strategy it can help influence the market Behavior right and and maybe make it easier to go to the peg but harder to go off the peg kind of thing right um it has as well exposure traps like the ones um you know was being described for for angle um meaning that there is a capap or a limit to the exposure that the module can have to the exogenous or to the other stable coins right um it imposes that cap and so if you want to Mint more gold um back by that stable coin or you wouldn't be able

to um I think right now if I don't remember wrong the the parameters for um that are in in the in the onchain vote right now are 500 um, cap for each usdc and and us and then the the the last two that I think you know this set that I've described are actually for effect mechanism itself but the other two bit different the other one is a last resource liquidation which is a feature that allows the Dow for you know kind of worst case scenarios to regain control post the GSM and even uh liquidate the exerion asset so that would be in this case use C or

use and um there's also kind of um the capacity for the underly to actually be you know LC 4626 like the um with the embedded capacity for uh the Dow to capture some of the yield right of these underlying assets again the first two are going to be us and so not necessarily this this feature is not being guess dag right now right away but still I still find it interesting that it has that the capacity um like I was saying in in the discussions that happened you know the last two three months was a lot of back and forth

um in terms of which should be the settings the parameters of these two press gsms that are being implemented um and there was a lot of um recommendations coming from the a risk service providers um and you know some of the the the parameters that have been uh chosen by the community and in in snapshot Boats were 0.2% of fees so again like I was mentioning before flet strategy for the F settled in in 0.2% and then the boundaries um again fin interesting and and it goes back to the comments that we were making about some of the challenges the PSM faced

there's there are two different set of boundaries one to freeze the modules and one to unfreeze them right so this information is already embedded in the smart contracts and in this case is when the underlying assets go um above 1.01 so that's um how 100% BPS um or below 0.99 which is minus 100 BPS that's when the module will be free Frozen right so at that point GSM will stop working um and then there are unfreeze ranges with which they have to be they have to be kind of a subset of the freeze range where the modules will unre on the price

of the under line reach part 0.995 or 1.05 so that's 50 VPS to each side right I think I mentioned them already but the the Caps the exposure caps are going to be 500,000 each for UC and that's kind of 1 million in total um yeah but there are there are ongoing discussions with the intent to grow that exposure right so this is a small small amount the intent is to make it larger and larger which I think will probably um be a joint effort with increasing the overall go um mean in cap right and the overall go Supply I don't know if it was

clear or is any any followup question on that I want to ask that also for the audience if there is anything that has not to be clear enough for what you are already training I encourage to ask now I think this is as I always mentioned having the speakers here is that the perfect moment to to learn more and ask about the doubts but I think I don't know if I don't want to like cut you with the next part because both of you actually have mentioned about of course the um go the peg situation so we're going to focus on that um is it like is it really fixed that situation uh and can you tell us

what have you learned from that um I don't know if should call it mistake is something that happens but yeah what could you tell us about it um who wants to go first maybe uh Pao um I'm sorry can you please repeat the question yes about the theeg uh the the go the PC situation the mistake you have learned from it so for me there was no like real mistake like it it was foreseeable uh it it could have held with like more liquidity to absorb go go sales I think it's uh more uh a good example that if you launch a stable coin

without a proper price stability mechanism um a CDP stable coin without a proper price stability mechanism or Redemption feature uh well you can expect this this transitory dep but doesn't mean that like the the stable coin is um is a is bad per you know like because people people tend to misinterpret and to consider that oh the stable con has deped uh it must have been hacked or it's a it's a a really bad asset to use here like for me my my conception and how I perceive go hasn't changed with the evolution of the price and the and the fundamentals of it it's just that you know it should have been launched

with a CDP with a with a Redemption feature and that's it but it doesn't mean that the the protocol was uh was that you would lose money by like putting money into it basically you can give us also more light to this uh because because uh as far as I'm concerned K pki is working with a is that right Mr cus yeah yeah that's that's right um yeah there was a proposal that passed not so long ago um but yeah we we are contributing with a and you know I think um there are I think there are um

several things to highlight from you know this um this this case of Co being under Peg almost after it was um created right I think it was a very short moment it was a tag and then went down um I think one of the one of the challenges it had initially was that you know the the rate the voling rate for go was actually very low um so that that created um a really easy Arbitrage opportunity for uh for rates right if I'm not mistaken if I remember wrong um the initial bwing rate was about 1.5 or something like that percent um so you can easily imagine

that it was easier to um Arbitrage almost any other you know stable coin rate that's out there um you can think about as di for instance right so I think that generated a lot of um setting pressure that together with the fact that it was a very new stable coin not so many integration and hence not so many poly use cases at that point um so that that kind that kind of generated the the D the liquidity profile I think wasn't that um great at the beginning as well um I think that's something that

was making a reference to that it wasn't much clear to kind of solve that setting pressure but I think at the end of the day um with those you know rate arbitrages opportunities I think that was deed to to happen um you know the the since then there were I think I could we could think about that as three different um type of efforts or trucks um you know on one side there were um several intents or several it wasn't intent actually that happened there were several instances where the rates were increased you kind of um get it closer to the market the rest of the market there is an intent to I think

having a bit lower than the rest of it but they were increasing it trying to get it closer to what the rest of the market is um money that there something I didn't mention before but uh there is um there is a possibility to have an even better rate to have a discount on the rate if the user has staked a right so you can stake a in safety module and then you would be able to get a discount on a borrowing rate and there are certain like tranches right depending on how many how much sto you have you know it depends how much of a discount you'll get um but I think at the end of the day with an already lower

um an interest rate that was lower than the market and a lot of I guess people that was already part of the a ecosystem and probably already had Stak Stak a sorry that even got you know an even lower borrowing rate that probably you know made the um AR opportunity even even larger so going back to to what I was heading there were several instances where the interest rate was increased but end of the day this still is um this still is um a manual process right um the borrowing rate is a fixed rate in the sense that it doesn't change with utilization it does change obviously what the decides to but it's s from that regards and you know there is an

opportunity I think to revisit you know having a fixed rate and finding ways to have this rate this following rain and somehow dependent on the market that that would be a good change and I I believe other is um looking into it um then there's um you know there was another track I guess of efforts there was a better engineering the liquidity profile that's in the market and um there was a large effort to do that with Maverick um I think to some extent that may have helped but um it wasn't able to recover the peg doing that per se um

of course you know every time you create an utility that demands um of a token and and create some buying pressure that definitely help recover the P but they on its own um wasn't able to do the tri and and one of the things that had the most impact and today was actually a very important day from that regards because actually that that got implemented and pushed the price up um there was um you know the the the discussion to add go to the safety modu uh through the state go kind of option functionality and both the attempts that that was being discussed in the Forum U you know back in December I think it was in this last week where There Was the

onchain vote and it was implemented yesterday and you can see how that influenced the the price action right and that's I think because the expected amount of incentives that would be you know allocated to the safety module prar to the supply of goal that's out there um that Prov to be significant enough that create a a good buying pressure that pull the the price up I think to to some of um PA's comment comments these are some of the aspects that I think made a challenge for go to keep the peg or maintain the Peg and and cause that that's lose now these things that I've said talked about are not

necessarily you know part of the core a design of of go but you know they're part of the ecosystem and satellite right um like sto so I think you know things that that will definitely help it recover the peg um but when the cap is increased and we enable more Co supply to be borrowed I think uh that's where we will see you know what new challenges may you know may present themselves or whether you know some of the solutions that or some of the the tools that the community have found helpful this this far will still remain helpful once the supply is increased right because I mean there's going to be so much that you can

go with other incentives for the SA module right um so I think it's a great it has to be a great hope right now um but I can can't wait and I'm excited to see what's what's going to happen once we increase the supply and find more um utility uh cases for for the token well thank thank both both of you for your perspective I have a lot of comments to what you've been saying uh first of about what you Pablo mentioned about this not really been been a mistake and it's uh it's really good that you clarify it I think that uh now

that you have explained it it's more like any I well what's a synonym for mistake but things that don't go as planned and not only work for one specific protocol for example this is the this is a very huge example is like now um protocols such as maker such as the one that you're working with I can also just like you mention right now that what you should take into account and the reason that happens and what we should have done and you know things like that I think that these are the perfect situation that you see that or you notice that one partical success it's not just one partical success is if the whole

blockchain ecosystem success and one uh when let's not call it failure but when things on goas plan well it it could benefit also uh a lot of protocols because everyone learns from that um situation I'm not gonna say mistake anymore uh okay so that's that's that was one and then well let's not forget that go it's not that old you know actually even I per say it's not that old so uh yes now having said that and the situations that you have already mentioned in order to maintain in the peeg let's go now to the next one the next topic which I think um yeah Mr I think you have already mentioned

about the um the stake model of go if you can tell us how it will work and what stage of uh development it it is good yeah I can I can sh a few words about that um so are they know has um to cover for um bad dep and in shortfall scenarios they have implemented this um safety module where users had incentivized to look their assets and you know if there's a thr full event then after um governance discussion or governance

exercise there could be a decision to cover that um cold that bad de with funds from the safety model right in you can think about safety model as really a set of different moduls where this far um you know you may have heard of a or no sorry St a or the a a e PPT right from balancer um the the whole state go discussion really was to add go as another module to the safety model if you will um so so that's really what it is it is users locking go getting incentives for

it get incentivized for locking it there um with the understanding that there is a risk that the protocol May the da may decide to actually use that code to cover for shortfalls um it has been actually implemented already um it was if I not mistaken the smart contract Cent I think was deployed yesterday but the UI I think went up in the UI in the UI today um and and again if you look at any price chart foro you'll see that it has spiked and since then has the price has lower a little bit um but you can see the the influence that has had in

the in the market in go market and I guess in terms of parameters or how that looks like uh for state these um like I was saying this this um assets are locked for you know be used to cover a shortfall and that means that there are two parameters I think which are important uh if anybody's thinking about doing that which is the cool down and the percentage of potential slashing right so those two parameters for staygo module are 20 days for the cool down meaning that if you look um go in order to unstake it or unlock it you have to

wait 20 days and then the slashing the maximum amount of possible slashing is 100% which is different from the a St a which is I think 30% if I'm not mistaken um you so that means that if there is an event that the D decides to cover for it is possible that doesn't mean it's going to be for sure 100% but it's possible that the D decides to um You Know cover by slashing that module with 100% um those that slashing it's socialized with all of the people that have um locked go meaning losses are going to be

proportional um but that's that's kind of how it works I don't know if I I try to also give a general description of what the safety module is I guess but let me know if uh that wasn't that wasn't clear that was perfect that was good now the last question that I have like uh before the last last one it's for it's for Pablo and if you could tell us about the um the products by angle which are C which is the very wanted one and also uh Ag and like how was this implemented in the most relevant aspects of them sure

um so like a Euro it's Euro stable coin uh works really similarly as maker except like for slight differences in our price stability module like that I already mentioned or for differences in our CDP infrastructure um like it differs from maker volts um the and all of this contributes to making a and another difference is that uh and that power a is that our CDP infrastructure is live on different chains like uh AG is it's it's a cross chain stable coin by uh by Ence um and um so we uh this is how it

works and the protocol generates uh earns uh yield on its Reserve from people borrowing the stable coin and from tokenized Securities held by the protocol in its Reserve just like maker Has Its Real World asset uh infrastructure while Angel has its um like uh real world asset infrastructure as well that is based on tokenizers it also works differently from back well we earn a yield on our assets and a portion of this SE is automatically allocated to a Euro holders just like portion of the Year generated by the D ecosystem is allocated to SD holders well the same goes for St Euro holders which are people owning State

ago and these people are earning a yield which is currently at par with uh the risk free I mean the base yields from the the the Euro zone so this is uh for sto and you know you you could look into it as like an inter Bond or a form of wrapper built on top of money market funds in the sense that you can get in get out whenever you want you don't have to face uh like uh a Redemption period you don't have to face bank holidays or weekends before you you you can exit um but and it's you have a full transparency on where the yield is

coming from uh how the protocol is backed and the fact that this is fully sustainable as well for uh the protocol to offer this well thank you so much now the last question is that we we we have already know more about your work about your experience about your insights on uh the maker situation so having mentioned Also earlier about the now maker has only usdp as a stable C uh what would be like the most viable solution in the short term or in the long term uh

to I think we all know that having just one stable coin it's not a it's not beable so uh you have given light on on this aspect but let's let's be like I don't know if the wor realistic but with the situation in the current situation in maker what be like the possible solution to um it's kind of like risky to have one one stable coin cash stable coin so uh what would you do in this situation so for me it's better to have one stable coin than to have multiple stable coins and no mechanism to protect against the dpeg of one of the stable coins in reserves so it's either you keep one stable coin and I I would put

in the in the price stability module as well I would try to bring your real world asset infrastructure back on chain even though it's it's complex but so like authenticated users could get a claim on this and you don't have to trust arrangers because this is also a form of price stability module uh and yeah would rely on on multiple stable coins but with good divers good diversification mechanism so a revamped price stability module oh thank you so much Pablo I was actually um writing down but but this is uh just a reminder that this is also been recorded and these are very uh uh well not that technical right now

because they're explaining it but still it's a little bit hard to process if you're not a um I don't an expert in these topics um so that will be all I don't know if uh you guys would like to just say one last thing before we finish the this uh no no thanks and thanks for the invitation and you know the rest of the guys for joining and giving the space I guess to share some of the things we are doing or you know things that we are collaborating with in the space same same glad glad to have been invited today thanks guys for for having us and uh happy to to answer any question you might have like

synchronously or like help help makeer governance along the way propose like improve like make the ecosystem converge towards better Solutions overall I'm glad you said that because actually we are going to reach out probably because this is what we want to work on on this a specific part and that now that you have also point that out that uh uh that we can actually reach out yes you will definitely hear from us and uh no thank you guys and I'm not gonna let you take more of your time so that will be all of this part and I cannot believe that it has already happened an hour and this as I mentioned before this has a

lot of very technical stuff so we're going to stop in here but just just a reminder please that we are working on our guide um of security um Journey which is the C transparent which is the we are collecting data from 80s I'm going to share U our document but right now there is no call from ecosystem because this was very very very uh deep at least for me so uh that will be all guys and we are going to see uh next next Thursday thank you so much bye-bye thank you bye